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Defence
23. If progress is made in the tasks described above we can have some assurance that Russia will not gain marked success in the cold war in the Middle East. It is necessary also to consider how we may best prevent Russian success in a shooting war in that area. There is no doubt whatever that the Middle East must be defended, on account of its value as an offensive base, as a source of oil and as a focal point of communications. The forces of Middle East Governments will never be adequate to make any appreciable contribution to this task, though the Turkish forces and the Arab Legion will be able to play a useful rôle in the early stages. In order to enable our forces to undertake successful offensive and defensive operations in the Middle East, it is necessary to have our main base in Egypt, the assurance that Turkey is both able and determined either to safeguard her neutrality or to impose effective delay on Russian forces, adequate subsidiary strategic facilities in Jordan, Iraq and Cyrenaica and preferably some additional facilities in Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon. It will also be essential in time of war for our forces to be able to operate in and through Israel. We do not at present desire strategic facilities in Israel in peace-time, largely because of the political pressure to which this might expose us. But the method of obtaining access to ports, airfields and communications in Israel must be constantly reviewed. possible that it may be easier for the United States than for the United Kingdom to obtain the necessary agreement from Israel.
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24. Middle East Pact. In order to be assured of the above facilities, our ultimate object must be to see the whole Middle East area covered by a system of defence agreements. Thought is being given to the desirability of a general Middle East Pact complementary to the Atlantic Pact. But it is unlikely that the United States would be willing to join in such a pact in the near future, and without United States participation it would be of doubtful value. Moreover, the prospect of the Arab countries and Israel joining together in such a pact is remote. Finally, a Middle East pact on the lines of the Atlantic Pact would not assure us of the strategic facilities which we possess or require. We should, therefore, still wish to retain and reinforce our bilateral agreements. If the Arab States wished, however, we should not object to some kind of general Arab League endorsement of bilateral agreements.
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25. Supply of Arms.-In áttempting to consolidate our strategic position and to build up a defence system throughout the Middle East, we shall constantly be faced with pressing requests from Middle East Governments for extensive supplies of war material. În some cases we have treaty obligations to make these supplies. Some of these requirements may be unrealistic and it may sometimes be better for the Governments concerned to spend more on economic development and less on arms. But the building up of independent armed forces is a matter to which Middle East States attach such prime importance that we must be careful to recognise it in all our dealings with them. If they cannot get what they want from us, they will certainly turn to other sources of supply, e.g., particularly Czechoslovakia. Our task must be to obtain the fullest and most definite statements of requirements of Middle East countries and at the same time to examine ways and means of meeting these requirements in the United Kingdom, including examination of the possibility of new production.
26. United States Strategic Fácilities.-The United States has airfields at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and at Mellaha in Tripolitania. She also wishes to obtain a fighter base. The strategic presence of the United States in the Middle East is to our advantage. In time of war action should be on an Anglo-American basis.
Turkey
27. Turkey sits astride the entrance to the road along which Soviet forces would have to advance in order to reach the Canal, and it is therefore very important that the Turks should be in a situation to delay such an advance as long as possible. The Americans have taken over from us the main burden of arming and training the Turks, though we still supply instructors, and given time the Thugch5arnofht be made capable of major degensive Operations. But it is never likely to be so strong as to make it worth our while that Turkey
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should gome nef 5 War on our side if she had not beegstacked 6Our treaty of alliance with the Turks, which requires us to come to their aid if they are attacked but does not require them to come to our aid if we are independently involved in war with Russia, is therefore not at all disadvantageous to us though prima facie one-sided. The Turks set great store by this treaty, whose validity we have recently reaffirmed, and it helps to keep up their morale in face of Russian threats. We should continue to contribute what help we can to the modernisation of the Turkish armed forces and we should continue to bolster Turkish resistance to Russian encroachments by moral and political support.
Anglo-American Co-operation
28. Co-operation between London and Washington in regard to the Middle East is extremely close. Divergence of policy over Palestine has now been very largely narrowed. In other matters there is virtual agreement, which is perhaps closer than in regard to any other area. Now that our differences over Palestine have been largely removed and, we hope, will not recur, it is our primary task to convince the Americans of the importance of a constructive Middle East policy on the lines of the present paper in the fields of defence, resistance to Communist penetration, economic development and social reform, and by constant co-operation in London, Washington and in the field to give practical effect to this programme by joint or concerted action. The United States do not wish to supplant our special political position in the Middle East. Although a large material contribu- tion both for defence and economic development ought to come from them, we have so much greater experience and expertise that we can justifiably claim to maintain this special position even if there are limits on our own material contribution.
Calls on His Majesty's Government
29. The need of Middle East countries for the provision of external finance from outside sources in order to carry out their development projects has been referred to in paragraph 15 above. Their need for guidance and technical advice from outside is no less great. If these are not provided by the West, they may sooner or later be provided by Russia. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government's first task is to decide, in the light of the Middle East projects under examination and of various other competing claims, what are the general lines of economic development in the Middle East which they can support and encourage and, secondly, what is the nature and extent of possible United Kingdom assistance. Our contribution may be one or all of the following:-
(1) allocation of United Kingdom production;
(2) support for loan applications by Middle East Governments to the Inter-
national Bank;
(3) larger sterling releases;
(4) direct cash loans;
(5) technical assistance.
Our present very limited resources will make it difficult for His Majesty's Government to consider any direct financial advance save in exceptional circum- stances. (In the case of Iraq, for instance, the internal financial situation is such that pressure for a direct cash loan from His Majesty's Government seems bound to increase, and in the case of Jordan the country's financial resources are so limited that it has even been found necessary for His Majesty's Government to provide a credit for internal expenditure.) The claims on available resources are world-wide. Our own resources are very limited. The decision will therefore be difficult. But even in advance of any further consideration one point is perfectly clear. If we have to refuse all participation in Middle East economic development, not only shall we lose our own position and influence there, but this will have a disastrous result for our political, strategic and social objectives, since in that case either development would not take place at all or it would take place under other and dangerous auspices.
Current liabilities of His Majesty's Government
30. Apart from the question of participation in general economic develop- menlagethe Middle2East, there are a number of chaga62abifi6i62 which His Majesty's Government have undertaken in the course of day to day dealings
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with the Middle East2qr high it is being recommended that they shouldønder- take. The most important of these, so far as can at present be foreseen, are:-
(a) Jordan.-Our present annual contribution to Jordan in the form of a subvention to the Arab Legion is £3 millions. This is based on a force of 7,000 men. The Chiefs of Staff consider that the size of force required to defend Jordan is 25,000. This would probably
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involve an increase in our annual subvention to £5 millions.
(b) Cyrenaica.-Cyrenaica at present receives a grant in aid of some £3-£1 millions per annum. The future grant in aid required by the territory is hard to estimate because the territory's economy will receive considerable help from the sums to be expended on military installations, which, of course, are a charge on His Majesty's Govern- ment, and by means of which some employment might be found for Arab refugees.
(c) Arab Refugees. In 1948-49 His Majesty's Government contributed £1,100,000 to the relief of Arab refugees. The Foreign Office have recommended that in 1949-50 His Majesty's Government should be willing to make a further contribution for temporary relief which might be in the neighbourhood of £1,000,000. We are also making an interest-free loan of £1,000,000 to Jordan to assist in the permanent settlement of Arab refugees.
(d) Military Mission and Civil Air Training Mission in Saudi Arabia.- The present cost of these Missions is about £90,000 a year. (e) Levy force in the Persian Gulf. A recommendation will shortly be made for the establishment of a small local force under British command in the Trucial Coast area of the Persian Gulf with the primary object of stopping the trade in slaves, which has recently increased. A very rough estimate of the cost is £40,000 a year.
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(f) Provision of Experts-Foreign experts of the necessary calibre can only be obtained if salaries and conditions of service are such as to attract first-class men. Middle East Governments cannot always afford to pay adequate salaries, in which case it may be impossible to appoint the right men unless some means can be found to make up the difference. Arrangements are also required to ensure that British experts and others who take service in a Middle East country do not suffer for having done so on their return to the United Kingdom, and it is essential to have an efficient organisation in the United Kingdom for the recruitment of experts.
(g) Training.-His Majesty's Government could usefully extend facilities free or at reduced rates for technical training either in the Middle East or in the United Kingdom.
Foreign Office, London, S. W. 1,
30th July, 1949.