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(iii) Regarding (b), the breaking off of all diplomatic relations may properly be regarded as a sanction and is one of the measures specifically mentioned in Article 41 of the Charter. Whether merely refraining from establishing relations that are anyway non-existent will have any effect is doubtful. We are, in any event, opposed to whole idea of abandoning rela- tions with China since the only effect would be to cut off the remaining channel (if the People's Government are also kept out of United Nations) `through which they might be influenced and weaned away from Russia.
(iv) (a) appears to be a consequence rather than a sanction. Its deterrent effect would probably be nil. In our view, how- ever, it seems unobjectionable provided that it is understood as referring to de jure recognition.
4.
We doubt whether those who are in favour of sanctions have really thought out their consequences to the end. It seems to us that none which have so far been suggested could honestly be said to do more harm to China than they would to the democracies.
5.
Moreover in the long run United States attempts to mobilise all resources of United Nations and the Specialised Agencies for the purpose of taking punitive measures against China will only lead to more violent counter-action on the part of Soviet Union. This will in its turn risk starting a pro- cess of disintegration of the United Nations and perhaps even end in the complete withdrawal of the Russians and possibly other (particularly Asian) members.
6.
Furthermore, to pursue the question of political and diplomatic sanctions at the United Nations would inevitably accentuate the divergencies of view in the democratic camp on some of the issues involved. India and probably Pakistan would almost certainly resist all such sanctions and her lead might well be followed by quite a number of the Asian and Arab countries. This would clearly present us with a dangerous split on East/West lines, even assuming (and this seems improbable) that all the West European Governments who have recognised Peking were prepared to participate in some or all of these sanctions.
7.
Moreover, from the strictly practical point of view it is doubtful whether the application of political sanctions would produce any result that will not be achieved without them. The changeover in the Security Council and General Assembly is in any case unlikely to take place until the Central People's Government shows some genuine desire to achieve a peaceful settlement since few countries who have not already recognised Peking will now do so unless the Central People's Government adopts a less intransigent attitude. In these circumstances the injection of the issue of political sanctions into the pro- ceedings at Lake Success could only be directed to a further moral gesture and would place a serious strain on the demo- cratic camp without securing any real compensating advantage. Should China however extend her aggressive activities to Indo- China, Burma or Hong Kong, a new and even more dangerous situa- tion might then arise. But in such a case greater unanimity of view and purpose would almost certainly be obtained and the whole effect of political sanctions, unless they are to be no more than an entirely empty gesture, largely depends on whether an overwhelming majority of the free nations is prepared to apply them. At this stage such a majority could in our view not be obtained, and to seek to do so would merely lead to unnecessary trans and dissension in the demagat 13 famp7
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