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The second course would almost certainly involve some further .concessions to the Egyptians who, as I have stated, are unlikely to accept the present proposals as they stand. The Chiefs of Staff have stated that their present requirements represent a minimum, any reduction of which would gravely prejudice our retention of the Middle East base in a state which would permit its immediate use at the beginning of a war. It would be difficult therefore for us to offer any purely military con- cessions sufficiently substantial to influence the Egyptians but not of such a character as to prejudice our own requirements.
10.
The third course may well not result in any agreement being reached. It should, however, enable us to spin out the negotiations for some time, and at worst it should strengthen our position, since we shall be able to say that we have made an offer which is reasonable in the circumstances. If, nevertheless, any agreement did result from such negotiations, it must at least provide a modus vivendi up to 1956 and if possible a long-term arrangement thereafter without seriously prejudicing our ability to use the Middle East base in the event of war.
11.
While on some grounds I should prefer to adopt the first course, I recognise that the consequences may be unacceptable, and I am on the whole in favour of adopting the third course.
Foreign Office, S.W.1,
30TH MARCH, 1951.
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H.M.
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