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be revised. We sympathise with the views expressed to us that the matters enumerated in section 23 (3) go beyond what is normally understood by defence Prap Cop offfans! We see no reason wagubject of gertain
Progh safeguards, the Maltese Government and Parliament should not now be invested with authority over such matters as the administration of civil aviation (not including operational control which the Maltese Government agree must, in the special circumstances of Malta, be retained by the Service authorities) and such other matters as are found to be appropriate for exercise by the Maltese Government and Parliament. We therefore recommend that the present list of reserved matters, as set out in Section 23 (3) of the Constitution Letters Patent, should be carefully reviewed. In making this recommendation, however, we should like it to be understood that the scope of defence and foreign affairs to-day is much wider than it was when the 1921 Constitution was drawn up, and that it would be undesirable if there were to be constant legalistic disputes about any definition which may be incorporated in new constitutional instruments.
89. The problem as regards legislation is comparatively small, since we understand that the main legislation on foreign affairs affecting Malta relates to diplomatic privileges, and that, in the field of defence, there are a good many provisions in United Kingdom law which would neither be appropriate nor needed in Malta. We see no reason why legislation on defence and foreign affairs should not, for the most part, be enacted by the Parliament at Westminster, and by Her Majesty in Council legislating for Malta by Order in Council, on the advice of a Secretary of State. The power to make subordinate legislation could, subject to the normal safeguards, be devolved on the Secretary of State for the Home Department and, in turn, on his representative in Malta. The main difficulty would arise with regard to borderline cases or changing requirements. It is thus important to ensure that legislation is not held up by disputes over vires. It has indeed been suggested to us in evidence that the Maltese Parliament should be given power of legislation in all fields, subject to the over-riding legislative authority of the Parliament at Westminster. This has the merit of simplicity, but might give rise to difficulties and misunderstandings and engender feelings of frustration. It would, in our view, be better not to confuse the normal roles of the two Parliaments. We are, therefore, more attracted by another suggestion that provision should be made for the power of the Parliament at Westminster to legislate on defence and foreign affairs to be devolved at discretion on the Maltese Parliament. This suggestion appears to offer a means of dealing with matters (such as the control of transit of strategic materials), the subject of which may normally be one falling to be dealt with by the Maltese Parliament but the object of which may be for the purpose of defence and foreign affairs.
90. Another difficulty which might arise is that the Maltese Parliament might wish to pass a Bill touching on defence and foreign affairs. This difficulty might be overcome by adapting the provisions of Section 34 of the present Constitution Letters Patent to the requirements of the new Constitution, i.e., by providing that any Bill which, in the opinion of the Governor or, alternatively, on the basis of representations to him by the United Kingdom representative in Malta, appeared to impinge on the field of defence and foreign affairs, should be referred to the Home Secretary, whose decision, after consultation with the Maltese Ministers, would be final.
91. It is even more important that, once legislation is enacted, the exercise of executive authority by the agency in Malta of the Government at Westminster, however it may be constituted, should not be subjected to unreasonable delays owing to differences, however genuine, about the