will be needed.
Could you please consult whoever is
responsible either Mr. MacInnes or the Cabinet Office and arrange for
the necessary requests to issue. I imagine the Foreign Office will not
wisk to prepare their brief until the last moment, while the Hong Kong
brief could probably be started now in terms of general policy and
long-term assessment, but will clearly need final revision nearer the
day. Mr. Holt's first talk with the Prime Minister is on Tuesday,
13 June.
(A.H. Reed)
24 May, 1967.
M Macinner tells me
will provide the necesscen
thakat
the TO.
насерс
Groups.If that
wr mal
가
ток робник
produce one.
CONFIDENTIAL
ARE, 67.
अ.
пова
SECRET
INVARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
(15)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 63
25 MAY 19/
HWJA 1/17
Cypher
D. 25 May 1967 R. 25
0550Z
FLASH SECRET No.69%
Addressed to Commonwealth Office,
Repeated
"Peking No.267
(C.O. please pass)
KOMOTRATION
Following from Galsworthy for Forster.
Please ensure S. of S. has following information before Thursday
D.O.P.C. meeting. Reference paragraph 4 of appreciation in our telegram
from Hong Kong No.688.. 135
S. of S. will wish to know that evidence is
accumulating from several sources in touch with pro-Communists that high
level Communist official from Canton has arrived in Colony to
investigate situation. The reports indicate that Peking are gravely
dissatisfied with local Communist apparatus for their conduct of recent
events. Local leadership is reportedly being criticised for misjudging
and misreporting the extent of their own support, of public opposition
to themselves and determination of the Government. There are less
reliable reports that they are also being criticised for inflating and
misreporting the nature of the "Fascist atrocities" and generally for
the way in which they have misled Peking. It appears likely that this
man's mission is to report to Canton and to advise on whether a further,
all-out effort should be made against Hong Kong or not. Less reliably,
he is reported to have instructed that, pending a decision, some form of
pressure should be maintained but that no serious incidents should be
fomented.
2. Another (and curious) development is that Ho Yin is now in Hong Kong.
It will be recalled that he is a prominent pro- Communist millionaire in
Macao who, having played an important part initially in the crisis
there, was thought to have been discarded. He has apparently now
returned to some degree of favour with Peking. He is said to have been
seen by Chou En-Lai in April.
3. It appears that he has come over on the suggestion of R.C. Lee (one
of the Governor's intermediaries) and with the approval of Canton where
we believe he might have been yesterday. He has been having
consultations with the "millionaire wing" of the Communist leadership
here (who are known to be disturbed on two counts, first that Peking
were not happy about the escalation, second, because the campaign was
not going well). indicated a desire to make some direct contact with
Cater on the Governor's staff: and we are hoping that a meeting between
He has
/Cater
A
13)
SECRET
PARA
165
SECRET
Cater and Ho Yin, with R.C. Lee and another Chinese friendly to us, will
take place at 4.30 this afternoon at the Hang Seng Bank building. (Ho
Yin's brother is connected with this bank.)
The
4. Probably nothing but courtesies will emerge from thi meeting today.
But it could be that Ho Yin may be probing (either for his own reasons
or on instructions) for some face saving gesture to enable the
Communists to disengage. Governor has instructed Cater to go to the
meeting primarily to listen. But if this or subsequent meetings go well,
Cater has been authorised to make certain points:-
(1)
that the Governor, knowing a need to save face would arise, had already
deliberately permitted demonstrations outside the main gate of
Government House which were allowed to reach a degree of unruliness
before being stopped that would not otherwise have been allowed (this
was in fact one of the Governor's reasons for tolerance):
(2) that a positive indication of good faith will
be required of them, such as the physical removal of the loudspeakers
from the Bank of China building:
(3) that he felt it probable the Governor would not
wish to take retrospective legal action for offences committed in the
last few days provided all Communist action now ceased, although he
could not of course intervene where charges had already been laid:
(4)
The
that, before going on leave, the Governor might in a television or radio
interview make a generally conciliatory (though not of course
apologetic) reference to recent events, including the theme of no
victimisation. major part of the subject matter in any such interview
would be references to general progress in Hong Kong, including mention
of steps to be taken to improve labour relations.
The Governor has some other ideas which could be held in reserve: the
above seems enough for a start.
5. Governor, however, has also asked me to emphasise that too much
should not be made of these developments and that, although all is quiet
today, Hong Kong is by no means out of the wood.
6. All this provides a further strong reason for not taking action
against N.C.N.A. in London.
7.
During this lull, though Governor has been preparing for tougher
measures he has not had to use any. Since publication yesterday of
regulations dealing with inflaminatory loudspeakers, there have been
virtually no such broadcasts. Governor had not therefore yet had to
declare any buildings closed areas. It is good that he has these
measures still up his sleeve. It is important to recognise that, if the
Communists decide after this lull to have another go, Governor may have
to hit them with all he has got.
8. Bolland would be grateful if copy could be passed at once to Private
Office, Foreign Office.
SECRET
/(Passed
•
SECRET
(Passed to Resident Clerk and Private Office, Foreign Office)
(Passed to Peking an advance copies to Messrs. de la Mare
and Wilson)
Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'
I.G.D.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
-
D.I.O., J.I.R. - P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Mare
- Hr. Bolland
11
ti
ti
"
#
-
tt
11
**
Treasury
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
- Mr. D. Hawkins
Export Credits Guarantee Department Kinistry of Defence (Room 7365)
-
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
-
It
Ir
Room 7163) Room 51 31 )
Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office Board of Trade
Mr. Henn
Major Koe M.0.2
Consular Dept.
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
En clair
D.
25 May, 1967
R. 25
09552
25
152
MAY
לי
1967
3
IMMEDIATE
No. 699.
Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.). Repeated "Peking No. 268.
*
"P.A. Singapore No. 130.
"Washington No. 141. (Please pass to Washington only).
131
Peking telegram No. 561.
Casualties in Kowloon Disturbances.
Hong Kong Information Services have issued a public challenge to anyone
knowing of any deaths in the disturbances (beside the one boy who was
killed by a stone on 13 May) to produce the names of those killed and
information about where
the bodies or graves are. One man (Fung Yuen-Heng) claimed by the
pro-Communist press to have been killed on 22 May appeared perfectly fit
in court yesterday.
The pro-Communist press has so far made no response. We (and no doubt
they) know perfectly well that one person only
2=
has been killed.
(Passed as requested and advance copies to
Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. de la Mare and Mr. Wilson)
ond
Distribution
-
-
H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:-
P.S. to Prime Minister
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.63
252.mi 170/
HLIA 1/1
D.I.O.. J.I.R.
P.S. to Mr.Rodgers Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
LET
rr
R2
13/
**
1:
11
TEXT
+
11
REF.
204
Mr. Wilson Mr. Denson
Mr
·
Treasury
Foggon
Mr D. Hawkins
*
Export Credits Guarantee Department- Mr. C.P. Rawlings Ministry of
Defence(Room 7365)
"
I
11
tt
14
Board of Trade
11 7163) 5131)
Commonwealth Office (News Dept.)
-
Mr Henn
Major Koe
M.0.2.
- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
Mr. Carrocher
KREISTRATION
En clair
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 25 May, 1967. R. 25
Cr
0958Z
PRIORITY No. 702.
153
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
Repeated
It
It Peking No.270
Washington No.143
(S. of S. please pass Washington)
Hong Kong Disturbances.
Tone of pro-communist press for 25 May
is rather less militant and more defensive. Much of front page of both
main papers is devoted to Peking news not connected with Hong Kong. "Wen
Wei Po" editorial attacks Government for using new "fascist" regulations
for suppression of struggle and emphasises unity of workers in carrying
out struggle to the end. A good deal of space is devoted to debunking
news items aimed at showing support of local population for Government.
(Passed as requested and advance copies to
Commonwealth Secretary Messrs. de la Mare
and Wilson)
Distribution
-
*
H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:-
P.8. to Prime Minister
Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
LRET
Fir
D.I.O., J.I.R.
- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Mare
tr
it
艹
-
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
-
Mr. Denson
Treasury
Export Credits Guarantee
Department Ministry of Defence
#
I
RECEIVED IN Board of Trade
ARCHIVES No. 63)
3 0MAY 1907
ний
リ
PAR
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
- Mr. C.P. Rawlings
(Room 7365)
-
Mr. Henn
(Room 7163)
-
(Room 5131)
Major Koe M.0.2
4
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
H
CYPHER/CAT A
154
RESTRICTED
བཅས་"
PRITY BANGKOK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 280
25 May 1967
RESTRICTED
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.280 of 25 May. Repeated for
information to long Kong and Canberra.
On instructions received from Canberra on 22 May the Australian
Commercial Counsellor and Consul here are telling businessmen and
tourists who ask that it is unwise to go to Hong Kong.
3.
2.. This is the reverse of what we are telling our people and Such Thais
as enquire namely that we see no reason why plans made to visit Hong
Kong should be altered. The Canadians, indians and New Zealanders are
adopting much the same line as ourselves.
Not only does it look odd in a matter like this to have
Commonwealth Missions in the same capital putting out conflicting
advice, I should also have thought the Australian attitude wrong in that
it encourages those who want to make the situation in
On the face
of it Hong Kong sound worse than it really is. Canberra's attitude does
not square either with the situation in Hong Kong as reported in the
London and Bangkok Press and an J.1.0. telegrams from London, or with
the forecast in Guidance 106, that the Hong Kong authorities should be
able to keep the situation under control.
4. You may care to consider whether anything can or should be said in
Canberra or London to produce a more united front. Meanwhile we shall do
what we can in conversation with our Australian colleagues to mitigate
the effect of their instructions. F.C. pass Hong Kong 51 and Canberra
14.
Sir A. Rumbold
Bent 1000Z 25 May
[Repeated as requested] Recu. 15172 25 May
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0.
F.3.D.
S.E.h.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
Consular Dept.
News Dept.
C.0.
F.E.P.D.
B.T.D.
RES ARCHE
IN
SOMAL90
168
HWAI/D
t I
SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAM NO. 1058
VVVVV
PAA.
RESTRICTED
:
SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
Cypher
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Sent 25 May, 1967. 1230Z
155
FLASH SECRET
No. 1038.
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong.
Repeated PRIORITY for information to Peking.
14
庸
处
tt
+
"POLAD Singapore. "Washington.
121
131
Your telegrams 677 and 691.
From Commonwealth Secretary.
Disturbances.
I have now consulted my colleagues and we agree with you that the key to
the situation is the maintenance of public confidence and police morale.
I would like to congratulate you and your staff and particularly the
police force on your Buccess in holding and keeping on top of the
situation. On this I am sending you a separate message which you can
make public.
2. We agree our policy must be to continue to deal firmly and fairly
with any disorders which the Communists may try to instigate.
3. We also agree that action should be taken about selected Communist
leaders so as to disrupt their campaign but have some doubts about your
being able physically to deport them. We are advised that they might
well not be accepted at the border, and that therefore we might lose
face. But we must rely upon your judgment to weigh up the various
factors here.
As you
say this weapon should not be used lightly and I assume that you would
begin with only two or three key leaders at a time. You have authority
to go ahead if the situation deteriorates but please keep me informed of
any action you take.
4. We also agree that if the Communist pres8 continues to carry out or
step up the campaign of sedition and intimidation you should use your
emergency regulations to close down the printing presses. I would,
however, wish to be consulted before any action is actually taken.
5. With reference to paragraph 1 of your telegram 691, it is appreciated
that any decisions on action against the N.C.N.A. must fully take into
account the position in Hong Kong.
LASY 6.
121 9 137
паро
SECRET
172-179 92428.288
151
SECRET
6. I agree with views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 3. We had already
thought of taking up with the Americans a reduction of their use of Hong
Kong on the lines you suggest and this will be pursued.
7. It was not in any case intended to make any announcement about the
decision to withdraw a major unit (your paragraph 7) till later in the
year and, prior to your present troubles, the position was to have been
reviewed in June in the light of the situation in China.
8. The return of Parliament next week will give me an opportunity to
make a statement on the situation in Hong Kong and to report H.M.G.'s
support for the Hong Kong Government's measures to maintain law and
order and of our determination to stay in Hong Kong.
9. We naturally hope that a show of firmness in maintaining law and
order will not lead to an all-out confrontation with the C.P.G. We
ought, however, to be prepared for this possibility and I am sure that
you have already planned how you would meet it. I expect Galsworthy can
tell me about your contingency planning on his return.
Please
10. Your telegram No. 698 has just been received. do not at present say
anything publicly about your intention to go on leave as this may cause
loss of confidence just when the situation seems to be improving,
paragraph 4 of your telegram refers.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking,
POLAD Singapore and Washington)
Distribution
-
H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.
J.I.C. External Distribution
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:-
P.S. to Prime Minister
Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
11
-
-
D.I.O., J.I.R.
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers Mr.
de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
tt
11
##
T
11
Treasury
-
Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)
11
11
tt
7163) 5131)
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
-
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
Major Koe
M.0.2.
Board of Trade
SECRET
- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
I
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date) 255-67 124.08.
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
Frip!/17
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified
Flash Immediate
Priority Routine
}
25.5.67.
Despatched Momo Kong / DS4A-
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
Blu
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
Hong Kong
No.
(Date)
And to:-
1038.
Repeat to:-
Saving to:-
260
Distribution:-
Copies to:-
Ar Owne
AG
25-6-7.
"Security classification] -if any
[ Privacy marking ]
any
[Codeword-if any].............
25 MAY 1967
SECRET
GOVERNER, HONG KONG.....
Addressed to
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