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18. For most of these posts there is the excuse of a warlike population to keep in check, but no such pretexts can for a moment be offered for the Bismarckburg and Siwa bomas. The tribes within reach of them are of the most unwarlike character.
19. In North Eastern Rhodesia we have no troops, and each British boma has from ten to twenty-five slovenly and untrained police carrying rifles. In Nyasaland there is a wing of a battalion of the King's African Rifles. But they are all stationed in the south of the territory, and a large proportion are on detachment, whence it would take several days to recall them. It would take several more days to transport them to the north end of Lake Nyassa. I do not think they would be available there with the greatest efforts under three weeks. Years ago our troops were concentrated in South Nyassa region, presumably to overawe the Yaos, Angoni, &c., but all threats from such a source have long since disappeared. Now there is urgent necessity for large military posts, on, or within easy reach of North Nyassa, and the northern frontier of Rhodesia, at Abercorn. A wing of a battalion of the King's African Rifles would, however, be useless and dangerous. One and a-half battalions at Karonga, and a half battalion at Abercorn, with a good complement of machine-guns, and small field or mountain artillery would only just meet the necessity.
20. In the event of hostilities, an inroad of German troops into our unprotected northern territories would have a disastrous effect on our native population, as it would be difficult to persuade them that strategic considerations elsewhere did not make it worth while our defending our own territory. This, I know, the Germans count on.
21. I believe the same quiet concentration has been going on along the frontier of British East Africa and Lake Victoria. Few movements of troops actually take place, and this is done slowly and quietly, but facilities and preparations for a sudden concentration have been the most notable features of the work of the last sixteen months.
22. It must be noted that, unlike ours, every German boma is a fort, which could give an excellent account of itself against even well-led troops, if unassisted by artillery.
23. The total strength of the German regular troops is stated at 2,500, the police at 1,500. The ruggaruggas are not mentioned.
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I have, &c.
(Signed)
H. 8. LAMOND HEMMING,
Captain, late 3rd E. Lancs. Regt.
No. 2.
Notes by the General Staff on Captain Hemming's Report on the Military Forces in German
East Africa.
CAPTAIN HEMMING'S report throws some interesting light on the German military dispositions in East Africa.
2. With regard to the paragraph 21, in the Addendum III, of May 1908, to the military report on German East Africa, the distribution of the companies was given as published in the
latest official " Jahresbericht.”
The conclusion drawn in the addendum was that the troops were distributed with a view to concentration in case of native risings:
(1.) At. Dar-es-Salaam (coast).
(2.) In the Tabora District (centre). (3.) In the Ruanda District (N,W.).
3. Since May 1908 there has been some difficulty about determining the positions of the German companies; the official "Jahresbericht" no longer gives the stations, and the difficulty is further increased by the existence of some 1,700 native police, besides various irregular levies regarding whose establishment and distribution nothing is known.
4. According to the latest Estimates the strength of the forces in April 1910 was :—
Military Forces—
Europeans
Natives
::
***
Police-
Europeans Natives
፧፧
::
Grand total
***
DID
With 42 field-guns, 22 machine-guns.
:
283 2,528
2,811
42
1,700
1,742
4,553
The military forces were organised in 14 companies besides a recruit depôt, a machine gun detachment, and a signalling detachment.
5. With regard to the possible intention of the Germans, the following points, summarised from the enclosed report and from some others, appear to be worth considering.
(a) The German officers are continually drilling their troops, even (as reported in one case), neglecting native raids in order to spend more time on drill.
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