is likely to provoke retzkittxury retaliatory
action by the Chinese Government. The Chinese could
cut off water and food supplies but the major effect
of doing so would be to injure the interests of the Hong Kong Chinese
population generally, including their pro-Communist supporters. Even if
these
supplies were cut off, Hong Kong could manage by
strict rationing and alternative supplies of food from
Japan at extra cost.
15. A long drawn out confrontation could sap the
morale of the Chinese and continuous widespread
disturbances could lead to fatigue on the part of the
police. But it would also affect the pro-Communists
unless they were able at an early stage to secure some
resounding success.
16. The alternative to firm action is likely to be
further humiliation and a gradual loss of control
over the situation in Hong Kong. We would only be
able to remain there on sufferance and we would have
to carry out the instructions of Peking and remove from
Hong Kong any organisations or interests which the
Chinese Government considered hostile or unfriendly.
Many Chinese and others who had thrown in their lot
with us, especially those in the public services and
the police, would be at risk.
17.
Conclusion.
a) The risk of an all-out confrontation with
China should be accepted.
(b) The known pro-Communist leaders of the
SECRET
present
SECRET
present campaign should be picked up and
deported if possible, or detained.
(c) Action should be taken against the Communist
newspaper "Wen Wei Po" and against other
Communist newspapers if they continue the
campaign of sedition and intimidation.
(a) The Governor should announce the review and
AXE¤nsatin expansion of Hong Kong's labour
legislation including steps being taken to
improve conditions of service.
We should
assist by providing expert assistance for this
purpose.
SECRET
SECRET
ANNEX
Hong Kong Disturbances
Events in Kowloon
The recent disturbances in Kowloon arise from an industrial
dispute in April between workers and their employers about wages
and conditions of employment involving 650 workers in two factories
producing artificial flowers. The injection moulding sections of
both factories were closed and the workers were dismissed. The
Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government offered to help the
parties to reach agreement but this was refused by both prties.
2. Disturbances broke out on the 6th May outside one of the
factories situated in Kowloon and as a result 21 persons were
arrested.
3. On the 8th May the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union put
formard four demands:-
4.
(8) immediate release of the workers arrested;
(b) punishment of the evil doers and compensation;
(c) guarantee of the workers and personal safety;
(a) no interference henceforth by the police in
labour disputes.
The pro-communist press endorsed these demands and deliberately
slanted its reporting to create the impression of unnecessary
brutality by the police who had in fact behaved with exemplary
moderation,
The pro-communist press also demanded apologies by
the Government.
5.
Further disorders broke out in Kowloon on the 11th May and
continued for several days. The police were attacked, cars were
Bet on fire and some property was damaged.
Curfews had to be
/declared
SECRET
SECRET
declared in certain areas to help control the situation.
Chinese Government's Statement
6. On 15th May the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
a statement castigating the Hong Kong authorities for "Fascist
atrocities", hostility to the Chinese people and "collusion with
the United States Imperialists". The statemont included a demand
that Her Majesty's Government should instruct the Hong Kong
Government to accept all the local pro-communist demands which the
Chinese must have known to be unacceptable to the Hong Kong
Government.
The statement was the strongest and most abusive about
Hong Kong for some years.
7. No direct reply was given to the Chinese Government statement
but on the 17th May a statement was released in London referring
to the industrial origin of the disturbances and stating that "H.M.G.
fully support the Hong Kong Government in fulfilling its duty both
in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is making to
bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute".
8. From the 18th May the campaign switched from Kowloon to
Government House on Hong Kong island. At first the demonstrators
were noisy and abusive. Petitions were presented and Government
House was plastered with posters.
9.
On the 20th May the demonstrations began to lose their orderly
and disciplined nature and the demonstrators started to resort to
rowdiness and violence by molesting spectators and blocking roads,
particularly in the area of Statue Square and the Law Courts.
Loudspeakers on the Bank of China buildings adopted an anti-British
tone and included such slogans as "Kill Trench" "British murderers",
etc.
10.
The Hong Kong Government issued notices stating that dis-
orderly processions or unlawful gatherings would not be allowed but
SECRET.
/the
|
SECRET.
the people would still be allowed to continue to exercise their
right to petition the Governor in small, orderly groups or by post.
11. The situation deterriorated further and on the 22nd May the
Governor asked for permission:-
(a)
to neutralize the buildings from which the campaign
is being directed the Bank of China and the communist-
-
controlled Federation of Trade Union H.Q. and the Workers
Club; and
(b) to bring the Commando Carrier "Bulwark" to Hong Kong.
Both these requests were approved.
Attacks on our posts in Macau, Peking and Shanghai.
12. Soon after the disturbances began in Hong Kong, the British
Consulate in Macau wes the target of repeated demonstrations and the
staff have been compelled to vacate their quarters for a hotel.
13. After the Peking statement of 15th May similar denonstrations
were mounted against our offices in Peking and on the 16th May the
On the
22nd office in Shanghai was invaded by a mob and sacked.
May the Charge d'Affaires in Peking was informed that the Chinese
Government considered that the 1954 Agreement was annulled and
demanded that the Shanghai office should be dosed within 24 hours.
The apparent parallel with Macao
14. There is an apparent parallel with events in Macao which
have been widely studied in pro-communist circles in Hong Kong.
There too the crisis began with a local dispute (in that case,
however, badly handled by the police) which led to "demands" by
local pro-communists which were endorsed later by the Chinese
authorities. The Portuguese reacted by trying to appease the local
pro-communists who only stepped up their demands. Internal and
external pressure was applied, including the implied threat of
/Chinese
SECRET
SECRET
Chinese military action, until the Portuguese backed down and
accepted the Chinese demands in full. The Chinese were entirely
intransigent and seemed determined to enforce their will and to
demonstrate that the Portuguese were remaining in Maoao only on
sufferance and subject to them falling in with Chinese wishes on
all points.
I d 12829)
J
!
|
SECRET
Reference..
Kr
Mr. Forster
ties
147
Hong Kong
We spoke and I enclose copies of a draft D.O.P. paper and background
note which I prepared last night. I have not yet had an opportunity of
discussing these with Ers. Hart, who is at present holding a meeting
with the Banabans. I hope to do so at about 12.30. I also enclose a copy
of three recent telegrams from Hong Kong, and you will see from telegram
No. 677 that the Governor now asks for urgent authority to pick up and
deport the ringleaders.
SECRET
APK.
(H.P. Hall) 23 May 1967
MEMORANDUM
From PRIVATE SECRETARY
To The Ganimats
To....
N429) 155249 50 7-65 ATGS 656.
mala...
SECRETARY OF STATE
With 147
145,146,
144
You will wish to have the attached papers of Ivertaken
have
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see
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The Hall.
148
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROFERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
OFD(67)39
24th May, 1967
CABINET
COTY NO.
14.
DEFENCE AND OVERSE.. POLICY COMMITTEE
HONG KONG
1.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs
We have always known that Hong Kong was vulnerable.
But
it is valuable to Ching end we had assumed that it was in her interests
to maintain the status quo. Indeed there has been evidence in the post
that the Central Government have controlled and restrained the
Communists in the territory.
2. The scene has now changed. arising out of labour troubles a major
campaign has been mounted in Hong Kong itself linked with hostile
demonstrations in Shanghai and Teking and with the expulsion of our
representative in Shanghai. (summery of recent developments is t innex).
locsening of control by mainland
+
China of the Communists in Hong Kong has resulted from recent
developments in the Cultural Revolution. The first mass demonstrations
in Hong Kong were probably promoted independently by the Communists
there, in an opportunist desire to make the most of genuine labour
unrest. Mainland China had to reset to the situation, and chose to give
support to the communists in Hong Kong.
3. The unknown factor in the present crisis is how far mainland China
has now decided to go in bringing pressure on H.M.G., and how for there
are different views there on future policy.
11. The possible interpretations of the Chinese course of action,
assuming that she is now controlling events, appear to be these:-
(1) China has made no basic policy change, but is trying to
achieve some rropaganda victory as the price for calling- off the
disturbances. Such a propaganda gain could relate to the presence of
American ships and troops from Vietnam on leave in Hong Kong; or to
labour reforms; or to the release from prosecution or imprisonment of
the persons charged with or sentenced for their role in the ricts.
5.
(ii) China has decided to try to force us to accept a Macao
position in Hong Kong. If this is so, she will continue to escalate
liong Kong disturbances to the point when, in order to remain in Hong
Kong, we must capitulate to whrte ver demands are made, and, in effect,
accept Chinese domination of Hong Kong.
(iii) China has decided to sacrifice the economic benefits
she derives from Hong Kong to Cultural Revolution "purity" of doctrine,
and to drive us cut of Hong Kong completely.
We cannot resist a determined attempt to force us out altogether and
we could not tolerate the humiliation of remaining in Hong Kong without
effective control. I um convinced that a Macao solution would be
unacceptable.
It would be damaging to
our international prestige (at a time when Gibraltar and den are
It would be intolerable for the
presenting several problems).
Governor, and impossible in terms of my responsibility for Hong Kong in
hurliament. This being so, it follows that if China
SECRET
/is
SECRET
is embarking upon course (ii), our resistance to it might compel
her to resort to course (iii)
6.
Firm
But there is no need to assume the worst and our immediate
responsibility is to maintain law and order, retain morale and
confidence so that te economy can continue to flourish. action is
required to do this but, at the same time we should avoid, as far as
possible, action which could be regarded by the C.1.G. as provocative.
We should avoid doing anything to "escalate the confrontation" to the
extent that we get involved in a situation from which there is no escape
except by abject surrender or a futile attempt to fight it out, leading
to the same result, Our steps, therefore, must we directed to the needs
of the local security situation, while taking the wider implications
into account, and they need to be carefully measured and timed.
7.
Recommendations
I accordingly ask my colleagues to endorse the views in paragraphs 5 and
6, and to agree to the following action:-
(i) Local Security
(11)
(a) We are already sending the Commando Carrier
BULWARK to Hong Kong where she should arrive by the end of this week.
(b) The Governor has already been authorised to
neutralise several of the buildings from which the campaign is being
directed.
(c) The Governor has now asked for authority to pick
up and, if possible, deport (or failing that, detain) some of the known
leaders of the present campaign limited to 2 or 3 in the first instance.
The disruption of the leadership would be a distinct and positive gain
and would be seen by the majority of the population as firm action. On
the other hand it is unlikely that the Chinese Government would accept
these leaders as deportees and, if they were detained in Hong Kong, this
would provide Peking and the local Communists with a grievance. The
Governor has undertaken not to use this weapon lightly or unnecessarily
and, on balunce, I recommend that he should be given authority to go
ahead if the situation requires it.
(a)
Action against the principal Communist newspaper which is the official
C.F.G. orgon in Hong Kong.
The Governor accepts that prosecutions for sedition or inciting the
police to disaffection might have dangerous repercussions, and is
proposing instead to seek emergency powers to close down the printing
press. But he would only take action after consulting me on cach
individual case. I would propose to give him a general authority on this
understanding.
Labour
Relations between employees and employers in Hong Kong have not been
good and we should do our best to improve matters. Less than 12% of the
total working force are declared members of trade unions and there are
100,000
SECRET
/members
SECRET
members of the Communist Unions as opposed to 70,000 others.
There is a complete split between Communist and K.H.T. unions.
The Communist Unions are basically disinterested in genuine industrial
issues.
I have
been engaged in discussion with the Hong Kong Government, through the
Governor, about labour reforms. The employers, who have in the past
shown a considerable amount of resistance to reforms are at presunt very
anxious about the general situation and we could immediately carry
through extensive and long-overdue
labour reforms
I would like to
do this. It would be welcomed by the average worker in Hong Kong and
would give us a better moral position, but it would be unlikely to
satisfy China. Nevertheless if the Chinese were to seek a lowering of
the temperature, this would give the C...G. a face-saving
I recommend that we should press the
Governor to go ahend vigorously with improvements in the labour
legislation including early stops to shorten the hours of work of women
and young persons.
(iii) Other Matters
Facilities to the U.8.
In the background of our difficulties with the C.I.G. lies their
irritation at the facilities which the U.S. forces in Vietnam enjoy in
Hong Kong. we have latterly restricted visits of worships to the same
number as last year and more recently have suggested that larger ships
should not come. I do not recommend any further inmediate retien since
any significent diminution would be claimed by the Chinese as a
propaganda victory. But I am sure that this is something that we should
keep under review in the longer term.
H. B.
Commonwealth Office, 5 ..1. 24th May, 1967
SECRET
SECRET
ANNEX A
Events in Korleon
HONG KONG DISTURBANCES
The recent disturbances in Kowloon arise from an industrial dispute in
April between vorkers and their employers about wagos and conditions of
employment involving 650 workers in two factories producing artificial
flowers. The injection moulding
sections of both factories were closed and the workers were dismissed.
The Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government offered to help the
partics to reach agreement but this was
rofused by 1oth parties.
2.
Disturbances broke out on the 6th May outside one of the
factories situated in Kowloon and as a result 21 persons were
arrested.
3. On the 8th May the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union put
forward four demands:-
LL.
(a) immediate release of the workers arrested; (b) punishment of the
cvil doors and compensation; (e) guarantee of the workers and personal
safety;
(a) no interference henceforth by the police in
labour disputes.
The pro-communist press endorsed these demands and
deliberately slanted its reporting to create the impression
of unnecessary brutality by the police who had in fact behaved
with exemplary moderation. The pro-communist press also demanded
apologies by the Government.
5. Further disorders broke out in Kowloon on the 11th May and
continued for several days. The police were attacked, cars were
Curfews had to be
set on fire and some property was damaged.
declared in certain areas to help control the situation.
Chinese Government's Statement
6.
On 15th May the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
/a statement
SECRET
SECRET
a statement castigating the Hong Kong authorities for "Facist
atrocities", hostility to the Chinese people and "collusion with
the United States Imperialists".
The statement included a demand
that Her Majesty's Government should instruct the Hong Kong Government
to accept all the local pro-communist (lemands which the Chinese must
have known to be unacceptable to the Hong Kong Government. The statement
was the strongest and most abusive
about Hong Kong for some years.
7. No direct reply was given to the Chinese Government statement but on
the 17th May a statement was released in London referring to the
industrial origin of the disturbances and stating that "H.M.G. fully
support the Hong Kong Government in fulfilling its
duty both in maintaining law and order and in the offorts it is
making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute".
8. From the 13th May the campaign switched from Kowloon to
Government House en Hong Kong island. At first the demonstrators
word noisy and abusive. Petitions were presented and Government
House was plastured with posters.
9. On the 20th May the demonstrations began to lose their
orderly and disciplined nature and the lemonstrators started to
resort to rowdiness and violence by molesting spectators and
blocking ronds, particularly in the area of Statue Square and the
Law Courts. Loudspeakers on the Bank of China buildings adopted
an anti-British tone and included such slogans as "Kill Trench"
"British murderers", ctc.
10.
The Hong Kong Government issued notices stating that
disorderly processions or unlawful gatherings would not be allowed
but the people would still be allowed to continue to exercise
their right to petition the Governor in small, orderly groups
or by post.
11. The situation deteriorated further and on the 22nd May the
Governor asked for permission:-
(a) to neutralize the buildings from which the campaign
/is being
SECRET
|
1
را
is being directed
-
SECRET
the Bank of China and the
I
!
communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union H.Q.
and the Workers Club;
and
(b) to bring the Commando Carrier "Bulwark" to
Hong Kong.
Both these requests were approved.
Attacks on our posts in lineno, Poking and Shanghai.
12. Soon after the disturbances began in Hong Kong, the British
Consulate in Macao was the target of repented demonstrations and
the staff have been compelled to vacnto their quarters for a
hotel.
13. After the Peking statement of 15th May similar demonstrations were
mounted against our offices in Foking and on the 16th May
On the the office in Shanghai was invaded by a mob and sacked.
22nd May the Charge d'Affaires in Poking was informed that the
Chinese Government considered that the 1954 Agreement was annulled
and demanded that the Shanghai office should be closed within
24 hours.
The apparent parallel with Macao
14. There is an apparent parallel with events in Macao which
have been widely studied in pro-communist circles in Hong Kong.
There too the crisis began with a local dispute (in the case,
however, badly handled by the police) which led to "demands"
by local pro-communists which were endorsed later by the
Chinese authorities. The Portuguese reacted by trying to
appease the local pro-cummunists who only stopped up their
demands. Internal and external pressure was applied, including
the implied threat of Chinese military action, until the
Portuguese backed down and accepted the Chinose demands in
full. The Chinese were entirely intransigent and seemed
determined to enforce their will and to demonstrate that the
Portuguese were remaining in Macao only on sufferance and
subject to them falling in with Chinese wishes on all points.
SECRET
L
SECRET
COM FOR REGISTRATIO
149
-NER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO.1751
SECRET
TO FOREIGN OFFICE
24 MAY 1967
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.1751 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION (PRIORITY) TO HONG KONG AND ROUTINE TO PEKING
AND POLAD SINGAPORE.
10MY TELEGRAM NO.1697: DISTURBANCES IN HONG KONG.
IN FURTHER GENERAL DISCUSSION TODAY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR CONCERNED
(DONALD) SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD MORE OR LESS REACHED THE
CONCLUSION THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO (NO) SIGNS OF ANY DECISION TO
DAMP DOWN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER IN HONG KONG ITSELF, PERHAPS
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF RECENT DAYS, AND A HOPEFUL ONE, HAD BEEN
THE REMARKABLE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM PEKING. THE AMERICANS HAD
NOT (NOT) AT THAT STAGE HEARD OF THE NCNA ARTICLES REPORTED IN PEKING
TELEGRAM NO.563, AND DONALD AGREED THAT THE DECISION TO PUBLISH SUCH
INFLAMMATORY FALSEHOODS WAS DISTINCTLY OMINOUS. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT
HE WOULD NOT (NOT) ATTACH TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARTICLES IN
ISOLATION: THEY DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PUBLIC REITERATION OF THE DEMANDS:
AND THE IMPORTANT QUESTION WOULD BE WHETHER THE CHINESE NOW SUSTAINED
SUCH A TONE.
2. OTHER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE SINCE TENDED TO WRITE DOWN
RATHER FURTHER THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE PARTICULAR REPORTS, POINTING
OUT THAT THEY ECHO SCURRILITY IN SOME PROVINCIAL PAPERS ALSO, BUT NEED
NOT (NOT) NECESSARILY IN THEMSELVES LEAD TO ANY PARTICULAR ACTION BY THE
CHINESE.
3. DONALD, LIKE THE GOVERNOR, EXPECTED LEFT WING EXPREMISTS IN HONG KONG
TO PURSUE FURTHER EFFORTS AT DISRUPTION THROUGH UNIONS AND INDUSTRY: HE
FEARED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT INDEED FOR THEM TO ACCEPT THE BAN
ON MEETINGS.
*
4. DONALD AGREED WITH A SUGGESTION THAT THE EXTREME CHINESE MEASURES IN
SHANGHAI MIGHT TIE IN WITH ACCUMULATING INDICATIONS
OF GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE PROVINCES,
RECEIVED IN
/AND
SECRET
t
104
PARO
ARCHIVES No.63
2 5Mini 170/
HWB1/12
SECRET
WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 1751 TO FOREIGN OFFICE
-2-
AND CORRESPONDING SENSITIVITY AT THE ONLY OFFICIAL FOREIGN
REPRESENTATION OUTSIDE PEKING. HE COMMENTED THAT THE REGIME NOW SEEMED
TO BE RUNNING INTO SERIOUS PROBLEMS EVEN IN SHANTUNG AND HEILUNGI ANG,
TWO OF THE VERY MEAGRE NUMBER OF PROVICES IN WHICH THE REVOLUTION HAD
REACHED AN APPROVED STAGE. THE EXCUSE TO ENGINEER THE DE FACTO CLOSURE
OF OUR POST IN SHANGHAI MIGHT HAVE BEEN ONE ELEMENT IN THE CHINESE
DECISION TO BACK THE EXREMISTS IN HONG KONG, THOUGH HE DOUBTED IF IT
WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR ELEMENT SINCE THEY WERE NOT (NOT) PEOPLE WHO
NEEDED EXCUSES. FO PASS PRIORITY HONG KONG 73 AND ROUTINE PEKING 22 AND
POLAD SINGAPORE 25.
SIR P. DEAN
SENT AT 25/0403Z
RECD AT 25/0403Z
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0. F.E.D.
S.E.A.D.
C.O. F.E. & P.D.
D.T.D.
D
+
SECRET
SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAM
NO.
1033
BBM
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Hason
Mr Gaminam
سام
145/15 (150)
c.c. Mr. Hall
Mr. Moreton Mr. Diggines
Mr. Holt's Visit : 12 to 18 June
-
Since the original briefing programme was drawn up we have had the
troubles in Hong Kong and the Middle East. I think Mr. Holt will wish to
discuss both these matters with the Prime Minister, and separate briefs
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.