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My recommendations on the main points of substance, which are discussed in more detail in Annex B, are as follows:

(a) The preamble to the Treaty should contain a declaration by Japan of her intentions-

(1) to apply for membership of the United Nations Organisation;

(2) to uphold the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (3) to maintain conditions of stability and well-being in Japan as provided

for in post-war Japanese legislation;

(4) to conform to internationally accepted fair trade practices.

BEN AM!

(b) The preamble to the Treaty should not, however, bind the signatory. States to facilitate the realisation of Japan's intentions enumerated above-e.g., to support Japan's application for membership of the United Nations.

(c) We should not seek, in view of the United States Government's attitude, to secure a reference in the Treaty to the responsibility of the Japanese militarist régime for having provoked a state of war.

(d) Specific reference in the Treaty to Japan's having surrendered uncon- ditionally in terms of the Potsdam Proclamation would be undesirable.

(e) Subject to further consultation with Commonwealth Governments, we should not insist that the Treaty should require Japan to renounce all past and present claims in the Antarctic Continent and in the islands adjacent thereto, or that it should prohibit Japan from making such claims in the future.

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(f) We should not press for the inclusion in the Treaty of provision for the protection of Japanese nationals who sympathised with or supported the Allies between the outbreak of war and the coming into force of the Peace Treaty.

(g) We should accept the United States Government's suggestion in its Draft Peace Treaty that the exercise of the power to grant clemency, reduction of sentences and parole to war criminals serving their sentences in Japan should be exercised jointly by the Allied Government concerned and the Japanese Government. We should also accept the suggestion that war criminals convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East should only receive clemency, reduction of sentences or parole with the agreement of the majority of the States represented on the Tribunal. In no circumstances, however, should we agree to the Treaty stating that convicted war criminals are eligible for pardon.

(h) We should agree with the United States Government that the Peace Treaty should not require Japan to prevent the resurgence of undesirable political societies since such a provision is likely to prove unenforceable.

(i) In view of the attitude of the United States Government, but subject to further consultation with Commonwealth Governments, we should no longer seek to insist that stocks of Japanese gold should be made available as reparations. (j) Subject to further consultation with Commonwealth Governments, we should agree to the inclusion in the Treaty of an Article on the lines of Article 89 of the Peace Treaty with Italy stipulating that no State which did not become a party to the Peace Treaty would receive any right, title or benefit granted to it in the Treaty.

(k) While all Japanese assets in Allied countries should, by the Peace Treaty, be placed at the absolute disposal of those States, exceptions should be made in the following cases:-

(a) Property of the Japanese Government used for Consular or Diplomatic

purposes.

(b) Property of religious or charitable institutions used exclusively for such

purposes.

Procedure

6. Questions of procedure are examined in Annex C, and the special question of Russian participation in Annex D. This paper does not cover the questions of Chinese participation and the disposal of Formosa, which were recently discussed by the Cabinet as a separate issue (C.M. (51) 22nd Meeting, Item 3). As regards procedure, my recommendations are as follows:

(1) Russia should be offered the opportunity to participate in the Peace Treaty, but we should be prepared to conclude it without Russia rather than allow it to be held up by Russian obstruction.

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(m) The draft Beace T8eaty should be agreed as soon as possible between 5the Governments of the principal parties, being the countries most closely concerned, namely, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and (assuming it can be arranged for them to participate) Russia and China.

(n) We should prefer that the Republic of Korea should not be included among the principal parties, but if, as is possible, the United States Government attach importance to this, we need not insist on our view.

(o) The proceedings should, if possible, be carried on through the diplomatic channel, rather than at a Peace Conference with all its attendant disadvantages of delay and publicity, but a formal Conference should be held to sign the Treaty. (p) The Treaty should be signed by the principal parties only, and there should be provision for the accession of the other belligerents.

Consultation with Commonwealth and other Governments

7. The policy approved by the Cabinet on 2nd January (C.M. (51) 1st Con- clusions, Minute 4) was explained to the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, and it was agreed that individual Commonwealth Govern- ments would consider the matter further. In spite of frequent reminders, no Commonwealth Government has yet expressed views on the policy of His Majesty's Government since that date. They have, however, been kept informed of every stage of the discussions with the United States, and in those discussions we have been careful to make it clear that we speak for the United Kingdom only. All Commonwealth Governments and the French and Netherlands Governments have received copies of all the documents referred to in paragraph 1 above.

(q) With the permission of my colleagues, I propose to keep the Common- wealth, French and Netherlands Governments fairly fully informed on the progress: of our talks.

General Programme of Work

8. Both we and the United States Government are anxious to see the earliest possible conclusion of this Treaty, and the situation has not altered in this respect with the departure of General MacArthur. The general programme which I pro- pose is:-

(r) Talks between our representatives beginning about 23rd April, either in Washington or in London, in an effort to reconcile the two drafts and also to agree on the procedural questions.

(s) A round of exchanges with Commonwealth and friendly Governments through the diplomatic channels.

(1) Reference back to the Cabinet of any major points on which it has not been able to secure agreement.

(u) Discussions, probably in Washington, on drafting the final text. (v) Reference back to Governments for approval.

(w) Signature of the Treaty, possibly in Washington, though this has not been settled.

(x) Ratification.

9. Assuming that no major difficulties arise, it may be possible to begin the discussions on drafting (the stage referred to in paragraph 8 (u)) towards the end of May so that the final draft might come back to us for governmental_approval some time in June and the signature take place perhaps in July. This, I think, is the best we can hope for and the programme may of course be delayed if unfore- seen difficulties arise. Even with this programme, however, my colleagues may note that it may not be possible to table the Treaty in the House before the summer

recess.

10. The next step is to comment as we have been invited to do on the United States draft Treaty. For this purpose a brief will be prepared for the use of our representatives in accordance with the decisions on the points on which I am now inviting your agreement.

11. I invite my colleagues to agree to the proposals set out above.

Foreign office SM58,7

H. M.