ANNEX C
PROCEDURE
Page 247
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
1. The following countries declared war on Japan:
Greece
Guatemala
Hayti
Honduras
India
Iraq
Italy
Paraquay Persia Peru
Philippines
Poland
Salvador
Saudi Arabia
China
Lebanon
Colombia
Liberia
Costa Rica
Luxembourg
Cuba
Mexico
Czechoslovakia
Netherlands
Dominican Republic
New Zealand
Ecuador
Nicaragua
Egypt
Ethiopia
Norway
Panamá
South Africa
Syria
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay U.S.S.R.
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
France
In addition, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and Pakistan are also regarded as in a state of war with Japan. Out of the above countries, the following are members of the Far Eastern Commission:
Australia
Burma
Canada
China
France
India Netherlands New Zealand Pakistan
Philippines United Kingdom United States U.S.S.R.
(The question of Chinese participation in the Peace Treaty has been under separate consideration. The position of Russia is considered at Annex D.)
2. As regards the general character of the peace settlement, the United States Government have indicated that, rather than have a settlement held up by difficul- ties about Chinese participation or other questions, they would be prepared to see a series of bilateral Treaties signed by the belligerents with Japan. This solu- tion would be open to legal and practical objections, and would also make it possible for the Chinese Nationalists to take part in the settlement through a bilateral Treaty. We should oppose this strongly, and press for a multilateral Treaty.
3. The United States Government have assumed the burden of centralising the arrangements in respect of the Peace Treaty in relation both to the other Allied Powers and to Japan.~ This is a reasonable procedure, since the United States provides the bulk of the Occupation Forces, and we need not raise objection to it. It fits in with the situation under which other Powers have, since the surrender, dealt with Japan through the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. More- over, provided we can get acceptance for our views on the general shape of the Peace Treaty, this situation has practical advantages, since it prevents the Japanese from trying to play off the various Allied Powers against each other. It is also convenient for us to leave in United States hands the responsibility of dealing with the Japanese over the main Treaty obligations. Otherwise we should feel that we had to record with the Japanese our views on points where we differ from the Americans, e.g., Chinese participation, a situation which would gratify the Japanese but no one else in the free world.
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4. It has been assumed from the outset of the negotiations that the Powers most closely concerned in the war against Japan, otherwise known as the parties principal, should play a special rôle in the drafting of the Treaty. This is a reason- able and convenient arrangement, but the difficulty lies in defining exactly who the parties principal should be. The United States view is that they should be the Powers represented in the Far Eastern Commission plus Ceylon and Indonesia. We do not like this definition, since on the Far Eastern Commission China represented by fe Nationalists, whom we do not wish to participate in the Settle. ment. In our view, the parties principal should be defined as laid down in a Note
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sent by MB Begi87to the Chinese Minister for ForeigngAffairs of 8ecember 1947, i.e., all those countries which are specially concerned in the settlement with Japan by reason of their contributions to the defeat of Japan, the degree to which they suffered from Japanese aggression and their vital interests in the future peaceful development of the Pacific area." This, in fact, gives us the same list as the Americans, but leaves us free to maintain our view, already recorded with the United States Government, that China should be represented at the settlement by the Government whom we recognise as such, i.e., the Central People's Government, and not by the Nationalists, although they happen to represent China on the Far Eastern Commission. There are two further complications. Mr. Dulles has been keeping the Republic of Korea informed of developments about the Peace Treaty, and the United States Government may decide that it, too, should be one of the parties principal. We have told the States Department on the official level that we question this proposal on legal grounds, since the Republic of Korea was never at war with Japan, but was itself part of the Japanese Empire. The State Department reaction was that the political factors involved should be considered as well as the legal ones. From our point of view it seems preferable that Korea should be treated as one of the outer ring of belligerents and given a chance of commenting on the draft Treaty with others in the same category at the appro- priate stage; if, however, the Americans feel strongly to the contrary, the point is perhaps not important enough to deserve pressing further. Secondly, it will be observed that, on the above basis, the principal parties would include all the Commonwealth countries except South Africa. It will be arranged through the Commonwealth Relations Office for the South African Government, even though not treated as one of the principal parties, to be kept fully informed of develop- ments. The special position of Russia is discussed further in paragraph 8 below.
5. The present position is that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have exchanged Aides-Mémoire setting out their respective policy as regards the Peace Treaty, followed by drafts of the Peace Treaty showing the application of their respective policies in detail. The United States Govern- ment have given their draft to the Far Eastern Commission Powers, Ceylon, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea. Our own draft has so far been given only to the Commonwealth and United States Governments. It is proposed to give it also to the French and Netherlands Governments, but no further distribution is contemplated at present. It is an unofficial working draft which has not yet been agreed with the Commonwealth, and is therefore unsuitable for communication to, say, Russia or Communist China, which could be expected to exploit the differences between our draft and the American one.
6. We have suggested to the United States Government that Anglo-United States discussions should be held starting about 23rd April, probably in Washington, with the object of conveying to the United States Government our comments on their draft, and we would hope that these discussions might result in recommenda- tions for a joint Anglo-United States draft, which if approved by the two Govern- ments, would then be circulated to the other Powers concerned. At this stage we should have to bear in mind the Australian elections on 28th April and avoid any step which might embarrass the Australian Government, either before or imme- diately after the elections. As soon as a firm decision had been taken about the talks, we shall in fact have to tell Commonwealth Governments in advance, and keep them informed about the result of the talks.
7. The time-table originally envisaged by the State Department was that comments on their draft would be received by the end of April, that May should be devoted to meetings aimed at resolving any remaining differences, and, if all went well, that a Treaty might be ready for signing at the beginning of July (Wash- ington telegram No. 759). It should be possible to keep to this general programme, the discussions in May having as their basis an Anglo-American agreed draft if one can be produced. It is, however, doubtful whether, given the further necessary stages (see below), a draft could be ready for signature as early as July.
8. Once a draft Treaty had been agreed by the principal parties, the next stage should be for the draft to be circulated to the rest of the belligerent Powers, with a request for their comments within a given period and a notification that these comments would be duly taken into account in the drafting of the final text, but that this would remain the responsibility of the principal parties. Special covering comageini48tions would be necessary in the case of cePage of4th for belligerents,