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army stiffened by a nucleus of foreign troops. For the present, however, it is sufficient to consider only the less formidable possibility of a purely Chinese incursion from the direction of Canton.
15. As regards Japan, the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, up to the present time, relieved us from the necessity of providing at Hong Kong local defences capable of meeting attack on the scale that Japan might bring to bear. For, so long as the Japanese Alliance remains operative, not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable probabilities to be provided against, but British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British, and Japanese forces in the Eastern seas are superior to the forces of any probable combination of two naval Powers. Having regard to what is said above as to the scale of attack that could be brought to bear on Hong Kong by other Powers, it would appear to follow from conclusion (a) of the Committee of Imperial Defence to the effect that "so long as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remains in force the British possessions in the Far East are secure," that there is at present no occasion to assume any change in the scale of probable attack which the local defences of Hong Kong are required to meet.
The present situation cannot, however, be regarded as permanent. Should the Anglo-Japanese Treaty be determined, not only would it not be possible to assume that the Japanese fleet would act in concert with the British navy in time of war, but the possibility of Japan being ranged against us, either alone or in combination with some other naval Power, must be taken into consideration.
16. In the event of a war with Japan the strategic position of Hong Kong, and the nature and scale of the attacks which the defences of the fortress might be called upon to sustain, would be altogether different from those hitherto assumed to be reasonably probable.
17. As regards naval attack, the Admiralty adhere to the opinion they expressed in the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 414 M, dated the 22nd December, 1909, on the standard of primary armament at British defended ports, that a naval commander will not expose his ships to the risk of incurring serious injury by engaging them in attacks on fortified positions, so long as there is a possibility of his being called upon with damaged ships, and perhaps with depleted magazines, to engage a superior naval force. This consideration will prove an effective deterrent to naval attack on defended harbours in waters where we can count upon being able to bring a superior fleet to bear at a few days' notice, or where the capture of a fortified position would not be of vital importance. The Admiralty are, however, of opinion that in the case of Hong Kong in a war with Japan, this deterrent influence might not be operative. In such a war the local command of the China seas at the outbreak of hostilities might rest with Japan for a period which has been assumed, for purposes of calculation, to be of one month's duration. If during that period Japan succeeded in capturing Hong Kong we should be deprived of our only base in the China seas, and, with no base nearer than Singapore, our difficulty in regaining the command of the China seas when naval reinforcements arrived from European waters would be greatly increased. The consideration of the great strategic advantages to be gained by an early capture of Hong Kong might, it is thought, tempt Japan to risk her armoured ships by making a determined naval attack upon the place, with a view to capturing it by a coup-de-main.
18. The Admiralty therefore consider that in the event of a war with Japan the following would have to be added to the forms of probable naval attack on Hong Kong :-
"Attack by a squadron of armoured ships closing with and attempting to run past "the batteries, with a view to gaining access to the inner waters. When the inner "waters had been reached an attempt would be made to land men from the ships "under cover of their guns, and capture the place by a coup-de-main.”
19. The scale of attack by an expeditionary land force in a war with Japan will not be limited to attack by a raiding force with a maximum strength of 4,000 men as now laid down. The size of the expeditionary force that Japan could bring to bear against Hong Kong while she held local command of the sea would be limited
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