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APPENDIX VII.
but necessarily short duration immediately following. Enemy vessels finding them- selves in this situation are liable to capture, and it was in former times the general practice of this and other nations, when hostilities seemed imminent, to prevent the departure of such ships by placing an embargo upon them. On war subsequently breaking out the ships would be seized and adjudicated upon by the prize courts.
4. The question whether and to what extent this practice of laying hands on enemy vessels remains open to belligerents to-day must be considered in the first instance with special reference to the terms of the "Convention relative to the Status of Enemy merchant-ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities," concluded at The Hague in 1907, the operative clauses of which are reprinted as an aunex to the present paper (see Appendix VIII).
5. The convention deals with what is generally known as Days of Grace." The practice of general embargoes, as above described, was first deliberately departed from on the outbreak of the Crimean War. Then, and in all subsequent wars, enemy ships in national ports were permitted to depart, after loading or discharging cargo, within a specified time, acquiring temporary immunity from capture on the high seas on certain conditions. It was much debated at the second peace conference in 1907 whether the uniform custom of the preceding half-century had invested the grant of days of grace with the character of a generally binding rule of international law,
6. The first article of the convention ultimately signed constituted a compromise between the views of those Powers which wished to make the grant of days of grace obligatory, and of those which, whilst approving the observance of the practice as a general rule, yet insisted on its being in each case considered an act of grace or favour, and on belligerents remaining at liberty to withhold such favour, if there were good reasons to justify this departure from the normal course.
7. In view of the decidedly preponderating opinion in favour of the obligatory character of the rule, it may be anticipated that if at the outbreak of a war Great Britain were altogether to refuse to allow any days of grace, such a decision, though not a breach of codified international law, would expose her to angry denunciation abroad and that she would be expected to justify it. No doubt the party most directly affected would be the enemy, who has no means of showing his resentment except by reprisals, and the mere continuation of the war. But the interests of neutrals are likely to be involved more or less seriously in the presence of neutral cargo or passengers on board of the vessels to be detained. It is generally politic to treat neutral interests with the utmost consideration, even at the risk of some inconvenience or pecuniary sacrifice. It should also be remembered that the United States of America declined to sign the convention because it was in their opinion less liberal to enemy merchantmen than the practice of nations had been since the days of the Crimean War. A refusal to grant days of grace would therefore be regarded with particular disfavour at Washington.
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8. Having regard to the foregoing observations, it will be for the sub-committer to consider in what particular circumstances it would advise that "days of grace should be either allowed or refused. It will probably be found advantageous to approach the problem from several different points, and to distinguish, as factors materially affecting the decision in each case, (1) between possible wars with particular countries or groups of countries, with or without allies; (2) between different moments or seasons at which war may break out; and (3) between particular classes or sizes of merchant-vessels.
9. As regards the third of these distinctions, it is to be noted that article 5 of the convention already quoted excludes from its operation all merchant-vessels " which show by their build that they are intended for conversion into war-ships." The wording is not altogether free from ambiguity, but it would certainly justify the refusal of any special privileges to vessels which there was good reason to assume would, if allowed to depart, be eventually employed by the enemy in his naval or military operations.
H-ENEMY Vessels at Sea, UNAWARE OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.
10. In accordance with article 3 of the Days of Grace convention, enemy ships encountered at sea before they are aware of the outbreak of war may not be
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