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SECRET
Page 199
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C.P. (51) 104ced a gooddow are allatte 'n wildzies einantada) dä 16th April, 1951
CABINET
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Background
On 2nd January (C.M. (51) 1st Conclusions, Minute 4) the Cabinet approved comprehensive proposals regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty contained in a Memorandum circulated by my predecessor (C.P._ (50) 323). The policy then approved has since been put to the United States Government on three separate occasions: unofficially in conversations between Mr. Dulles (who has been charged by President Truman with the task of preparing the Japanese Peace Treaty) and His Majesty's Representatives in Washington and Tokyo, and in Canberra by Sir E. Dening, during January and February; officially, in concise form, in an Aide-Mémoire handed to the United States Government on 12th March; and in a draft Peace Treaty which was handed to the State Department as an unofficial working document on 9th April. The views of the United States Government have been made clear to us in similar stages: first, in the discussions with Mr. Dulles; secondly, in an Aide-Mémoire handed to His Majesty's Embassy in Washington on 14th March; and, thirdly, in a preliminary draft Treaty handed to His Majesty's Embassy in Washington on 23rd March. Copies of the United Kingdom and United States drafts, arranged as parallel texts for purposes of comparison, are at Annex A.
2. The problems to be considered fall into three categories:-
(a) The form of the Treaty.
(b) Issues of substance in the Treaty.
(c) Procedural questions related to the Treaty, including the questions of timing, consultations with other Governments and general programme of work.
The Form of the Treaty
3. The most striking difference between the American draft and our own is in length. The United States draft is much shorter and more loosely worded than our own. While I sympathise with the United States Government's wish to see a simple and non-restrictive type of peace settlement, I feel that the general form of the United Kingdom draft is more appropriate to our purpose. It would be against the interests of future relations between the free world and Japan to give the Peace Treaty a form which was not sufficiently precise or comprehensive and therefore left points of friction open for the future; it is far better to face difficulties in the Treaty and do everything possible to resolve them, within the framework of the liberal type of settlement which both our Governments wish to ensure; and a Peace Treaty of this type seems best calculated to ensure the resumption of normal relations between Japan and the participants in the Treaty, and indeed all the rest of the free world.
4 Mr. Dulles has informed His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington that he personally would be glad to see a draft Treaty agreed between our two Govern- ments, which could then be circulated to the other Governments concerned in both our names. I am attracted by this offer and am seeking to obtain confirmation of it. I have also suggested that our representatives should be ready to begin discussions with the United States Government about 23rd April.Page 199 of 587
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The Substance of the Treaty