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The Chinese authorities are not at present capable of working a railway efficiently for military purposes, and during the 1911 revolution all big train movements were arranged by the European staffs of railways. In the event of China contemplating an offensive movement against Hong Kong it is reasonable to assume that they would be able to count on the services of sufficient Europeans hostile to British interests in China to admit of the efficient working of the railway to the limit of its capacity.
6. A summary of the railway rolling stock available is given in Appendix (A).
7. Assuming that only the rolling stock belonging to the Chinese Section is available in Chinese territory when the authorities decide to send a force against Hong Kong, that passenger stock only is used for the transport of troops, and that the carriages are only filled to their normal capacity, it should be easy for the Chinese to place 4,000 men on the frontier within forty-eight hours of the outbreak of hostilities, to follow them up with detachments of 2,000 men every twenty-four hours, and to keep them supplied there pending the arrival of artillery, transport, and reinforcements, which might be expected to be concentrated at Sham Chun on the tenth day, supposing that all the transport had to march from Canton.
It is, however, reasonable to assume that the Chinese arrangements for collecting and organizing transport are not at present very perfect, and it is doubtful whether they would be successful in collecting quickly more than is necessary to equip and maintain a force of 4,000 men with three batteries of artillery.
Assuming, therefore, that the Chinese have made no previous movements in preparation, and that all troops have to move from Canton, it is considered that they could have a force of 4,000 men, with 18 guns and sufficient transport, ready to cross the frontier on the eleventh day after the decision to attack Hong Kong was arrived at.
8. It is, however, probable that such an enterprise would have been under consideration for some time previously, and that troops would have been moved to the frontier, and transport collected, on the pretext of manœuvres or the necessity for preserving internal order.
In such a case it would be possible for the Chinese to collect a striking force of 4,000 men and 18 guns quietly on the frontier beforehand, and to deliver an attack on the land front of Hong Kong within 24 hours of the receipt of the order to advance.
9. The conclusions arrived at may be summarized as follows:-
(1.) It is improbable that any Power other than China could dispatch a raiding force of more than 2,000 men against Hong Kong under present conditions.
(2.) China can at the present moment dispatch a force of at least 4,000 men and 18 guns against Hong Kong.
(3.) Owing to inferior leading, the value of these troops is at present less than that of European troops.
(4.) Lack of sea-power confines China's power of attack to the land front, and consequently it would be possible to concentrate the whole of the infantry garrison of Hong Kong on the mainland to meet a Chinese advance, provided that the civil police were sufficiently powerful to maintain order unaided.
(5.) The Chinese army is improving rapidly in training, discipline, equipment, and organization, and will be able in the course of time to increase the force which can be dispatched against Hong Kong to such an extent as to necessitate the provision of an infantry garrison considerably greater than that at present available.
10. The length of time necessary for China to attain its full power of attack depends on the progress made in the civil development of the country. A very definite increase in her power will probably be apparent in 1915, when through connection by rail between Peking, Canton, and Kowloon is established.
General Staff, War Office.
[160]
January 6, 1912.
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