CAB129-78 — Page 204

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Page 204

ALE

propriety of the action involved. This is one reason why it is important to ensure pa regular means of consultation and co-ordination between the United Kingency in Malta and the Maltes Government2h matter

which we discuss below.

the

92. Subject to these requirements, we consider that, once it is accepted that the authority of the Maltese Parliament and Ministers can be enlarged on the lines indicated above, the Governor should no longer have discretion to ignore the advice of Maltese Ministers in matters which are their concern. We therefore recommend that, in matters other than defence and foreign affairs, the new Constitution should provide that the Governor should act upon the advice of his Maltese Ministers.

93. However, in view of the unique situation of Malta as an Island- fortress, we consider that some discretion must be reserved to the Imperial side in event of an emergency. Strong views were expressed to us by all Maltese witnesses that the present powers of the Governor under Section 59 of the Constitution Letters Patent are too extensive and should be restricted to what is necessary to deal with "real" emergencies. It was argued that Maltese Ministers would be ready to recognise a situation of emergency and to take the necessary steps to deal with it. They would be fully competent to deal with emergencies caused by fire, flood and other forms of natural disaster; in emergencies involving defence interests, responsibility would in any case fall to Her Majesty's Government.

94. On this question, we feel that, behind the desire for a change, there is an apprehension, rooted in past events, that the present scope of Section 59 could be used to frustrate the will of the Maltese Parliament. We sympathise with the view that any interference, even in times of natural disaster or other emergency, with the authority normally exercised by Maltese Ministers could be justified only in the most serious circumstances. Nevertheless, we are convinced that it would not be in the general interest, particularly when urgent action is required to deal with a threatening situation, if the powers of the Imperial side to deal with an emergency were to be unduly restricted; and we trust that, in the new constitutional framework we are recommending, it will be possible for the Maltese Government to accept this view.

95. As regards consultation between the two Governments, we recognise that the avoidance of friction under any constitutional arrangements for Malta will always depend on the ready acceptance of defence needs, which in- clude the needs of foreign forces and of N.A.T.O., and on goodwill and mutual trust between the two sides of Government. Nevertheless, we consider that many of the difficulties which have arisen in the past regarding the respective spheres of authority of the Maltese and Imperial sides could be avoided, or dealt with before becoming sources of grievance, if there were machinery both in Malta and in London to ensure effective consultation and co-ordination between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Maltese Government. This would provide a forum in which apparently difficult requirements of either side could be explained, and opportunity taken wherever possible of making mutually satisfactory adjustments. It could also provide a means for consultation on Malta's economic and social problems and for arranging mutual assistance by the two Governments in each other's projects.

96. We were concerned to discover why the machinery of the Privy Council, provided for in the present Constitution, had not worked successfully in the past. It became clear to us that a body which is specially summoned, and, in practice, summoned to meet only for discussion and resolution of differences when these have reached an acute stage, cannot

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