STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN
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The modernizing activities of Li and others were never coordinated by the central government. Nor were any efforts made to integrate the "regional" armies of these leaders into the dynasty's "regular" military system. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War, the Ch'ing army was little more than a motley collection of diverse armies at various stages of development. There was no standardization in arms, dress or training, no unity in command, and only the most rudimentary commissariat, transport, medical and other services.17 China's two small, uncoordinated provincial military academies did little to improve the situation. China had no draft system and no General Staff. Funding for most modernizing projects (including the armies of Li and others) was irregular and unpredictable. Meanwhile, the "regular" military forces of the empire—some of which had undergone cosmetic surgery to become "re-trained troops" (lien-chün) or members of the Peking Field Force (shen-chi ying)—continued to consume about two-thirds of the national "budget."t
China's failure to reform her military institutions in the nineteenth century prevented the emergence of a modern, Western-trained Chinese officer corps. In the eyes of most foreign observers in China, this was the key deficiency of the Chinese army.19 Lacking sufficient numbers of competent Chinese officers, individual Ch'ing officials found it necessary to continue employing foreigners not only to instruct and drill Chinese troops, but also occasionally to lead them.20 The presence of these individuals in Chinese armies often produced or exacerbated anti-foreign feelings, encouraged foreign interference, and created security problems.21 The existence of neutrality laws and other legal obstacles complicated the problem of employing foreigners in a military capacity after the breakdown of the "Cooperative Policy," and the absence of central government guidelines for the employment of foreign nationals encouraged rivalry and intrigue among the Western powers for heightened influence in Chinese military affairs.22 In all, the experience of using foreign military assistance was humiliating, expensive and frustrating.
The contrast with Japan is striking. Although no less anxious than the Chinese to maintain control over foreign military employees, and to avoid surrendering administrative authority to them, the Japanese treated foreigners far more regularly, rationally, and regally.23 Extremely careful in its centrally-supervised hiring
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