CAB7-4 — Page 75

Page 75

47

Page 75

40

Brigade Royal Artillery men to look after the guns (I am asking for one). I am, and shall be, most Appendix No. 4. careful to avoid anything like offending German susceptibilities, so except to yourself do not mention the matter, taking care to make all subjects that can in the slightest degree be considered English the

HELIGOLAND. subject of confidential despatches, as I have not a soul who could even copy such a letter; Gatke is German, so are the doctor, both clergymen, and whole school staff (one the paid Prussian Meteorological Observer); Maxse, whose wife was German, and who lived mostly in German society, though thoroughly English at heart, as shown by his despatches, would probably not notice many little things which strike a stranger having no such proclivities; however, the feeling of the people is being, I fear, gradually allowed to drift, as it eventually must do, except England makes some exertion, towards Germany. We must not forget that the Heligolanders were ever Germans, and were far more Danish originally, hence our object should be to, in my opinion, Anglicise them as much as possible, and give them openings in England or in our Colonies; while, if possible, the English element, both in officials and in increasing our overworked coast-guard, or in rendering them assistance by means of Royal Artillery Coast Brigade, if only by a very few men, would be a great advantage, the former alternative, as being less liable to attract attention abroad, being preferable of the two.

8. I hope the Report may meet with your approval, and that you will be enabled to make use of it.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed)

J. T. N. O'BRIEN.

P.S.-My brother may have to leave with this, so I send you the Report at once in case you wish to refer to it for further information when he calls on you. I have kept no copy, but should be glad to place one on record among the confidential letters of the Office.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Major O'Brien to Governor O'Brien.

J. T. N. O'B.

"

(Confidential.) Sir,

Heligoland, February 1882. IN compliance with your request I have the honour to submit for your consideration a Memo- randum on the present defenceless state of this island, and on the general question of its capabilities for defence, should it at any time be the policy of the Imperial Government to entertain this subject.

1. The geographical position of Heligoland offers, in the event of war with Germany, such immense strategic advantages to us, and would be such a thorn in our enemy's side, that, in spite of its- liability to distant bombardment (as are Malta, Gibraltar, and other small places), I look upon its retention and armament as a matter of Imperial necessity.

Unless it is held that, under no possible circumstances, will it ever again be to England's advan- tage to control the action of the fleets of the nation possessing the North German ports, as was the case during the French occupation in 1806-1813, then I consider it would be of great value to us to retain Heligoland.

If, in the days of sailing-vessels, and before the development of telegraphs and signalling, it was found to be worth our while to capture the island in 1807, it is doubly valuable to us now that these appliances would enable us to blockade a whole group of important ports in an efficient manner, and yet be able to shelter our heavy ships in these roads.

2. Its advantages are, first, its central position with regard to the mouths of the Rivers Eider, Elbe, Weser, and Jahde; and, secondly, its being secure against a coup de main if held by a very small garrison. Its defects are that the town can be destroyed by distant bombardment, that there is no regular harbour sheltered in all weathers for ships of large draught, and that, owing to its small size, it must, if blockaded, surrender at the end of a few weeks for want of provisions.

3. That Heligoland must eventually belong to the Power that is mistress of the sea is obvious, yet, in these days of short wars, the Power of retaining an advantageous position for a few weeks during the temporary absence of the fleet would be invaluable.

4. As regards its position, the distance from the mouths of the Rivers Jahde, Weser, Elbe, and Eider is rather under 20 nautical miles, i.e., from 14 to 12 hour's steam.

The light on the Heligoland lighthouse (230 feet above the sea) is visible in clear weather to a distance of 20 miles, so that its possession offers great facilities for signalling between a squadron anchored under shelter of this island and its outposts, or advanced gun-boats in or near the mouths of the rivers. Of course intermediate vessels, for passing on signals, would be required at intervals, depending on the clearness of the atmosphere; but possession of a fixed point of observation at such an altitude must be a great advantage, especially in the present day, when ships prepared for fighting are obliged to lower their masts, &c., and thus greatly diminish their range of observation. I believe that with an efficient system of signals, and sufficiently numerous look-out vessels, a fleet might avail itself of the shelter afforded by Heligoland, and yet efficiently blockade the rivers, ie., be able to meet and check any attempt to break out within three hours of the enemy's ships being sighted.

The mouth of the Jahde being furthest away from here, is the one exception to this, if we suppose the ships take a south-westerly direction and keep close in shore. This difficulty would have to be met by a more formidable line of gun-boats at this point.

5. In illustration of my meaning I would ask you to examine the diagram on the chart* of the North Sea. In it I have shown (in blue) the positions that could be reached in each successive half- * Not printed,

Page 75

.

Page 75

Page 75Page 76