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the naval strategical advantages to Germany, together, perhaps, with the prospect of a permanent occupation of the Netherlands, must be weighed against the disadvantage of the certainty of a British commercial blockade of Dutch ports. Possibly the German estimate of the probability of the British respecting the neutrality of the Netherlands

any case may here be the deciding factor.

in

it

7. Turning now to that aspect of the question which is bound up more particularly with the bearing of the fortification of Flushing on the defence of Belgian neutrality, may be said at once that the question of the legal right of the Netherlands to forbid or to permit access to Antwerp by the River Scheldt is little likely to weigh with the Power, which is, ex hypothesi, already infringing the neutrality of Belgium. The Dutch will permit the passage of the forces of the guaranteeing Powers at their own peril, so far as Germany is concerned. On the other hand, if the guaranteeing Powers force the hands of the Dutch, they may drive them permanently into the arms of Germany.

Apart, however, from such a matter of high policy, it is open to question whether the fortification or non-fortification of Flushing affects the strategical aspects of the question, even on the assumption that His Majesty's Government resolve on the dispatch of a military expedition.

8. It is hardly conceivable that, in present circumstances, we are likely to be called on alone to aid the Belgians in the preservation of the integrity of their country. Should that be the case, we should, of course, be confined to Belgian ports as landing places; but, in the more probable contingency of our acting in co-operation with France, alternative landing-places would be open to us, and might even be preferable on broad military strategical grounds.

A discussion of the advantages or disadvantages of the alternative lines of operation open to a British military expedition (assuming that His Majesty's Government had decided to dispatch such an expedition) cannot, however, be undertaken usefully until the Admiralty are able to indicate the probable naval conditions.

9. The concentration of a British army in the vicinity of Antwerp, which the Committee of Imperial Defence has directed the General Staff to be prepared to carry out if required, is a military operation requiring most careful adjustment for its successful accomplishment. Rapidity and certainty are essential to its usefulness, and nothing can be left to chance. But, before these plans can be laid, the governing naval conditions must be determined. The Committee require to know :—

(1.) Whether the Admiralty can assure to the transports crossing the North Sea to Belgian ports reasonable security against interference by German ships of war between, say, the fourth and twentieth days after the declaration of war, or the order to mobilise.

(2.) Whether it is possible or probable that access to Antwerp by the West Scheldt could be prevented by a vessel being sunk in the river or by mines or otherwise.

(3.) Whether the general conditions of the river are favourable to the protection of the transports by fire from war-vessels against attack from the banks during their passage up the river.

10. If the reply to the first of these questions be in the negative, it is decisive against the use of Antwerp or any other Belgian port as a landing-place for the British army, and unfavourable answers to the remaining questions would go far to outweigh any balance of military advantage which a landing at Antwerp might offer.

If the balance of advantage be against the use of Antwerp as a sea base for a British army, it is immaterial, from a military point of view, whether Flushing be fortified or not.

The naval strategical aspects of this particular problem are included in the more general problem indicated above.

C. L. OTTLEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens,

April 3, 1911.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY J. W. HARRI»OK.—10/4/1911.

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