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avoid opposition by even an inferior naval force while the operations are in progress. The assumption on which Australian armaments have hitherto generally been based is that the number may be limited to a maximum of three or four, and nothing has occurred in recent naval warfare to give ground for supposing that this is other than a liberal estimate.
The number of men that three or four cruisers could disembark for a raid depends upon the following considerations. If only the normal complements are borne, it is estimated that the total number available would usually not exceed 500 men. It is not unlikely, however, that raiders dispatched to so great a distance from their base as Australia would carry numbers surplus to the complement in order to replace casualties and wastage, and these would be available to reinforce the landing party. An enemy willing to incur the very serious danger of losing his ships entailed by operations in these distant seas might not hesitate to risk a few hundred additional înen in the enterprise, and although it may reasonably be assumed that the raiders would not hamper them- selves by the presence of unarmed transports, and that every vessel must form a fighting unit, the embarkation of a limited number of troops in the cruisers for the express purpose of raids on porta cannot be excluded from the range of possible contingencies. On the other hand, it is clear that the necessity for keeping the ships at all times ready to fight an action, and the great importance of carrying large supplies of coal and ammunition, would militate against over- crowding the decks of the three or four unarmoured vessels postulated.
**
For purposes of calculation, therefore, it may be assumed that the landing parties disembarked for a raid on an Australian port might reach a total of 1,000 men at the outside. The strength and disposition of the force required to meet this attack will vary at different ports, according to the topographical conditions."
5. The above statement was based upon the general principle laid down in the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 348 M., dated the 2nd August, 1905, in paragraph 2 of which it is recorded that the Admiralty-
"have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against organised invasion from the sea."
Again in paragraph 3 of the same Memorandum it is stated that--
"The strength of the garrisons of naval bases is governed by the consideration that in no case could a greater attacking force than a few thousand men be collected and conveyed oversea without such arrangements and preparations as would bring the operations under the category of * organised invasion,' which the navy has undertaken to prevent."
6. In the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 417 M., dated the 7th July, 1910, on the general principles of Imperial defence, the opinion expressed as to the conditions limiting the scale of oversea land attack are considerably modified : in paragraphs 18 and 19, for example, it is stated :---
"18. Of recent years, however, owing to the rise of the American and Japanese fleets based upon the Western Atlantic and Pacific, and to the entry of Germany into the ranks of first class naval Powers, the naval situation has undergone considerable change.
"The superiority of the British fleet over the fleets of the two strongest foreign naval Powers is, in the opinion of the Admiralty, still maintained. But, owing to the increase in the number of first clase naval Powers, the strength of our naval forces, as compared with that of the naval forces of all the Powers in the world, has diminished; and it is possible that immediately on the outbreak of war the British fleet might not be supreme in all quarters of the world where the enemy's ships may be found.
For example, in view of the great strength of the foreign squadrons now normally stationed within striking distance of the shores of the United Kingdom, a peace distribution of our fleets designed to meet a hostile combination of European naval Powere would not place our naval forces in a position immediately to assert their superiority over a hostile combination which included a Power based upon the Pacific or Western Atlantic. It is thus possible that, in the early stages of a war with a combination of naval Powers whose bases are far apart, the command of seas remote from our centres of naval strength might rest with the enemy.
"19. It must not, however, be inferred that operations of the enemy in waters where he temporarily possessed a local superiority would be as unhampered as if he possessed undisputed command of the sea. So long as our battle squadrons remained undefeated, the local superiority of the enemy would be of uncertain duration and liable to sudden extinction. This consideration would impose strict limitations upon the strategic employment of the enemy's fleets, and upon the nature and strength of the oversea attacks that he would be able to undertake on British territory
abroad.”
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And in paragraph 24 of the same Memorandum it is laid down :-
24. No general rule can be laid down for universal application regarding the period during which the local defences of British ports abroad may be called upon to sustain attack without naval support, or as to the nature and scale of the overses attack to be provided against. The duration of the period will vary in the case of each place according to its proximity to the centres of naval power of the enemy and to the disposition of our fleets on the outbreak of war.
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