9
30. Rescue operations were concluded at about 0845, possibly a little earlier. The Fire Brigade were then able to devote their full attention to fighting the fire itself and preventing its spreading to adjoining property.
Casualties:
31. 155 persons were reported missing after the fire, and a further 18 died in hospitals of burns or shock, making a total of 173 casualties. Of the 119 bodies re- moved to the mortuary, only 23 could be identified as those of missing persons. Bodies of 36 persons were therefore never recovered. We were concerned to find out whether beyond reasonable doubt all the persons reported as missing had in fact died in the fire. Evidence from Dr. D. W. Gould of the Hong Kong University, and late Police Medical Officer, indicated that the fire was sufficiently intense completely to incinerate a body. Coupled with the fact that there was on the staircase between Nos. 363 and 365 a considerable quantity of ash and bone fragments and that about 25 of the bodies unrecovered are likely to have been those of young children, we are satisfied that all those reported as missing died in the fire.
32. The particularly noteworthy feature of the fire was the enormous heat that was generated and the amazing rapidity with which it ignited either partially or en- tirely a building divided by party walls into nine separate tenements. It was undoubtedly this great heat and the rapid expansion that caused such a terrible loss of life. It is inconceivable that a fire spread in any other way than by the rapid and fierce flaming of cinematograph film could have caused such casualties in a tenement block. A consideration of the responsibility for loss of life therefore necessarily in- volved an examination of how the film came to be in Godown No. 5. This is discussed in Chapter VII.
CHAPTER V-THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE FIRE BRIGADE
TO CONTROL AND EXTINGUISH THE FIRE.
Time of Arrival of Appliances:
33. We heard a very considerable volume of evidence on the action taken by the Fire Brigade to control the fire. We had at our disposal the Central Fire Station Occurrence Book, brief reports by all the senior officers present at the fire, and state- ments made by the Sub-Officers in charge of appliances. At Appendix 2 will be found a list of the times of departure of appliances compiled from the diary, and an estimate of their times of arrival at the fire area. We have not attempted a detailed description of the fire although we heard much evidence about the earlier stages, but have con- centrated on those essential points, to the examination of which attention must be directed in assessing any responsibility for loss of life and damage attaching to the Fire Brigade.
34. It is clear from the Occurrence Book that at 0830, i.e. within 25 minutes of the outbreak of the fire, there were five appliances on the scene. The Acting Chief Officer, Mr. C. W. Brand, arrived at about 0822. By that time the tenements and godown No. 5 were well alight, and rescue operations fully in progress. On examina- tion of the evidence, it appears that there was little possibility of saving from destruction either the tenements or godown No. 5, and the officer in charge of opera- tions must largely have been concerned with the prevention of fire spreading to adjoining buildings and getting a firm hold in godown No. 2. Mr. Brand told us that on arrival he was aware that there was a fire blazing in the interior of godown No. 2, because he saw water being played upon it from the seaward side of the wall across Whitty Street, but he himself did not see this fire till after rescue operations had been completed.
Action taken by the Chief Officer to Combat the Fire in Godown No. 2:
35. The Chief Officer was concerned with rescue operations during the initial stages of the fire. These were being skilfully and courageously carried out and we believe that all possible steps to save life were taken. We understand that it is the