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ANNEX D
Background
RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION
The United States Government have been careful to associate Russia with all the main stages so far of the preparatory work for the Treaty. The Soviet Govern- ment have received a copy of the United States draft Treaty. The policy of the United States Government is to give Russia ample opportunity to participate in the Peace Treaty, but to be prepared to conclude it without Russia rather than allow it to be held up by Russian obstruction. This policy is in accordance with the views of His Majesty's Government. It is in fact most unlikely that the Soviet Government will agree to sign a Treaty leaving Japan free to rearm. It follows that we must examine the implications of making peace with Japan without Russian participation.
The United Nations Declaration
2. In the United Nations Declaration of 1st January, 1942, each signatory Government pledged itself " to co-operate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies." The Russians can be expected to accuse us of violating this clause if we make peace with Japan without them. Our answer to this would presumably be to point out that the Russians are themselves responsible for not coming in, and that the provision cannot be interpreted as meaning that, nearly six years after the cessation of hostilities, a small minority of the signatories (a maximum of five, if we assume that Yugoslavia as well as Czechoslovakia and Poland followed the lead of Russia and China over this) would be justified in holding up a peace settlement desired by the remainder of them. On the propaganda side a further point is that on 1st January, 1942, the date of this Declaration, Russia was not herself at war with Japan, and that, having in fact only come in against Japan at the very last moment, it would be illogical and slightly ridiculous of her to take a solemn line about other Powers making a separate peace with Japan, especially at this late date.
The Implications of a Continued State of War between Russia and Japan
3. Theoretically, on the coming into force of a Peace Treaty between Japan and the rest of the Far Eastern Commission Powers, the Russians (as well as the Chinese) would be entitled to argue that they were themselves in no way bound by the provision in the Treaty providing for the termination of the Occupation, and that they were therefore entitled to move their own troops into Japan in order to continue the Occupation on their own behalf pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Japan and themselves. This implication is an inevitable consequence of a partial peace settlement and there is nothing we can do to mitigate it. On the other hand, in practice it would be clear to the Russians (and the Chinese) that they could only move forces into Japan at the very considerable risk of starting a major war; and, assuming they were on general grounds not yet ready to start a major war, they could clearly not depart from this policy simply because of the partial nature of the Japanese peace settlement; while, if they were ready for a general war, they would contrive to start it anyway, pretext or no pretext. So on this point it seems that our going ahead with a Peace Treaty without Russia would not appre- ciably increase the already existing dangers of the world situation.
The Sino-Soviet Treaty
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4. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 14th February, 1950, speaks in the preamble of the determination of both Powers to prevent a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other State which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression "; a similar formula is repeated in Article I of the Treaty which says: Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other State which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or States allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the meanage its disposal.7"
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Page 251 5. It seems clear that the signature of a Peace Treaty with Japan by the United Kingdom, the United States and other Powers without Russia and Commun- ist China would not in itself constitute a casus fœderis under the Sino-Soviet Treaty, even should hostilities still be continuing between United Nations forces and the Chinese in Korea after the signature of a Peace Treaty; the Peace Treaty in itself being limited to terminating the state of war between the other signatories and Japan and not amounting to an act of "uniting " or allying with Japan. The con- clusion of a bilateral defence pact between the United States and Japan after the signature of a Peace Treaty might, however, be represented as a "union" or alliance between the United States and Japan for purposes of Article I of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, and if on the signature of this defence pact United Nations and Chinese forces were still fighting each other in Korea, it might be argued that the Sino-Soviet Treaty was thereby called into operation. The argument would be legally bad, since the Sino-Soviet Pact only refers to uniting "in acts of aggression." But the effective answer to this problem is the same as that suggested in paragraph 2 above, namely that if the Russians (and the Chinese Communists) want a war, they will have one anyway, whereas if they do not, they will not start one for a technicality.
Conclusion
6. The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that, while Russia's absence from a peace settlement with Japan necessarily represents one more step in the final break-up of the war-time alliance between the West and Russia, it need not in itself lead to any decisive deterioration in the general relations between East and West, unless, on other grounds, Russia wished to use it as a pretext to that effect. Viewed purely as a propaganda issue, the absence of Russia from the peace settlement need not win sympathies for her outside the Iron Curtain, provided our own case is properly handled on the propaganda side. We should try to make sure that the break with Russia comes on an issue favourable to us from the propaganda point of view.