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the other hand there is a vast Asiatic population which necessitates the maintenance of a considerable British garrison, as well as a large Native army. In certain contingencies the British garrison might have to be largely reinforced. In other contingencies British and Native troops from India might be made temporarily available in the future, as they have been in the past, for expeditionary action outside India. India is comparatively immune from the risk of invasion from the sea, on account of the difficulty of landing along the coast line, except at the principal ports which are well fortified, and of its possessing an army sufficient under normal internal conditions to repel invasion.
The prospect of the Dominions or India being liable to organized attack from the sea seems at present remote, as they are far distant from the conceivable bases of such attack, and in proportion as their land forces are strong and efficient, invasion from the sea becomes more hazardous, and has to be undertaken on a larger scale. Moreover, the risk has been minimized, for the time being, by our alliance with Japan and our good relations with the United States. So far as Canada is concerned, the Monroe doctrine has also to be taken into account.
Two years ago His Majesty's Government urged the Governments of the Dominions so to organize and train their respective land forces as to render those forces capable not only of self-defence, but also of furnishing contingents for expeditionary action in war in support of the Regular Army. Some progress has since been made in this direction. Canada and Australia have also begun to create navies of their own, the idea apparently being that these navies should be used not only for local defence, but for the reinforcement of the British Navy, should the Governments of the Dominions concerned place them for for this purpose at the disposal of His Majesty's Government.
It is submitted that in the circumstances the military advice given was sound and consistent with the guiding principles of Imperial defence. For Canada and South Africa an adequate land force is an obvious necessity. For Australia and New Zealand the immediate necessity may not be so obvious, but the people demanded the creation of such a force, and in view of the naval and military situation in the Pacific their demand was not unreasonable. When sufficient land forces are available in the several Dominions it seems probable that the task devolving upon the British Navy of guarding the Dominions from organized attack from the sea will be lightened, and that the Dominion Governments will be less reluctant to place their navies at the disposal of the Admiralty for combined operations.
When the several Dominions became self-governing communities it was reasonable to expect that they would recognize their obligation to share in the defence of the Empire by taking steps to raise local land forces with the object of maintaining internal tranquillity, protecting their seaports, guarding, as far as their resources would admit, against external attack, and participating, should they think fit, in military operations outside their own territories. It was perhaps equally reasonable to expect that, according to their means, they would be prepared to contribute towards the cost of the British Navy, or to raise local navies, which in war would come under the control of the Admiralty. These two obligations have to some extent been met, the latter, how- ever, in a less degree than the former. It is suggested that the reason is that the Dominions have been assured of the competence of the British Navy to protect them against organized attack from the sea in all circumstances, that it is not easy for them to provide naval personnel from their own population, and that whereas the funds allotted to local land defence are expended within the several Dominions, the funds allotted in support of sea command are mostly expended outside the Dominions.
I have already shown or tried to show that the organization by the Dominions of land forces for local defence, the protection of their ports, and so forth, has been so much to the good from a naval as well as a military staudpoint; and that their contribution of money or ships to the general naval defence of the Empire is likely to be equally valuable. So long, however, as the population of a Dominion is nervous about its own safety from sea or land attack, it is improbable that its Government will spare any of its troops for expeditionary action in support of the Regular Army, or any of its ships for co-operation with the British Navy. The Dominions would be very ill-advised in not placing their ships at the disposal of the Admiralty, but we must take human nature as we find it. If to prevent them from being nervous about their own safety we too con- fidently assure Australia and New Zealand that they are not open to serious attack from the sea, we shall discourage them from taking measures for self-defence on land and from contributing in ships or money to the British Navy. If in view of the present political situation we assure Canada that attack from the sea by the United States fleet is most improbable, land attack by the United States army must be equally improbable, and we thus stultify our advice that Canada should organize an army capable of guarding
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