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So long as we are actually in Egypt, the Egyptians must know that, if they overstep certain limits, they must make it correspondingly more probable that we shall insist upon remaining in Egypt. Equally, the presence of British troops in the Canal Zone and the Middle East base exercises a stabilising influence throughout the Middle East as a whole.
(ii) We need to retain the Middle East base and to send British troops into Egypt in time of war. Any decision to withdraw our troops gradually before 1956 must prejudice to some extent our ability to do this. The extent to which this is true depends partly upon whether any war comes before or after 1956, and partly upon the general political situation both in Egypt and in the rest of the world.
If
(iii) The Egyptians will certainly raise the question of the future status of the Sudan. We cannot make any substantial concessions to them over this, and it may well be that no agreement will be possible. we cannot agree on the Sudan, it may be that our efforts to reach agreement on defence will prove abortive.
Conclusion
6.
We have frequently stated publicly that it is our desire to settle outstanding differences with Egypt in the spirit of the long tradition of friendship between the two countries, on a basis of equality, and with full respect for the independence and sovereignty of Egypt.
Since the war, there has been an increased strain on our own resources all over the world. This has made it harder to maintain our position in the face of Egyptian demands, but at the same time the growth of the Soviet menace has made it even more imperative that we should maintain a firm base from which to defend the Middle East. It would be difficult to meet the further strain on our resources which might be occasioned by an immediate rupture with Egypt over the current negotiations.
7.
8.
(a)
(2)
(c)
There are therefore three possible courses of action before us:-
to maintain our forces and base in the Canal Zone and tell the
Egyptian Government that we are not prepared in present circumstances to resume negotiations for a revision of the 1936 Treaty';
to make a real effort to secure agreement by negotiation on a
revision of the Treaty;
to offer to resume negotiations with the Egyptian Government upon the basis of the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff, but to make no substantial concessions which would derogate from these proposals.
If we adopt the first course, we should have to be prepared to maintain our position in the teeth of the Egyptian Government's opposition. As I have already made clear, this would entail serious political conse- quences. It might also give rise to administrative difficulties for our forces in the Canal Zone, and possibly lead to disorders endangering British lives and property.
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9.