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Similarly, in endeavouring to assign a limit to the scale of probable oversea attack, it will be necessary to consider the case of each place separately, due regard being had to the value of the objective, to hydrographical and topographical conditions, and to considerations of distance, time, and relative naval and military strengths."

Determination of Scale of probable Attack on Australia under New Conditions.

7. It is obvious that the course of events in war cannot be predicted with certainty; and in recording the following opinions as to the probable nature and scale of oversea attack on Australia, the Admiralty desire to point out that they must not be held to have given an absolute guarantee that any particular form of operation will not be undertaken in war. All that they claim to do is to state what forms of oversea attack, having regard to the general strategic situation, they consider to be reasonably probable, with a view to furnishing a reasoned basis for the calculation of the standard of defences required at any place, so as to ensure that the defences are provided on a uniform system and wasteful expenditure avoided.

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8. As regards naval attack, the view expressed in the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 362 M., that "the employment of armoured cruisers as of battle ships in Australian waters is not a contingency which in the light of present and "future naval developments, as far as can now be judged, need reasonably be expected," was arrived at after an examination of the nature of the probable objectives in Australian territory. The establishment of an Australian fleet unit, based upon Sydney, will to a certain extent alter the situation. As a naval base the value of Sydney as a strategic objective to an enemy will be considerably increased. It is therefore considered that, in determining the standard of fixed defences of Sydney, the con- tingency of attack by armoured cruisers should be taken into consideration.

As regards other Australian ports, the Admiralty adhere to the view that their strategic importance is too small to justify, in the opinion of a.naval commander, the employment of armoured vessels in attacks upon them, for such operations, even if successful, would exercise no decisive effect on the result of a maritime war.

9. As regards the possibilities of attack by a military landing force, the following particulars of the naval ports and the available military forces of Powers having possessions in the Pacific serve to indicate the relative capabilities of each Power to dispatch a military expedition against Australia :—

(a.) France.-The French fortified port nearest to Sydney is Saigon, 4,620 miles

distant.

The peace strength of the garrison of French Indo-China is now 25,000 men, of whom 11,690 are Europeans. In the event of war 16,000 to 18,000 native reservists and 8,000 gardes indigènes would be available, besides about 7,000 Europeans who have undergone military training. The native troops are indifferent and the military position is still considered somewhat precarious, although the internal conditions of the country are improving.

(b.) Germany. The German fortified port nearest to Sydney is Kiao-chau

(“T'sing-tău "), 4,970 miles distant.

The establishment of the garrison of Kiao-chau is 2,240 men. There are also about 400 reservists, who can be called out when required. (c.) Russia. —The Russian fortified port nearest to Sydney is Vladivostock,

5,120 miles distant.

The war between Russia and Japan has been so recently concluded that it is not yet possible to forecast the future naval and military position of Russia in the Far East, though their military garrisons will probably be of considerable size.

(d.) United States.-The American fortified ports nearest to Sydney are Kavite in

Manila Bay, 3,880 miles distant, or San Francisco, 6,430 miles distant.

The strength of the United States garrison in the Philippines is about 12,000 regular troops and 1,300 Marines. There are in addition 5,000 Philippine Scouts, commanded by American officers, and 6,500 Philippine Constabulary, officered by Americans and Philippinos.

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