Sessional_Paper_1949 — Page 14

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first duty of senior officers at a fire to ensure the safety of life, and Mr. Tiplady, the Acting Deputy Chief Officer, told us that it is the responsibility of senior officers to take action personally if necessary. We were told that all officers were competent to carry out rescue work. At the time of the Chief Officer's arrival on the scene there were engaged in rescue operations three responsible officers, Deputy Chief Officer Tiplady, Divisional Officer Browne and Station Officer Wong, the former two personally involved. Mr. Brand also concentrated his efforts on rescue operations. We can understand his anxiety that no efforts should be spared to save life, but we consider that, if the Chief Officer himself wished to take personal responsibility for the rescue operations, the responsibility for the general supervision of the fire area should have been delegated to one of three senior officers already present. If this had been done, it is possible that the urgency of the action to be taken in godown No. 2 might have been appreciated at an earlier stage.

36. In our opinion the only possible way to have prevented the utter destruction of the contents of godown No. 2 was to have tackled the various fires within it at source in their very earliest stages, and, in view of the fire burning in the scavenging lane at the rear and the merchandise piled up high against the windows in Whitty Street, the only way in which this could be done was to effect an entry into the godown through the doors or windows on the seafront side. The Chief Officer told us that he was anxious not to admit air unnecessarily, but we think that to have been able to play hoses in the neighbourhood of the flames themselves, rather than on the walls of the building, might have been worth the risk of admitting more air. Instructions were eventually given to the officer in charge of the fire floats to break in the centre door of godown No. 2 and this was done with crowbars. It is difficult to establish the exact time when ingress to the godown was effected, but it was almost certainly after nine o'clock, and probably about 0915. If an entry had been made between 0830 and 0845 and if hoses had been brought in then, we consider that there might have been a chance to save this godown.

37. It must not be implied that if such action had been taken we consider that the major part of the contents of godown No. 2 would certainly have been saved. We could come to no conclusion about this on the evidence which we heard, but we should have felt that all possible steps to prevent destruction had been taken. Owing to the enclosed nature of the building and its large cubic capacity, its lack of partitioning, the fire being alight right from the beginning on several floors, the dessicating action of the extremely hot flame from the film, and the difficulties which firemen would encounter within from smoke and general obstruction, it is indeed doubtful whether the fires could have been extinguished or segregated, even were ingress to the godown effected at an earlier time.

Sending of the "Fifth Alarm”:

38. There is a further consequence of the apparent absence of general control at that early stage. The "Fifth Alarm" which implies that a fire for the time being is out of control, that it is spreading rapidly, and involving surrounding property, was not sent till 0848; it was then given on Mr. Brand's instructions. We consider that the urgency of having more firemen present in the early stages warranted the sending of the "Fifth Alarm" before 0848. The fifth alarm when given brought an additional fire float and an appliance from Eastern Station together with their complement of firemen. Mr. Brand in his evidence informed us that he did not want all appliances to arrive simultaneously, as their placement would have been a matter of difficulty. We consider that these additional appliances, especially the fire float, might have been of great assistance in these early stages, because of the additional manpower that would have been available for the work of breaking in doors and windows on the seafront, and that the fifth alarm should therefore have been given earlier. If there was a danger of cluttering up the fire area, the Eastern appliance could have been stopped a short distance away and called forward when required. The second fire float could hardly have impeded operations along the sea wall.

Action taken to Prevent the Fire Spreading:

39. When entry into Godown No. 2 was effected, the Chief Officer saw that the fire had taken a firm hold and realized that owing to its open internal structure and the difficulty of gaining access to the upper floors, the destruction of the contents was