(a) They demand the inclusion of an item on the Atlantic Pact and
on the establishment of United States bases.
(b) They insist on drawing up the passage in the agenda on armaments in such a way as to bring disarmament
to the front without relating it to the existing level of armaments.
To concede (a) would be to admit by implication that the Atlantic Pact is a cause of world tension and so to enable the Russians to launch a propaganda and diplomatic offensive designed to raise doubts about Western firmness and solidarity in carrying through our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty and our rearmament programme. cannot make any such admission or expose ourselves to such a risk
8.
As to (b) there has been some divergence of view among the Western delegations. While there has been unanimous opposition to the Soviet text as at present drafted, which would commit the four Ministers to a discussion of disarmament and how to implement it without any direct relation to the present level of armaments, we for our part have hitherto taken the view that it ought to be possible to produce a text which, while leaving the word "reduction" in a prominent position, would nevertheless relate it firmly to the existing level of armaments.
9.
This view has not been shared by the United States and French Governments. In deciding the best course to follow in these circumstances, I have had two main considerations in mind:-
10.
(i) In negotiations of this kind it is highly important to maintain
a united front: it is the only safe position from which to deal with the Russians,
(ii) The United States position is not founded on mere intransigence
but arises from conviction that any formula which places reduction of armaments before consideration of their existing level would, in fact, from our point of view, be dishonest, since until some adjustment of the level has been agreed, we cannot reduce and are in fact compelled by the existing Soviet preponderance to increase.
I have found these considerations of sufficient weight to justify me in authorising the leader of the United Kingdom Delegation in Paris to assure his United States and French colleagues, if they maintain their firm opposition to any compromise, that, so far as an agreed agenda is concerned, we will join them in refusing to admit
11.
(i) any reference to the Atlantic Pact or to United States bases
(ii) any reference to armaments in which 'reduction' precedes
'level'.
In return we shall ask the United States and French delegates to agree to the promotion to the leading place under Item I of the sub- item dealing with German demilitarisation. I have reason to believe that the United States and French Governments will meet us on this
poRagan290€585le us to offer a bargain to the RuBagn329£5&ould at
-2-
any ate give the satisfaction on one point to which they attest 587
importance.
12.
259
Whether the Russians would be prepared to settle on these terms is something which can only be found by asking them, and our three Delegations are at present concerting tactics with a view to selecting an appropriate time and manner for indicating to Gromyko that we have come to our sticking place, so far as an agreed agenda is concerned.
13.
I have twice underlined that phrase about an agreed agenda. The point is that if the delegates fail to agree on an agenda acceptable to them all, there are two other possible courses which would still enable a Ministerial meeting to take place. The first is to work on a skeleton agenda, a mere tabulation of single headings such as Tension, Germany, Austria and so on. The second is the device of a split agenda, which in effect means that each side will be free to set down its own version of the agenda, leaving the Ministers to agree on the order and manner of the discussions as best they may. I do not think we should refuse either of these courses if it proves impossible to attain an agreed agenda; and it may well be in our interest at a suitable stage to offer them ourselves and so confirm our fundamental willingness to proceed to a Ministerial meeting.
14.
There is a certain risk that the Russians, when they are made to understand that we are unwilling to yield over the issue explained above (involving inclusion of a reference to the Atlantic Pact and the prominent placing of the reduction of armaments), may decide that it is in their interest to break off the discussions altogether. I do not regard this as probable, but it is a possibility which must be borne in mind.
15.
I would add that if we do get an agreed Agenda on the lines of the bargain indicated in paragraphs lu and 11 above, there are two further points to which I have drawn Mr. Davies' attention with a view both to safeguarding our position and to setting the discussions on a more coherent basis. The first is the possibility of getting the Russians to accept a written proviso, in the final communique, for example, to the effect that the formulation of the Agenda cannot be held to commit any of the four parties on substance. This would obviously be of great value in combating Soviet propaganda attempts during the interim period to throw doubts on our intentions of going through with our own rearmament and that of Western Germany. The second is the possi- bility of obtaining Russian acceptance of our view that at the Ministerial Conference Item I on the causes of international tension will be taken as a whole. Mr. Davies will consider with his colleagues how best to proceed on these two points.
Foreign Office, S. W. 1.,
24TH APRIL, 1951,
H. M.