Page 54
Page 54
Z
شكو مشو
巍
Sir,
29
Enclosure 2.
General Oficer Commanding to Governor,
Head-quarters, Hong Kong, December 7, 1908. IN reply to your Excellency's secret letter of the 28th November, with enclosure from Commander-in-Chief, China Station, I beg to point out that a Report on the recommendations contained in the latter is beyond the scope of the Local Defence Committee, which only deals with the employment of personnel and material as allotted.
The following are my remarks on the proposals:-
1. Night Anchorage for Fleet in Chung Kwango.-I quite agree and presume that the navy would require no land assistance for its security beyond that which would be given by the guns and lights of the Eastern Entrance.
2. Submarine Mines.—I thoroughly agree with the Commander-in-Chief's strictures on the withdrawal of the mines without providing the submarine boats which it was apparently the intention to substitute for them.
Paragraphs 11-13 deal with probable result of an engagement between battle-ships and the forts, and on this point the Commander-in-Chief's views seem incontrovertible, provided it is granted that such an engagement is reasonably probable: I read that the "Class A" attack by battle-ships, to which the Colonial Defence Memorandum of the 15th March, 1907, declares Hong Kong to be liable, refers to a long-range bombardment of docks, &c., and not to an attack on forts-the latter having been considered a contingency so improbable as to be negligible.
Paragraphs 15-17 deal with the adoption of 9-2-inch guns instead of 12-inch and with the absence of protection in the form of cupolas. Neither of these is a local peculiarity; the principle that 9-2-inch have advantages over 12-inch guns which more than compensate for loss of power, and that shielded guns in open positions similarly have advantages over guns protected by cupolas which compensate for loss of protection, is, I believe, accepted in the armament of all British fortresses.
I quite agree with the Commander-in-Chief's statement that Hong Kong is at the mercy of any country such as America which is in a position to land 10,000 troops; it cannot be said, however, that Sam Shui Wau and Taitam Bay are devoid of defences or protection of any kind, as they are provided on mobilization by moveable armaments and infantry detachments. That these defences would be insufficient against a force such as he names is true.
As regards the dangers of hostilities being opened with a hostile fleet lying in the harbour, certain guns still bear on the inner anchorage, but I should think torpedoes and submarines would be a greater deterrent to such an attempt than any guns,
In arriving at the defensive necessities of Hong Kong the Colonial Defence Committee were presumably guided by considerations of Imperial strategy, and without access to these it is difficult to discuss the class of attack against which this colony should be protected.
Except in the case of a war with China or Japan one cannot imagine the capture of Hong Kong a primary objective of an enemy, and, if it were not so, it is inconceivable that such irreplaceable weapons as battle-ships would be risked in attempts to silence the forts.
If Hong Kong is to hold out for even a few weeks against an attack in which battle-ships and a serious landing force are employed-by serious, I mean something bigger than a raid--then besides additions to the fixed armament, the garrison should be increased to at least ten battalions. A landing on the mainland would be the most tempting line for an attack on Hong Kong.
I have, &c.
(Signed) R. G. BROADWOOD, Major-General,
Commanding the Troops, South China.
Page 54
Enclosure 3.
Sir,
Naval Commander-in-Chief to Governor.
66
King Alfred," at Hong Kong, December 11, 1908.
I HAVE the honour to thank your Excellency for showing me Major-General Broadwood's letter of the 7th instant, on which I beg to offer the following remarks:--
I am well aware that other British fortresses besides Hong Kong are only provided with a very insufficient number of 9-2-inch guns. This only makes the situation worse for the Empire.
There could be no serious risk to battle-ships engaging the very few guns here, which, to put it plainly, would have no more chance of stopping a battle-fleet than Dame Partington had of mopping up the Atlantic.
*9-2-inch guns have very little penetrative or destructive power compared to 12-inch, and if they are to be trusted to alone should be in numerical superiority.
A good example of this occurred in the American Civil war at Charleston.
Ships mounting in all thirty-two guns bombarded forts mounting in all sixty-seven guns, most of them much smaller than the guns in attacking vessels.
The ships were not well handled, and were easily beaten off.
The forts fired 2,229 shot and shell, the ships only a miserable 139 in all.
[345]
H
Page 54
Page 54