CAB38-17 — Page 33

Page 33

2

“(c.) The Admiralty and War Office should concert measures to ensure that the "local naval and military defences at Hong Kong are on a sufficient scale “to enable the fortress to hold out for a period of one month."

5. These conclusions were referred to the Colonial Defence Committee to consider what measures should be taken to give effect to the conclusion (c) of the Committee of Imperial Defence that the local naval and military defences should be on a sufficient scale to enable Hong Kong to hold out for a period of one month.

6. The consideration of the question by the Colonial Defence Committee was, however, deferred pending the receipt by the Army Council of a report by the Inspector-General of the Forces on his visit to the Eastern Colonies at the end of

1909.

An extract from the Report of the Inspector-General dealing with the defences of Hong Kong, which has been referred to the Colonial Defence Committee by the Army Council, is printed as Appendix II to this Memorandum, and a further despatch, dated the 17th January, 1910, from the Governor of Hong Kong regarding the visit of the Inspector-General of the Forces, which has been referred to the Committee by the Colonial Office, is printed as Appendix III to this Memorandum.

III.—Forms of Attack on Hong Kong hitherto regarded as reasonably probable.

7. Hong Kong, the centre of British trade and influence in the Far East, is a commercial port of the highest importance. It is also the principal naval base of His Majesty's ships in these waters, and the only port of refuge for the mercantile marine in the China seas.

It was assumed, for the purpose of calculating the standard of the local defences as at present approved, that the following forms of attack on Hong Kong should be regarded as reasonably probable in a war with a maritime Power :—

(a.) Long-range bombardment by a squadron of battleships with a view to the

destruction of the naval dockyard or of warships lying in the harbour. (b.) Raids by night by unarmoured cruisers on merchant shipping lying in the

harbour.

(c.) Attacks by sea-going torpedo craft with a view to the destruction of the

docks or warships lying in the harbour.

(d.) Raiding attack by two or three armed transports conveying in all a maximum

landing force of 4,000 men, supported by a squadron of armoured vessels.

IV.-Existing Defences of Hong Kong.

8. The following is a brief summary of the local defences now approved to deal with these forms of attack :—

(a.) Primary Armament to meet Attack by Armoured Ships-

(i.) Eastern Entrance of Harbour: 3-9-2-inch B.L. guns, Mark X. (ii.) Western Entrance of Harbour: 5-92-inch B.L. guns, Mark X.

(b.) Medium Armament to meet raids by night by unarmoured cruisers on merchant

shipping lying in the harbour-

(i.) Eastern Entrance of Harbour: 3—6-inch B.L. guns, Mark VII. (ii.) Western Entrance of Harbour: 8-6-inch B.L. guns, Mark VII.

Concentrated movable beams are provided at the Eastern and Western

entrances as fighting lights for these guns.

(c.) Defences to meet attack by sea-going torpedo craft. The decision that it is necessary, in view of the modern developments of torpedo craft, to make provision against attack by sea-going torpedo craft, has only recently been arrived at. The defences to be provided to meet this form of attack are discussed in sections IX and X of this Memorandum.

-The approved

(d.) Garrison to meet raiding attack by a landing force of 4,000 men.—'

garrison includes 3 Companies, R.G.A. (Europeans), 3 Companies of R.G.A. (natives), 2 Companies R.E., 1 Battalion of British Infantry,

Page 33

Page 33

Page 33

Page 33