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its land frontier, and also discourage any efforts which Canada may be ready to make in support of the British Navy. For, if that Navy is in itself sufficient, why should the Dominions exert themselves to strengthen it either for local or Imperial purposes, except on sentimental grounds? South Africa is different. Its first task is to organize and train its land forces; and until this has been done and the memory of the war has died out, it may be doubted whether the Union will be willing to make a substantial contribution to the British Navy or to allow its troops to take part in expeditionary action outside South Africa.

In this matter a middle course seems best. While on the one hand, we should not exaggerate, on the other hand we should not minimize, the risks to which the several Dominions might be exposed in war; and for that reason I ventured to deprecate the statement in some recent memoranda by the Colonial Defence Committee to the effect that the responsibility for protecting all British territory from organized invasion from the sea reata solely with the Admiralty. Whether strictly correct or not, the statement seems inopportune, because its acceptance by the Dominions will tend to check the instinct of self-defence which renders young and growing nations virile and vigorous, as well as the patriotism which ought to induce every part of the Empire to take its due share in the obligation of Imperial defence. If it is permissible to differentiate in such a matter, I should say that sea command is vitally essential to the United Kingdom for the purpose of home defence and of free access to our home ports of our seaborne trade. It is hardly less essential to the United Kingdom and the Empire for the purpose of free communication between the United Kingdom and the oversea Dominions, India, and our Colonial possessions. Moreover, without it expeditionary action could not be taken or reinforcements despatched to any threatened point, and the defences of our naval bases abroad could not be adequately maintained. It is submitted, however, that less urgent or immediate importance attaches to the defence by the Navy of India and the Dominions against organized attack from the sea, because first, the danger is somewhat remote, secondly, the danger can to a great extent be guarded against by the existence of local military forces, and thirdly, the Dominions and India in regard to food supply are self-supporting.

As regards the United Kingdom itself, it is possible that the naval view may be right and that our naval strength in home waters and the steps taken by the Admiralty for the protection of our coasts may be sufficient to protect this country against invasion on a large or small scale. Nevertheless, the British public are not convinced of this, they prefer to have two strings to their bow; and unless a reasonably adequate land force, specifically assigned to home defence is available, it is to be feared that in the event of war popular clamour would demand that an unduly large part of the Navy should be tied down to the sedentary defence of home waters, and that the bulk of the Regular troops which are intended for expeditionary action or the reinforcement of our oversea garrisons, should be kept at home.

In conclusion, I submit the following statement of strategic policy which, if acceptable to the Admiralty, might perhaps serve as a basis for the discussion of the question at the Imperial Conference. No reference is made therein to the military co-operation of the land forces of the Dominions with the Regular Army outside their respective territories, that point having been discussed in considerable detail at the late Defence Conference.

It is the aim of the Admiralty not only to keep open and safe the lines of sea communication throughout the Empire, but also to protect the United Kingdom, the oversea Dominions, India, and other possessions of the Crown, against organized invasion from the sea. The attainment of this object has been rendered more onerous of late years by the rapid growth of the navies of foreign Powers. To facilitate its attainment it is desirable that the land forces of the Dominions should be of such strength, and so organized and trained, as to be capable not only of defending the principal ports of each Dominion, and of guarding against raids, but also of obliging an enemy contemplating the invasion of a Dominion to come in such force that there would be no chance of his transports evading our fleets. It is equally desirable that the Dominions should endeavour, so far as their resources will permit, to strengthen the naval forces of the Empire, either by contributing to the cost of the British Navy, or by creating names of their own, which would be available for local sea defence, or, preferably, should the Dominion Gorernments so determine, would co-operate with the British Navy, under the control of the Admiralty, for the general defence of the Empire.

29th March, 1911.

W.G. N.

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