8. Our aim must be that the whole of the Middle East, including both the Arab countries and Israel, should have close and friendly relations with the West, but if we were to gain the friendship of Israel at the expense of losing our position and influence in the Arab countries, we should lose more than we should gain. We must therefore hold the two if we can.
SPECIFIC TASKS AND METHODS
9. The following points are applicable to all or most of the area, subject to stated exceptions. Notes on some of the more important tasks and problems in individual countries are given in the Annex.
Social and Administrative Reform
10. The standards of administration are lamentably low by Western standards and in many cases declining. Except to some extent in Israel, Turkey, and to a lesser degree in the Lebanon and Jordan, social conditions are most inequitable and provide an obvious field for Communist propaganda. Although the present régimes are in most cases unsatisfactory, we are obliged to deal with them in current affairs and there is usually no possible alternative régime which would not be under Communist or quasi-Fascist influence. We are often accused of deliberately supporting reactionary and corrupt régimes. One of our principal tasks must be to use every possible means to encourage the emergence of progressive and honest governments and efficient administrations. Our means of carrying out this task are-
(a) Constant advice to Governments.
(b) The supply of social and labour experts.
The supply of information about social developments in the United
Kingdom. (d) Whenever we are able to give material or other assistance, we should seek to make use of it to secure an improvement in the local administrative and social conditions. (e) While being scrupulously careful not to join in any intrigues against existing régimes, we should lose no opportunity of maintaining informal contact with progressive individuals or groups who seem to be genuinely working for administrative and social reform. 11. Where drastic constitutional changes occur, as recently in Syria, we should be ready to establish our influence with the new régime in order to make the most of its plans for reform. But there can be no certainty that such changes will always be for the better, and in special cases, e.g., Iraq, there may well be special dangers.
12.
We should be particularly careful to ensure that social reform keeps pace with economic development, e.g., that the reform of land tenure does not lag behind the increase of irrigated land.
Education
13. In the long run progress towards more progressive and honest govern- ment will depend largely on education. Outside pressure on Governments towards reform can never achieve the same results as pressure from an educated nucleus within. One of our most important general tasks must therefore be the encourage- ment of education on the right lines. Such encouragement can best be given in practical form by British Council advice to local educational authorities, by the maintenance and expansion of British schools and by the offer of scholarships in the United Kingdom. We should be prepared to devote increasing attention and resources to the creation and development of this nucleus in each country, even perhaps at the expense of some other forms of expenditure.
Economic Development
14.
The countries of the Middle East vary greatly in their resources. The populations are by no means commensurate with these resources (over-population in Egynte under foulation in Syria and Iraq; the greatest prouch oil resources in the world in Kuwait with 150,000 inhabitants). The standard of living is,
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however, almdsagatyersalfy6far too low except for a few peoplegat the topбwhose standard is far too high. In most cases a redistribution of existing wealth would not be enough to remedy the dangerously low standards of the masses. The development of potential resources proportionately to the financial possibilities of each country must go hand in hand with social reform. Various schemes have been surveyed, e.g., the control of the Nile waters, irrigation and flood control in Iraq, extensive agricultural development in North-Eastern Syria, and the com- prehensive Seven-Year Plan in Persia. (A paper by the Middle East Official Committee containing a selective list of projects is being considered by the Official Committee on Economic Development in relation to other calls on available resources from the Colonies, the Commonwealth, &c.)
External Finance
15. Plans for economic development pose two extremely difficult financial problems the provision of internal and external finance. It has been estimated very roughly that the projects whose early realisation the Middle East (Official) Committee believe to be desirable would call for an internal expenditure of about £70 millions over the next 10 or 15 years and external expenditure in foreign currencies of about £90 millions over the same period. To the extent that Middle East Governments cannot meet external finance requirements from their own earnings, the primary source for such finance is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in which the United States Government and His Majesty's Government are major participants. There may be calls on the United States Government and on His Majesty's Government in addition. The attitude to be adopted by His Majesty's Government in dealing with these requirements is discussed in paragraph 29 below.
Internal Finance
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16._ Difficult as the provision of external finance may be, the provision by Middle East Governments of adequate internal finance is likely to be, if anything, a more intractable problem. It cannot be found without improved collection of revenue and higher taxes. These demand major administrative and political reforms, of which no Middle East régime has yet shown itself capable, but which are absolutely essential if the objectives of our policy are to be achieved. Even in advance of decisions about external finance, much can be done by His Majesty's Representatives to bring home to Middle East Governments the gravity of the decisions with which they are faced in this internal field. We must continually press them not only to bring development plans to more advanced stages by expediting technical study and preparation, but, more important still, to face immediately the administrative, political and social problems involved in the provision of the necessary internal finance and in the creation of social conditions in which the maximum benefit may be derived from the economic plans.
British Middle East Office (B.M.E.O.)
17. One of our most effective agencies for bringing about improved social and economic conditions and for co-ordinating British political, strategic and economic interests is the British Middle East Office, which was set up in 1945. Its tasks are to give expert guidance to Middle East countries in economic and social matters, to make recommendations on political questions affecting the Middle East as a whole and to give political advice to the Middle East Defence Co-ordination Committee. The B.M.E.O. should receive every encouragement and possibly increases in staff.
Communist Activities
18. The above paragraphs deal largely with the creation of conditions in which Communist penetration will fail. Middle East Governments are slow to take the necessary action in this field, but are usually readier to deal with the manifestations of Communist activities which come to their notice. We can and should give valuable assistance in this matter also both as regards publicity and security measures. We should at the same time be careful to
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watchPfge signofthe reactionary Governments uBagantiComfomist measures to repress genuinely progressive opposition.
External Relations
19. Arab Unity-We desire that Middle East countries should become increasingly strong and prosperous and should compose the quarrels and differ- ences which have in the past so weakened them. We do not wish to express an opinion about the form which Arab unity should take as between, e.g., the existing Arab League, the proposals for the unity of the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan) or the Greater Syria plan (the unity of Syria and Jordan). We are strongly opposed to the use of force by one Arab country against another to bring about changes of their relative status. But if closer relations between any or all of the Arab countries, leading even to some kind of union, grew up organically and constitutionally, by the free consent of the peoples concerned, and without hostile intentions against other Arab States, we should see no reason to oppose. this and, indeed, such a development might have advantages, though we should have to consider carefully how it affected our treaty relationships. The Arab League has not been as beneficial as was hoped. Its main function has been as a forum for nationalist propaganda, though it may well have had some value as a safety-valve. His Majesty's Government cannot take any steps to bring it to an end but we should not regret its demise. If it continues in being we should hope it would concentrate more on social and economic problems.
20. Israel.--The developments in Palestine since the end of the Mandate, resulting in the emergence of the State of Israel, have been one of the most disturb- ing elements in Middle East policy. It is largely owing to them that the present review of our Middle East policy is being held. We must never under-rate the political and psychological preoccupation of all Arab Governments and peoples with the Palestine question. They will, for instance, refuse to respond to our guidance on social and economic matters if they find us differing too widely from them over Palestine. His Majesty's Government accept Israel as an established fact and intend to grant her de jure recognition at the earliest suitable moment. They regard it as a matter of high importance that she should be orientated towards the West and play her part in the defence of the Middle East against Communist penetration and Soviet aggression. For this purpose they will use their best endeavours to have friendly and mutually profitable relations with her. At the same time they are bound to have regard to their existing friendships and alliances with the Arab States, particularly as the latter are at present more willing than Israel to commit themselves to the anti-Communist camp. It would be too high a price to pay for the friendship of Israel to jeopardise, by estranging the Arabs, either the base in Egypt or Middle Eastern oil. Subject always to these interests being safeguarded, His Majesty's Government are anxious to pro- mote not merely peace but friendly relations between Israel and the Arab States. They would see no objection to the development of normal trading relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours on a basis of complete independence. But His Majesty's Government would not regard it as in their interest that Israel should acquire more Arab territory without a quid pro quo or that she should carry her economic exchanges with the Arab States to the point of dominating them economically and so politically, and thus perhaps imposing her own ideas of neutrality on the Arab world. They would not lend their assistance to the fur- therance of any such ambitions and would indeed support the Arab States in resisting them.
21.
This being our general policy, we should judge on their merits all ques- tions arising in our relations with Israel and we should be ready to take such opportunities as occur of improving these relations in such ways as do not endanger our position in the rest of the Middle East and the Moslem world. We do not at present dispose of such influence with the Arabs, however, that we can safely press them to make friendly overtures to Israel.
Baged shof1a6ontinue to co-operate as closelyage posib oth the United States Government and the Palestine Conciliation Commission of the United Nations to bring about a final settlement of all Palestine questions, including particularly the Arab refugees, the territorial settlement, Jerusalem and Haifa.
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