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Dominion of Canada, which was bound by Order in Council to use all its influence to secure the continual maintenance of the naval station at Esquimalt, whether these defences should be undertaken by the Dominion or continued, as at present, by the Home Government.
In war, or a prospect of war, the Commander-in-chief on the station would at once concentrate his squadron, most probably at Esquimalt, ready to act against any enemy intending to attack our commerce or local interests, and Her Majesty's Government would have it in its power to telegraph to the Admiral in command, directing him to act on any special locality on the western coast of America, or to proceed to China.
It must, however, be borne in mind that a squadron could not by any possibility steam direct for China, 5,600 miles distant, against the prevailing westerly winds, but would have to proceed to a more southern latitude to gain the north-east trades, probably in latitude 18° north; this circuitous route from Vancouver to Hong Kong would be over 8,000 miles in length, and the only place to obtain coal would be at the Sandwich Islands. In fact, this passage would probably have to be made almost entirely under sail.
I consider this proposal to remove the Pacific squadron is not within the scope of the instructions under which the Commission is acting, for it is one which would require the special consideration of the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, and is, in my opinion, an interference with the Executive Departments of the State.
(Signed)
A. MILNE.
I agree with Admiral Sir Alexander Milne in considering that the present Pacific squadron should not be transferred to the China command, and that the naval station at Esquimalt ought not to be abandoned.
(Signed)
HENRY BARKLY.
Having been required by the Government to proceed to Ireland early in May, I was unavoidably absent from the later meetings of the Commis- sion at which the trade routes Nos. 5, 6, and 7 were considered. I have not therefore been able to go into the financial details involved in the recom- mendations in regard to these routes, but in the general conclusions re- specting them (as in the other general recommendations) I entirely agree.
(Signed) R. G. C. HAMILTON.
Additional Memorandum relating to Merchant Steamers.
WHILE concurring entirely in the opinions expressed in paragraph 19 of the Second Report of the Commission, that a preference given to fast British merchant-steamers in time of peace, coupled with a more exclusive employ- ment in time of war for the transport of troops and Government stores, would go far to prevent their transfer to a foreign Power, and to insure their being constructed so as to enable them to receive moderate armaments,
1270.
we question whether a pledge of this nature and the mere provision of Key, 1746-47, 1752. suitable armaments to be stored for such ships in different ports would Barnaby, 1248, 1256–57, satisfy the condition laid down by the Commission in the second paragraph of that Report, that any measures adopted for the protection of the vast amount of British property afloat upon the outbreak of war "should be of such a nature and so organized as to be immediately available."
The experience of the Russian preparations in 1878 points to the necessity of vessels of this nature being able to defend themselves on the voyages on which they may happen to be engaged at the outbreak of war. The mere provision of guns and their fitments at certain points abroad will not insure this end. The ships will be subjected to risks in going to the Key, 1748. specified ports, and to loss of valuable time in fitting and arming; there
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