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Page 287 he gave me whilst I was in the Union it was rather surprising that he never raised the question of the transfer of this base to the Union, though I had several talks with him on defence matters. The base is very well run it is the only corner of the Union where the colour ban is wholly absent and skilled workers of all colours work happily side by side.

Although we will have one day to face the question of the transfer of this base and may have to make some concessions to South African sovereignty, I think this day is a good way off. The Union is quite incapable of running a great base like this (its Navy is a sub-department of its Army). I think we may hope to play this problem very long.

(iv) Problems of Policy

35. Our relations with the Union of South Africa raise appallingly difficult problems, for which there can be no simple solutions.

36. It seems to me that one of our prime aims must be to contain South Africa. By this I do not mean that we should pursue a hostile policy towards the Union: indeed, as I argue later, I think we must be friendly. By containment I mean that we must prevent the spread of its influence and territorial sovereignty northwards. This will not be at all easy to achieve as South Africa is infinitely the most powerful political unit on the whole African continent. Its economic, and therefore its potential military, strength is rapidly increasing. There are, moreover, in Central and East Africa settled white populations that the Union may hope to bring under its political leadership and protection. It would be illusory to count on internal racial tensions frustrating South Africa's plans of expansion. These internal tensions may indeed one day become insurmountable, but we cannot simply sit back and reckon on this happening in time to prevent South African expansion.

37. We can only succeed in containing South Africa and playing the very strong cards that we have in our hand if we seriously set this objective of contain- ment as a genuine aim of our policy. This would mean that we do not regard as our sole objective the emancipation and political advancement of the African in all our African colonies. That must of course remain a major objective, but we must not subordinate all else to it.

If we wish to contain South Africa we must succeed in keeping the white communities in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and even Kenya inde- pendent of, and distinct from, the Union. This should not be too difficult to do as they are all very British and very loyal. They like neither Afrikaners nor Republicans. But here too we must have a positive policy. We cannot count on this loyalty alone and for ever. If we do not shape our policies aright there is a very real danger indeed that, to avoid domination by Africans, these white com- munities will in the end throw in their lot with the Union.

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38. We must in our long-term African policies reckon this as a grave danger to be set alongside the danger of some African (and Indian) discontent. Should we, intentionally or by default, throw British communities in East and Central Africa into the arms of the Union our whole work in Africa would be undone. The policies that we detest in the Union would be established far to the North and in the heart of this part of our Colonial Empire. Millions of Africans would be subjected to oppression. Terrible wars might even be fought between a white- ruled Eastern Africa and a black-ruled Western Africa.

39. It would be a fatal mistake to count on our power to prevent these things happening if in fact our policies tend to bring them about. In the last resort we do not control these British communities by power. As they grow richer and more numerous they will become potential American colonies-very loyal, but very determined to have their own way. If we are in due course faced by defiance of our will in the Rhodesias or Kenya there will in effect be nothing that we can do about it. Certainly our power on the spot would be inferior to South Africa's.

40. Fortunately these dangers are not imminent. But they will come upon us if we allow the impression to arise that we are committed to a policy of sub- ordinating Whites to Africans. Rather than face that the Whites will in the end revolt. I am not at the moment concerned about the morality of their possible actions but abagit their possibility. It would be small comfort toPugto2have been right, if the consequence were the effective end of our position in Africa and the

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