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Appendix No. 7.

AUSTRALIA.

My dear Colonel Scratchley,

503

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Governor Sir IV. Jervois to Colonel Scratchley,

Marble Hill, near Adelaide, February 23, 1882.

I SEE in the "Argus" of the 10th instant a report of a lecture on the "Defence Force of Victoria," delivered in Melbourne on the previous evening by an officer of the volunteer force of the Colony, Captain Christopher. It appears that after the lecture there was a discussion thereon.

I wish to draw your attention to this lecture and discussion, because it seems to me that there is considerable force in the statement that the military force of Victoria should be rendered more efficient than it possibly can be under the present system.

All the training that the volunteers in Victoria acquire is obtained by drilling in their drill-sheds after dusk. They cannot expect to be efficient soldiers unless they give more time to their work, and are paraded and exercised by daylight. In my Report on the "Defences of Victoria," dated July 1877, to which I beg you will refer, I remarked that "the following points should be borne in mind in the organization of a force required for purely military purposes It is essential that powers should be obtained for retaining men for a fixed period of service, for continuous training in daylight during a certain number of days in the year, besides a certain number of drills at detached periods, for their permanent embodiment during war, for the strict enforcement of discipline, and for the appointment of officers only after passing a proper examination."

As observed by the lecturer, very good results have been obtained by the adoption of such prin- ciples in New South Wales. In South Australia also the volunteer corps is undoubtedly a very efficient body of troops; and, if funds can be provided by the Government of Victoria, I would strongly urge that a similar, or nearly similar, system should be adopted there. So far, it appears to me that the lecture of Captain Christopher may be very useful in drawing attention to the necessity for improved organization, discipline, and training for the military force of Victoria. I feel obliged, however, to dissent from some of the views expressed by th› lecturer. I see he wishes to have 3,000 well-trained troops, and that that force should be capable of expansion to 10,000 in case of war. Now, I think that the 2,700 recommended in my Report of July 1877, would, if properly trained, be an ample force to meet all contingencies.

I observe that it is assumed that 5,000 troops will be dispatched by the Government of Russia to attack Melbourne; it is supposed that ten fast steamers filled with infantry and artillery will be dis- patched singly, with orders to rendezvous at some place "out of the ordinary run of commerce, say, 200 miles south of Tasmania," and that when they had all assembled they would make a "sudden dash at Melbourne." It is also stated that the enemy's transport vessels will be powerfully aided by the guns of his fleet.

Now, with regard to this scheme of attack, I may first draw your attention to the fact that the Russian squadron of three men-of-war, which is now on a friendly visit to Melbourne, contains only about 600 men, only about half of whom could be landed for service on shore. But, to understand what is involved in the transport of 5,000 infantry and artillery, with the necessary appliances for war, take up the detailed Reports of Captain Mends, R.N., the officer who managed the transport of 25,000 British troops from Varna to Eupatoria in 1854, divide his numbers by five, and you will see approxi- mately what would be requisite for the transport and protection of the expedition of 5,000 men against Melbourne. Reflect, moreover, that the distance from Varna to Eupatoria is under 300 sea miles, whilst the distance from Petropaulovski to the proposed rendezvous to southward of Tasmania is about 6,000 miles. Where could such a force as that contemplated coal its ships? Even if an expedition against one of the Australian Colonies consisted only of two or three cruizers, it would be necessary to make special arrangements for coaling them, either by colliers at sea, or by establishing depôts of coal at some points intermediate between the point of departure and the object of attack. To suppose that such special arrangements for coaling the ships of a large expedition would be permitted by us involves the assumption that Great Britain has ceased to hold that command of the seas upon which the very existence of the British Empire depends.

As remarked in my Report of 1877, "there is no probability of an expedition on any extensive scale being dispatched against Australia. In the improbable event of Great Britain ceasing to hold the command of the seas, such an expedition might, perhaps, be undertaken with a view of subjugating the Colonies, finally annexing them, and instituting some form of despotic Government.

The very existence of the British Empire, however, depends upon her naval supremacy, and the question must obviously be considered on the assumption that that supremacy is, as undoubtedly it will be, maintained.

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In the event of Great Britain being engaged in hostilities with any great maritime Power, the enemy would retain the most powerful portion of his fleet in European waters, or in the Atlantic, for the protection of his country, or for operations in the immediate neighbourhood of hostilities. If he sent his fleet, or any considerable portion of it, on an expedition against the Australian Colonies, a sufficient part of our home fleet would in turn be set free to intercept it, and our squadrons in the Pacific, on the China, the Australian, and Indian stations might, if necessary, be concentrated to oppose it.

"But whilst the bulk of the enemy's naval forces would be occupied in the immediate scene of action in Europe or America, he might, no doubt, dispatch one or more cruizers to operate against our maritime commerce, or make a descent upon any of our Colonial possessions; and the Australian Colonies, owing to their wealth and prosperity, would, if undefended at certain points, be tempting objects of attack."

It is only against such an attack that the Australian Colonies have to provide.

The question as to what are the best, and, at the same time, the most economical measures to adopt, is so fully entered into in my Report of 1877, that I need not, therefore, repeat the argument

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