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Page 288 effective frustration of all our well-intentioned policies. Certainly tens of millions of Africans for whom we are responsible would be calamitously worse off.
41. The test-case will be Southern Rhodesia. This country already has practical independence. The day is not far off when it could defy us with impunity if we sought to interfere improperly, as its white inhabitants would think in its internal affairs. We certainly could do nothing to prevent Southern Rhodesia's accession to the Union were they to decide on such a course. As it seems to me the whole fate of our policy in Southern Africa turns on whether Southern Rhodesia is drawn Northwards or Southwards. It is not big enough to remain for ever a separate unit without access to the sea. At the moment its loyalties are with Britain-but if we do not succeed in attaching Southern Rhodesia to the North, it will inevitably turn ultimately to the Union. As I say above (paragraph 10) there is even now a force in Southern Rhodesia in favour of incorporation with South Africa, that it would be folly to ignore. We must, therefore, it seems to me, adopt a deliberate policy of attracting Southern Rhodesia to the North. If we do not, we will fail to contain South Africa and in the end all our good work and all our influence will be ruined.
42. I would therefore propose that it should become one of our cardinal policies to keep Southern Rhodesia out of the Union. This is a key-stone of the policy of containing South Africa. This should be a policy of equal weight and importance in our eyes with the political advancement of the Africans in our Central and East African colonies. It should not be a secondary or subordinate policy, but an equal one.
43. This would involve a shift in the emphasis of our policy and it would not be popular or easy. It is very easy for Africans and many in Britain, and especially many in the Labour Party, to say that there is no difference between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in respect of Native policy. Anyone who stands up for a policy of binding Southern Rhodesia closer to our colonies in the North will have to face a pretty vocal chorus of abuse, both from Africans and from sections of British opinion. It is, of course, true that Southern Rhodesian Native policy is different from ours: but it does not follow from that that it is identical with the Union's. It is, in fact, different (see paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 28 above). It is about as good a Native policy as one can expect at this stage from any considerable settled White population. If we insist on treating it as being identical with South African Native policy we shall in the end succeed in making it so. By driving Southern Rhodesia into the Union we would allow a fatal shift of the balance of power and immensely increase the attractive power of the Union's policy for White communities in neighbouring colonies. By listening to the protests of Africans and others against any truck with Southern Rhodesia we would in the end betray our trust to the Africans by being unable effectively to protect them against South African Native policy. It would not be against South African expansionism as such that we would have to contend but against the will of our own white communities.
44. We will soon be faced by a practical problem that will raise this very issue in an acute form-namely, the question of some form of closer association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. I do not here wish to argue the merits of this question; the recommendations of the recent officials' conference will have to come before Ministers. But one issue that will have to be decided may well be whether Southern Rhodesia is to go Northwards or Southwards. Closer union may now encounter some opposition: but if we fail to face it, the result may be that Southern Rhodesia finally loses hope in any possibility of closer association with her Northern neighbours. Moreover, were we at some later time to attempt again to achieve some sort of a Central African Union, we would certainly find African opinion even more strongly against it.
45. Apart from positively drawing Southern Rhodesia northwards it should be our policy to widen in every possible way the gulf between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. South Africa's economic and other influences upon Southern Rhodesia are bound to remain strong and Southern Rhodesia must live in peaceful and neighbourly relations with the Union: nevertheless, there are natural differences between them.
46. One of these concerns South African migration to Southern Rhodesia Bagigrap8 6 fab87e). Here we should give Southern Rhodesia all possible support in her desire to restrict migration from the Union and to encourage it from Britain.