Page 449, from the military point of view; but both the French and Germans seem to take the European Army seriously and will probably be prepared to compromise in order to bring it to fruition. If, for example, the French did in fact concede that national units should be at Divisional (i.e., “unité opérative") instead of Combat Team level, the Germans might forgo, for the purposes of the European Army, the complete political equality which they have so far made a condition of their partici- pation in any Western defence.
BONN DISCUSSIONS
8. The European Army must be viewed in the light of our policy for German rearmament as a whole, and of the parallel talks in Germany between the Federal Government and the Occupying Powers. When these talks were authorised by the North Atlantic Council in December, their object was " to secure the earliest possible recruitment and training of German formations for the integrated defence force." And in noting the French Government's intention of calling a Conference to discuss the European Army, the Council expressed doubt whether the latter could be developed quickly enough to meet the immediate military need. Since that time, however, it has become evident that for various reasons, including the process of modifying the occupation régime and the probability that the necessary equipment for German units will not be available during the next two years, German rearma- ment cannot be rushed through. The United Kingdom High Commissioner has accordingly been instructed to concentrate attention on the development of a contractual relationship with the Federal Government rather than on the military discussions. One of our original objections to the European Army, namely that it would inevitably delay the creation of German units, is therefore less valid now.
9. On the whole, the Americans do not seem to share our views on the timing of the German contribution, although General Eisenhower has expressed very similar ones. Nevertheless, in view both of the evident relaxation of British pressure and of the rapidly increasing military strength of the Western Powers, the French Government might be tempted to argue that the Brussels decisions were premature and to drag out the European Army Conference as a means of indefinitely postponing German rearmament. Alternatively they may decide, whatever the final Allied decision on timing, to press on with the European Army so as to have the desired framework firmly established for such time as German units are finally raised. This is perhaps the more likely alternative.
10. The Germans are of course in a strong position to play off the two sets of negotiations against one another. They have not yet taken advantage of this, but the possibility cannot be overlooked that they may do so, particularly if we now seek for our part to drag out the Bonn discussions.
CONCLUSIONS
11. (a) The European Army Conference still has a long way to go, particularly in the vital question of relations between the Army and N.A.T.O. There have been only five plenary sessions and a few meetings of sub-committees, all of them devoted to preliminary exchanges of view in which three of the five contributing countries have taken very little part. No Government seems to be in any hurry. Comments on the possible outcome of the Conference can therefore only be very tentative; with this reservation the chances seem to be that-
·
(i) the political structure will be retained in something like its present form; (ii) German realism will succeed in modifying the more impracticable features
of the military part;
(iii) an agreement of some sort will be reached.
(b) There seems no reason yet for His Majesty's Government to reconsider their decision not to join the European Army and to attend the Conference only as an observer. Nevertheless, if the original proposals undergo as much modification as did the draft Schuman Plan, it would still be open to us to join it at a later stage.
Foreign Office SH 587
8th May, 1951.
H. M.
Page 449
.R.