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2 Regiments of Indian Native Infantry, together with detachments of administrative services and departments, a total of 4,212 of all ranks.
The disposition of these troops to meet attack of the nature of a landing includes the occupation of the central ridge of the island to oppose an enemy landed on the southern shore, and the occupation of a position on the passes over the hills running across the Kowloon Peninsula to repel attack from the mainland.
(e.) Local Naval Defence.-A torpedo-craft flotilla consisting of one destroyer and
four torpedo-boats, is stationed at Hong Kong.
V.-Determination of Scale of Oversea Attuck under New Conditions.
9. In the Colonial Defence Committees Memorandum No. 417 M., dated the 7th July, 1910, on the general principles cf Imperial defence, affecting the oversea Dominions and Colonies, it is stated regarding the limiting conditions governing the scale of oversea land attack :---
"18. Of recent years, however, owing to the rise of the American and Japanese fleets based upon the Western Atlantic and Pacific, and to the entry of Germany into the ranks of first class naval Powers, the naval situation has undergone considerable change.
"The superiority of the British fleet over the fleets of the two strongest foreign naval Powers is, in the opinion of the Admiralty, still maintained. But, owing to the increase in the number of first class naval Powers, the strength of our naval forces, as compared with that of the naval forces of all the Powers in the world, has diminished; and it is possible that immediately on the outbreak of war the British fleet might not be supreme in all quarters of the world where the enemy's ship's may be found.
For example, in view of the great strength of the foreign squadrons now normally stationed within striking distance of the shores of the United Kingdom, a peace distribution of our fleets designed to meet a hostile combination of European naval Powers would not place our naval forces in a position immediately to assert their superiority over a hostile combination which included a Power based upon the Pacific or Western Atlantic. It is thus possible that, in the early stages of a war with a combination of naval Powers whose bases are far apart, the command of seas remote from our centres of naval strength might rest with the enemy.
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19. It must not, however, be inferred that operations of the enemy in waters where he temporarily possessed a local superiority would be as unhampered as if he possessed undisputed command of the sea. So long as our battle squadrons remained undefeated, the local superiority of the enemy would be of uncertain duration and liable to sudden extinction. This consideration would impose strict limitations upon the strategic employment of the enemy's fleets, and upon the nature and strength of the oversea attacks that he would be able to undertake on British territory
abroad."
Again in paragraph 24 of the same Memorandum it is stated:-
“24. No general rule can be laid down for universal application regarding the period during which the local defences of British ports abroad may be called upon to sustain attack without naval support, or as to the nature and scale of the oversea attack to be provided against. The duration of the period will vary in the case of each place according to its proximity to the centres of naval power of the enemy and to the disposition of our fleets on the outbreak of war. Similarly, in endeavouring to assign a limit to the scale of probable oversea attack, it will be necessary to consider the case of each place separately, due regard being had to the value of the objective, to hydrographical and topographical conditions, and to considerations of distance, time, and relative naval and military strengths."
10. The conclusion (c) of the Committee of Imperial Defence "that the local naval and military defences at Hong Kong should be on sufficient scale to enable the fortress to hold out for a period of one month,” appears to imply that we cannot in all circumstances count upon having a preponderance of naval force in the China Seas on the outbreak of war. This assumption involves a fundamental change of the strategic conditions assumed when the existing defences were designed.
Before the standard of defences required to meet the new conditions can be determined, it is necessary to ascertain what changes in the scale of probable attack follow from the assumption that local command of the sea may, on the outbreak of war, rest with the enemy. To enable an estimate to be formed of the scale of attack now required to be provided against, it is necessary to examine individually the circumstances of potential enemies with a view to forming an estimate of the scale and nature of the naval and military attack that each could bring against Hong Kong within a period of one month.
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