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Page 249 drawing their attention to points of individual concern to them, e.g., with Turkey, to the provision relating to the Straits Convention of Montreux, and, with Belgium, to the provision about the Congo Basin Treaties. The Powers to be approached at this stage would include Poland and Czechoslovakia, who should be given their chance to join the settlement, but would presumably refuse it if Russia had already done so.

All these Powers should be given enough time in which to comment, but should not be allowed to hold up the proceedings.

9. Once the comments of the minor belligerents have been received, these should be incorporated in a final draft to be agreed among the principal parties. In order to gain time, it may be thought that all the proceedings so far could be most appropriately handled through the diplomatic channel.

10. A formal Peace Conference would thus only be necessary in order to sign the Treaty. On the whole, providing that the result is a multilateral Treaty, it may be thought that this procedure would have advantages over any Conference at which actual discussions took place. Such a Conference would not only lead to waste of time by giving minor belligerents scope for not necessarily helpful contributions; it would tend to have an unduly exacerbating effect on international relations by emphasising the absence of Russia and Communist China from the peace settlement; and it would also, with the publicity inevitably involved, tend to magnify the importance of the differences of view between the Powers concerned about the substance of the Treaty, with results that would be helpful to the Japanese but to no one else in the free world. All of these disadvantages would be either reduced or eliminated if the discussions were conducted entirely through the diplomatic channel. Again, if a Conference was held to discuss the Treaty, it would be necessary first to reach agreement on the extremely delicate question of voting procedure. While we have agreement on the official level between the Common- wealth countries on the procedure to be followed, we imagine it would be difficult to get this principle accepted by the Americans and perhaps by some of the other Powers concerned, and that, indeed, it would prove an extra item in the discussions, which might well take up as much time to resolve as most of the outstanding points. of substance. In practice, if America wishes to veto a proposal, the rest of us are not going to be able to stop her, and we are far more likely to make an impression on her by concerted pressure from the Powers concerned through the diplomatic. channel than with all the embarrassing publicity attendant on a deadlock at a Conference.

11. The Japanese Government would, of course, not be allowed to discuss the Treaty, but would be expected to sign it once it had been agreed by the other Parties. There would, however, be no objection to the Japanese Government being shown the draft Treaty, even at a fairly early stage, for their confidential informa- tion, not for comment. (Mr. Dulles gave them a copy of his provisional memo- randum about the Treaty when he visited Tokyo in February, and so far his confidence has been scrupulously respected by the Japanese Government.)

12. As regards publicity, the State Department considered releasing officially the text of their draft, but in deference to representations from ourselves and the Australian Government they have so far postponed doing so. The text of their draft has, as was to be expected, already leaked to the press, but this is not the same as an official release, which would be particularly undersirable as tending to make subsequent concessions by the United States to the views of other Governments all the more difficult. Official publicity will, however, have to be given to the draft at some stage. From our point of view this should perhaps be when an agreed Anglo-United States draft has been duly considered by Commonwealth Govern- ments after adequate advance warning of its publication. (From the point of view of Australia and New Zealand, an official release about the conclusion of a Pacific Defence Pact would be another essential prerequisite.) The susceptibilities of the French and Dutch would also have to be borne in mind.

13. For the place of signature, General MacArthur wanted Tokyo, which seemed to us undesirable on various grounds. With the dismissal of the General, this proposal may fall to the ground, and it may prove easier to get the Treaty signed in Washington, which would seem to be the most suitable place for it, though the point is not one to which we need attach undue importance.

14. The signing of the Treaty should be by the principal parties only, with provision for the subsequent accession of the rest of the belligerenge 249 of 587

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