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(e.) Japan.-The nearest base in Japan is Nagasaki, 4,140 miles distant from
Sydney.
Japan has a standing army of nineteen divisions complete and fit for service in every detail. A division at war strength is about 20,000 men. With the addition of certain reserve brigades and of her national army, Japan could probably place over a million men in the field.
10. Having regard to the comparative weakness of their naval and military forces in the Pacific and to the remoteness of their bases from Australian territory, it is to the last degree improbable that either France or Germany could bring against Australia any military landing force more formidable than the present defences are calculated to meet, viz., a maximum landing force of 1,000 men. While Russia, in spite of her great military resources in Eastern Asia, owing to her naval weakness, appears for the present to be precluded from undertaking serious operations oversea.
11. In view of the limited military force available in the Philippines and of the remoteness of the contingency of a war with the United States, it is not necessary, in calculating the standard of the local defences required in Australia, to take into special consideration the scale of attack that could be brought to bear by that Power.
12. As regards Japan, the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, up to the present time, relieved us from the necessity of considering the scale of attack that modern Japan could bring to bear on British possessions in the Pacific. For, so long as the Japanese Alliance remains operative, not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable probabilities to be provided against, but British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Eastern seas are superior to the forces of any probable combination of two naval Powers.
The present situation cannot, however, be regarded as permanent. Should the Anglo-Japanese Treaty be determined, not only would it no longer be possible to assume that the Japanese fleet would act in concert with the British navy in time of war, but the possibility of Japan being ranged against us, either alone or in combina- tion with some other naval Power, could not prudently be disregarded.
The strategic position of Australia and the nature and scale of the overland attacks that the local defences might be called upon to sustain in the event of a war with Japan therefore require special consideration.
13. It must be assumed that, at the outbreak of hostilities, the local command of the Pacific might for a brief period rest with Japan, until such time as British naval reinforcements could arrive from European waters; during that period it would no doubt be possible for Japan to convey oversea to Australia a military force of con- siderable size.
14. In considering the scale and nature of overses attack that the temporary possession of the local command of the Pacific would enable Japan to bring to bear on Australian territory, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between large operations, the success of which will depend upon the power of the Japanese fleet to keep open oversea communications with its bases for an indefinite period, and hasty raids dependent for success rather upon surprise and rapidity of execution than upon the number of troops employed.
15. The oversea conveyance from a distant base of operations of a military expedition strong enough to effect a prolonged or permanent occupation of any considerable area of British territory, and the continued supply of such an expeditionary force when landed with munitions of war, would be possible only to a Power which was mistress of the seas and was able to destroy or mask all the hostile ships that might at any time be in a position to interrupt the communications of the expeditionary force.
No such overses expedition has ever been carried to a successful conclusion unless this condition has been fulfilled, and some of the greatest military disasters recorded in history have resulted from failure to secure or retain the assured sea command which is essential for the prosecution of an oversea campaign.
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