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There are several other possible economic sanctions, but as they are not live issues, I do not propose to deal with them here. There are references to them in Annex B (telegram No. 814 Saving to Washington).
8.
There might be considerable support for a selective embargo against China in the United Nations if it had as its purpose the denial of goods of prime importance to the Chinese war effort. Items selected would mostly be covered by the list of goods whose export to China and the Soviet bloc is already prohibited by certain Western countries co-operating through the Paris Consultative Group. Thus, a United Nations selec- tive embargo of strategic materials would close to China alone sources of supply outside the Paris Group and might help to prevent leakage through re-export from countries other than the Soviet bloc which are not members of the Paris Group.
9.
Chinese reactions to a selective embargo are diffi- cult to estimate. It is possible that China might ignore it entirely, as she did when controls over vital strategic materials and oil were first instituted in the summer of 1950. Chinese propaganda has recently been stressing the "futility of the imperialist blockade" and the country's independence of "imperialist and capitalist economy". Even a selective embargo, however, will increase tension in the Far East.
COMMONWEALTH VIEWS
10.
There is likely to be general Commonwealth agreement with the view that the United Nations should continue to lay main emphasis on efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with China. It is probable that while the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa may agree in general with the conclusions of the study of possible political and economic sanctions against China outlined in paragraphs 4 to 7 above, the imposition of even a selective embargo against China will not be supported by the Asian members of the Commonwealth.
ATTITUDE OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA
11.
Should the Good Offices Committee fail, the position of the United Nations might be seriously undermined if no further steps were taken to meet Chinese aggression in Korea. But the conclusions to be drawn from the preceding paragraphs are that political sanctions might not only be unlikely to achieve their desired effect but might also be harmful. They should therefore be opposed. As regards economic sanctions, the only measure which His Majesty's Government should be pre- pared to support is a selective embargo on strategic materials designed to decrease China's war potential. Under the present proposal for a selective embargo, no fresh action would be called for by Hong Kong and Singapore. But if significant leakages occurred through the two Colonies, it might be necessary to consider supplementary action (over and above the proposals considered by the Economic Policy Committee on 3rd April). Item (v) in the American list of possible sanctions, calling for an embargo on all materials useful for the produc- tion of the preceding four categories, is clearly objection- able, since differences of interpretation might well give rise to mutual recriminations amongst members of the United Nations. We shall therefore have to take this up with the State Depart- ment.
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-3--RECOMMENDATIONS 87
12.
161