CAB129-45 — Page 448

Page 448, of 587 disadvantages of a national independent Germany-and in this particular case without bringing her into full membership of the North Atlantic Treaty. If this is true, it means that the French look on the European Army as part of a considered long-term policy and will do their best to make it succeed-even at the cost of concessions from the original draft such as they made in the course of negotiations on the Schuman Plan.

(b) Germany

It is, of course, on the German attitude that the European Army will stand or fall. The Federal Government's first reaction was not unnaturally against the Plan, since it places Germany in a position of obvious inferiority: the proposed European Defence Commissioner, for example, will for the first few years have much greater powers over German forces than over those of other contributing countries; the latter will also maintain national contingents outside the European Army, while Germany will not. But the German delegate to the Conference has repeatedly expressed his Government's desire to participate in the European Army and their sympathy with its political aims, and if they can secure such modifications of the Plan as to make it militarily effective they may decide to co-operate in the interests of lasting reconciliation with France. Here too the principle of European union has a certain appeal.

(c) United States

Official American blessing for the Pleven Plan has been given in a letter from Mr. Acheson to M. Schuman, warmly welcoming the Conference on behalf of the United States Government and promising their assistance in making it a success. Although dated 27th January, this letter had been shown to the French in draft two months before and was in fact a quid pro quo for French acceptance of the North Atlantic Council's compromise plan for the creation of German units under N.A.T.O. In the past week the Americans have told M. Schuman that they are following the progress of the Conference closely and with sympathy but that they do not consider the French Plan to be sufficiently realistic and feel that agreement should be reached on an "area of compromise " which would allow national units of a workable size. (This is in fact very similar to our own approach, with the difference that the Americans are not eligible for membership of the European Army; we, on the other hand, are eligible but have chosen not to join.)

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PROGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE

5. The Conference has so far proceeded in rather desultory fashion, and the only delegation other than the French to have played any appreciable part in it is the German. The crucial point so far as German participation is concerned is the level at which national units are to be integrated in the Army. The French Plan provided that the largest single unit of one nationality should be the Combat Team (5,000- 6,000 men). The Germans argue, as they have at the technical talks in Bonn with representatives of the Allied High Commission, that an “unité opérative," made up of two Combat Teams of the same nationality, is the smallest practicable fighting unit. Two or three unités opératives" of different nationalities could then be linked together as a major formation. (The Combat Team was accepted by the N.A.T.O. Powers for purposes of the German defence contribution on French insistence. It was a purely political decision, and the views of the British and American Chiefs of Staff remain that the Division is the optimum unit.) The German case has been argued at the Conference with great persuasion and the conversation between M. Schuman and Mr. Acheson referred to above brought out the interesting point that the French are seriously considering the German counter proposal, which has the advantage of avoiding the actual word "division."

6. The political, as opposed to the military, features of the European Army have so far been only briefly discussed in Paris; they are modelled closely on the Schuman Plan, and the Court of Justice and possibly the Assembly are to be the same for both organisations. There is no reason to suppose that the participating countries, all of whom are members of the Schuman Plan, will have any objection of principle to this part of the scheme.

7. Broadly speaking, therefore, the Paris Conference begins to look as if it might result in an agreement. It is true that the French look on the European Army primarily as a long-term political device, whereas the Germans, while recog- nising its political importance, are primarily concerned agat44&hou make sense

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