CAB129-45 — Page 327

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Arsulated, 24, 4, 51. (1)

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(THIS DOCURagN328ŒÍHÊ7PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC Mage5328'sfGOVERNMENT

MS GRAUS ON CE to ens

SECRET

C.P.(51) 115

24TH APRIL, 1951

CABINET

COPY NO. 31 NO.31

SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF FOREIGN

MINISTERS

PRELIMINARY TALKS

iMemorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

I agreed on 19th April to try to provide the Cabinet with an appreciation of the course of the talks in Paris about an agenda for the proposed Four-Power meeting (C. M. (51) 29th Conclusions, Minute 9).

2.

My colleagues will recollect that in earlier discussions on the proposed Four-Power talks and on the framing of an agenda we were concerned at the probability that the Soviet delegate would insist on placing an item on German demilitarisation at the head of the agenda and there was general agreement that it would not be practicable to proceed with the meeting if the Soviet Government insisted on confining the agenda to the demilitarisation of Germany and other purely German problems (C. M. (51) 11th Conclusions, Minute 6).

3.

For the first few weeks of the meeting the Russians did indeed take the expected line, and met with the unanimous resistance of the Western delegates. On 28th March, however, M. Gromyko announced that the Soviet Government were now prepared to see German demilitarisation reduced from being the first and main item to a sub-item under the Western first item, thus accepting it as one among the 'causes and effects of present international tensions in Europe". (M. Gromyko still insists that it should be the first sub-item and this point has not yet been conceded to him see paragraph 11 below.)

4.

·

On a superficial reading M. Gromyko's move on German demilitarisation looks like a genuine concession, but in point of fact it covers an important change of tactics. Instead of concentrating solely on German demilitarisation, the Russians are now turning the spotlight on Western rearmament; instead of concentrating on an attempt to prevent the rearmament of Germany they are now trying to get an agenda which will commit us to revision of our policy of rearming ourselves. Another way of expressing it would be to say that they are trying to manoeuvre for a position where they will be able effectively to undermine the defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

5.

This development in Soviet tactics is due partly to the firmness displayed by the Western delegations on the German item but mainly, it is believed, to a growing realisation by the Soviet Government that while our German policy is in itself unlikely in the near future to affect the present balance of world power, the scale and impetus of the87 rearmament of the Atlantic Treaty nations as a whole is rapidly building up an effective obstacle and deterrent to any aggressive plans they may have in mind.

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The new Soviet approach is a double-headed one:- Page 329 of 587