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Appendix No. 4.
HELIGOLAND.
hour by a fleet endeavouring to break the blockade, steaming 12 knots, and (in red), after deducting half-an-hour for transmitting signals, and half-an-hour for getting under weigh, the positions that could be reached by the iron-clads of the blockading squadron. There is little doubt that a fleet coming out of the narrow channels at the river mouths would be much delayed by the torpedoes and fire of the blockading gun-boats. As, however, it is difficult to estimate what allowance should be made for this, I have omitted it from consideration, and assumed that both fleets can steam at the same rate. On these assumptions, I find that only in the case of ships coming from the Jahde is it possible for a fleet to escape encountering the ships from Heligoland, and then only by steering one course can they get an hour's start of them. As, however, some ships might escape, I have indicated on the same diagram the distances a German fleet could cover in twelve hours, and the like distances from Harwich and Yarmouth Roads respectively that could be traversed by British ships intent on stopping them. My object in this was to illustrate the value of connecting Heligoland with England by cable. If we suppose this to be the case (and it was so connected a few years ago), it is, I think, evident that the German squadron would certainly be intercepted near the Texel if it had eluded the pursuit from Heligoland.
6. There are three separate anchorages for large ships sheltered by Heligoland and Sandy Island. The holding-ground is, I believe, not good, but whether or not a fleet availing itself of this shelter in heavy weather would be better situated than at sea in the open is a purely naval question I do not pretend to answer,
At the same time it is, I believe, well known that the French Admiral commanding the Blockading Squadron in 1870-71 (and who, consequently, was in a position to know) frequently pointed out to the late Governor what an advantage it would have been to him then if this island had been a French Possession.
7. In a recent article in the "Deutsche Rivere" on the Heligoland question, by Vice-Admiral von Henck, the advantages of its possession are forcibly explained, and I do not think I could more strongly illustrate the case for us than he does, if we reversed the conditions and suppose that England's advantage and Germany's disadvantage is the question to be considered. He states that Heligoland is the key to the German naval arsenals on the Jahde and to the great channels of the Elbe and the Weser (and might have added equally so to the ship canal which is to connect the Baltic and North Seas, and which is to come out in the Eider).
He considers if Heligoland were protected by batteries and provided with appliances for sub- marine defences it would be a most effective support for maritime operations against a fleet attacking the North German coast.
The one point on which I differ from Admiral von Henck is that it can be of no use whatever to England.
8. The second point, which renders it valuable from a defensive point of view, is that the plateau which forms the largest portion of the island, is at the top of a rock 160 to 120 feet high, with cliffs almost vertical, and practically only accessible by a flight of steps from 10 to 12 feet wide.
On the accompanying tracing,* from a plan of Heligoland done in 1854 by a Prussian engineer officer, I have marked two or three places where, although very difficult, yet, owing to accumulations of débris froin frosts and small landslips, the ascent of the cliffs does not appear to me to be impossible. Our experiences at Majuba Hill have taught us two lessons which I think should not be lost sight of: 1st, that if unopposed it is possible to escalade the most inaccessible looking places; and 2nd, that the defence is most difficult, if, for want of entrenching, the defenders have to fight at the edge of the cliff; the only remedies are to increase the natural difficulties by scarping the doubtful places, and endeavour to so arrange your defences as to flank the cliffs and landing-places from such points as will be least exposed to direct fire.
Having in view the present small number and probable paucity of defenders even in time of war, it would, in my opinion, be very advantageous if two gatlings were obtained from England on carriages that would allow of considerable depression for this work of flanking the cliffs and streets of the lower town. Gatlings require a small gun detachment, and have the effect of a crushing musketry fire for local defence.
9. The only approach to the upper town is by a flight of 200 steps cut in the rock and the side revetted with brickwork.
This work was done some years ago by the Home Government, and it is unfortunate that neither drawbridge and drop-ditch, flanking loopholes, or even a defensible barrier gate at the top were provided. In the Danish time, and even as late as 1858, a block-house existed at the head of the steps, which was used as a guard-house and store, and commanded the passage.
The position of this building is so important that it is greatly to be regretted it should ever have been allowed to pass from Government into private hands. The old building has been replaced by a three-storied lodging-house, which would on an emergency serve as a barrack, but only the basement of which could be strengthened so as to be of use in a bombardment.
10. The armament consists of three 40-pounder breech-loading Armstrong guns with limbers and 200 rounds of ammunition; two 12-pounder breech-loading Armstong, naval pattern field carriage, and 200 rounds; twenty-five Snider rifles and bayonets, with 150 rounds per rifle; no belts or pouches; twenty-five Enfield rifles complete, with bayonets, belts, and pouches, and 112 rounds per rifle; besides the six Martini-Henry rifles and six revolvers belonging to the coastguard.
I would suggest that all the small arms should be of the same pattern, and that the Sniders and Enfields be exchanged for Martini-Henry rifles.
The guns are distributed--two, viz., one 40-pounder and one 12-pounder, at the south point; three in the gun-shed to the north of the town.
Seeing that guns of this calibre cannot be expected to produce much result on ships, I should have thought it better to place at least one more 40-pounder at the south point to resist a landing on the beach.
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