CAB129-45 — Page 179

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Page 179 (a) Refusal to recognise any territorial gains resulting from aggressive activities of the People's Government.

5.

It may be necessary for political reasons to provide

· some outlet for feeling against China in the United Nations, but it should be realised that none of the preceding courses seem likely either to persuade China to mend her ways or to decrease her war potential. It is also to be noted that:-

(i) Recognition of a regime ought not to be either granted or withheld on moral grounds once the facts of its stability and its control of its territory are established beyond reasonable doubt.

Several statements to this effect have been made on behalf of His Majesty's Government, both in Parliament and in the United Nations. To agree therefore to the first of the four courses of action would run counter to our declared policy.

(ii) As regards not sending diplomatic representatives to Peking, this would isolate China still more from the West.

(iii) The same considerations as in (i) above apply to the question of Chinese representation, and are strengthened by the fact that the Charter of the United Nations lays down that China is not only a member of the United Nations but also a permanent member of the Security Council.

6.

(iv) Refusal to recognise any territorial gains resulting from China's aggressive activities is acceptable provided it is understood as referring to de jure recognition of such gains.

In brief, the possible sanctions outlined in para- graph 4 above are unsatisfactory and unlikely to achieve the required effect. They may well provoke strong Russian counter- action in the United Nations (with consequent danger to the United Nations Organisation as a whole) and also create a split between the Asian and Western countries, thus playing into Communist hands. The arguments outlined in paragraph 5 above are set out in greater detail in Annex A (Foreign Office telegram 813 Saving to Washington).

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

7. (a) The only economic sanction which is under discussion is a United Nations selective embargo. From our desk-level talks, we know that such an embargo is envisaged by the State Department in the form of a resolution calling on members of the United Nations to place an embargo on the export to China of

(i) petrol, oil and lubricants,

(ii)

atomic energy materials,

(iii)

arms and ammunition,

(iv)

implements of war, and

(v) items useful for the production of (i) – (iv) above.

They suggest that it might be left to individual countries to interpret what commodities fall within these categories, although it would have to be made clear that countries should not defeat controls imposed by others. These proposals seem to be the very minimum likely to find support in the United States Administration. The State Department hope, too, that like-minded nations would go further, as the Americans have done, outside the framework of the United Nations.

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