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SECRET.
THE PROPOSED STRENGTHENING OF THE DUTCH COAST
DEFENCES.
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY,
THE Foreign Office has forwarded to the Committee for circulation copies of memorandum, prepared by Mr. Parker, respecting the proposal to fortify Flushing, with the request that the strategical aspects of the proposed strengthening of the Dutch defences in general, and of Flushing in particular, may be considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence from the point of view of British interests in war. The memorandum by Mr. Parker, together with the minutes thereon, may be taken provisionally as reflecting the views of the Foreign Office.
2. From the British naval and military point of view the proposed strengthening of the Dutch coust defences presents two main aspects-firstly, their general effect on the strategical conditions in a war between the British and the German Empires; and, secondly, their particular effect on the strategical conditions of warlike operations which might be undertaken by us in defence of Belgian neutrality.
3. The Dutch may have undertaken these measures of defence from one of the following motives :—
(1.) To secure the neutrality of the Netherlands against all comers in all good faith. (2.) From fear of the misuse of their harbours by German vessels operating against the United Kingdom.
(3.) From fear of a similar misuse of their harbours by the United Kingdom operating against Germany.
(4.) Under pressure from Germany, ostensibly for one of the reasons given above, but really to insure to Germany the use of Dutch harbours in time of war.
4. The opinion has been advanced in German periodical literature that the United Kingdom would disregard the neutrality of the Netherlands in a war with Germany- in the first place, because a blockade of the German North Sea ports could not be maintained successfully from naval bases so far distant as the British coast; and, in the second, because a British commercial blockade would lose much of its effect upon German trade if the neutral ports of the Netherlands were left open to commerce in neutral bottoms. It is for the Admiralty to say if the necessities of our naval strategy are in any way likely to make such action on our part desirable, or otherwise.
5. In view of the weakness of the Dutch land defences and of the Dutch army, any such operations on our part would probably lead to an immediate occupation of the country by a German army, and whether the war ended in a formal withdrawal of the German forces or not, it is probable that German influence in the Netherlands would be so far strengthened that some form of union between the Netherlands and the German Empire would resuit. The Committee of Imperial Defence has recorded the opinion that it would be prejudicial to our interests for Germany to obtain permanent possession of Holland. It will be a matter, therefore, for His Majesty's Government to decide whether temporary naval strategical advantages, if any, are or are not outweighed by disadvantages which may become permanent.
6. The suggestion has been made that the German Government has put pressure upon the Dutch Government with a view to the creation of these fortifications, not for defensive purposes, but with the intention of making use of the ports thus defended as advanced bases for German naval operations against the United Kingdom. In this case
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