fco-40-328-disturbances-in-hong-kong-bomb-attacks-and-threats — Page 2

National Archives 英國國家檔案館 All

COPY TO:

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE,

54 PALL MALL

PA

&

814

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

रिवरि

27.4.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE

HONG KONG

M Ganfinanci

This hands careful егодня

9

F

تا

Study. 9, ws. Pike 6

April, 1977. Ave,

RP (52) in CR 6/3371/71. T.S. 7/71.ful 19

Dear Kestie HKKI/19 Dea

ן.

T

dai comm

copies to: sil. Math. M: Morgan (with our 20 Miciifunt.

HK. Dept.

Mw 267

Scut

In your telegram No. 257, you asked for our considered
views on the recent spate of "bombing", and these of course we have been
preparing. The situation is a complex one, with possible dangers in it,
and, without wishing to be any way alarmist, I have felt it right to
send you a full report both for your own information and, if you think
fit, to bring Murray MacLehose up to date.

2.

Enclosed with this are:-

(a) S.B. assessments;

(b) an analysis of each incident;

(c) Press summaries of material on:-

(i)

the "bombing"; and

(ii) the release of confrontation

prisoners which took place at the same time as the "bombing" started.

(d) S.H.A's assessment of opinion from other than press sources on the
release of the prisoners.

SECRET

Mr. Mary chore has seen a

copy of this letter (with a submission Land Yomon

on TAKK 1/1)

B11/6.

५.

27/4.

SECRET

·

2 -

3.

One must first take into account the background. Every Government is, I
imagine, inflicted with what might be termed the "hostility creep" while
in office. Hong Kong is, of course, no exception: and it is a phenomenon
which is perhaps exaggerated here by multi-racialism, a rootless
community with no basic

security or identity to sustain it, and opportunity to vent feelings
periodically by voting to throw the rascals out.

4.

This creep, here anyway, is a selective process more
than a generalized one. Almost any actions of Government, especially
when ordered solutions have to be applied to difficult mass situations,
leave someone dissatisfied with or without reason; and the number of
such people, equally inevitably, gradually grows. Moreover the hostility
creep flourishes best in times of comparative progress and prosperity,
such as Hong Kong has been enjoying.

5.

Graft onto this an unprofessional, highly competitive and sensation
seeking press presented with Government as a convenient target because
we do not retaliate, and the result once again is the encouragement of
critical public attitudes. This is the more dangerous in that, given the
Colony's form of Government, we are always vulnerable to charges
(however ill-founded) of being dictatorial, or insensitive to public
opinion. vulnerability is the greater when leading members of the
community are reluctant to defend publicly policies with which they
privately agree.

Our

6.

Then there is the fact of our necessarily careful
policies immediately after 1967 when, for good reasons, we leant over
backwards, perhaps too much so, to keep public opinion on our side. This
has encouraged a climate of popular thought which assumes Government not
only will, but must, defer to any and every point of view

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

and meet every demand: particularly if it is sufficiently vehemently
expressed (this too, after all, is a public attitude which is growing in
most places). Anyone whose view is not accepted, particularly if his
pocket is affected, tends to join the ranks of the critical, without
wondering whether he might not be wrong and Government right.

7.

Finally, the years 1967-9 meant the deferment of a number of difficult
problems, such as the hawkers, which must now be tackled; and also led
to the appearance of new problems giving rise to complaints such as the
increase in violent crime, rents rising sharply from the low levels of
1965-69, rising costs and wage levels, and traffic congestion, most in
fact originating in very rapid recovery from the uncertainties of the
period or rising affluence. These we are in process of dealing with as
sensibly as we can, but the occasional mistiming or unfortunate
coincidence of events must be admitted to have flawed our record
recently now and again. With the best will in the world, a machine the
size this Government has now reached does not always operate as smoothly
as one would wish.

8.

In this and similar ways Hong Kong will always tend to build up to
periods of incipient emotion, when a casus belli of any sort (a paper
flag or ad fare increase) easily leads to a cathartic eruption of some
kind. We look to be possibly entering such a period now. Hong Kong's
virtue however is that commonsense and the very considerable fund of
basic goodwill and support (even if it is based largely on stronger
objections to something different) which Government in fact has under
the surface, comes fairly quickly into play to help redress the
situation. For though we may accrete critics who are vocal, we also
quietly make friends who are not trouble arises.

9.

-

until

Against this background, came the increases in water charges, made
urgently necessary by the deficit in the water account over the past 5
years, when

SECRET

SECRET

4

we kept charges stable, and the need to recognize that very heavy
expenditure lay ahead if we were to be able to maintain adequate
supplies. We were always aware that the increases would be opposed and
that the reaction might be troublesome increases in water charges have
always been objected to (water being an emotive subject to a population
of peasant origins), just as strongly as increases in the cost of other
basic services. We did our best to minimize the criticism by most
reasonable modifications of the original proposals: indeed, although
objection is wide-spread, that it has not been worse is a measure of the
acceptance our action has really had.

bombers".

The

10.

Almost simultaneously came the Hill incident and the
release of more confrontation prisoners, fairly widely described in the
press as coincidence of these two events and the publicity given to
objections to our action over the prisoners (although in fact overt
objection to the releases was quite limited and our action was not
wholly disapproved by any means) could well, after the initial incident,
have suggested using bombs as a means of protesting over water charges
popular and widely publicized current method of protesting

One
cannot in many parts of the world nowadays anyway. entirely follow the
trains of thought of bomb planters. But Hill's injury did at first cause
some public apprehension that we might be in for another spate of
bombing; apprehension which died away as most bombs turned out to be
fakes. It also inevitably on the one hand caused the public to speculate
briefly about a link between the incidents and released confrontation
"bombers", and on the other led to further speculation (encouraged by
the Communists) about whether this was not a Nationalist-inspired action
indicating disapproval of "improved Sino-British relations" Finally, the
fuss generally gave a number of people, for a variety of reasons, an
added impetus to plant fake bombs, and so the practice built up.

11.

L

The one thing that is clear about the "bomb" planters in general, as the
variety of slogans used also shews, is that they were unorganized, and
came from no

SECRET

SECRET

-

5 -

one specific group.

Their only known common motivation

Without in any way

was a desire to cause mischief.

being able to say to what extent each group was guilty, I think they
probably fell more or less into the following categories:-

(a)

those with generalized grievances against Government, working off their
feelings and using current issues (e.g. water charges) as an excuse;

(b)

those naturally hostile to the Police, such as youth gangs;

?

(c)

(d)

(e)

disappointed Communist militants;

pro-Nationalists, upset at "improving Sino-British relations and recent
Police action against Nationalist intelligence units; and

pranksters.

-

In the very early stages, it is reasonable to speculate, categories (a)
(d) were the most likely culprits, while in the latter stages it is very
possible pranksters predominated, just for the fun of scaring people and
making the Police scurry about. There is some evidence to this latter
effect, but otherwise all this, it is emphasized, is based largely on
negative evidence and must remain almost entirely speculation.

12.

incidents.

The

Turning now to the effects of these First, they are not all wholly bad.
As I said earlier, ill-feeling does tend to build up here over peaceful
periods and erupt in some way periodically.

'bombing" has perhaps acted as a mild catharsis and may well have a
slight temporary settling effect, although this effect has been probably
too slight to have much lasting value. More of the same kind of thing,
however, would not surprise me whenever some other excuse arises.

SECRET

13.

SECRET

6 -

- 6

Unfortunately a number of highly unpopular steps will indeed have to be
taken in the next few months, the timing of which will be largely out of
Government's control and over which Government will have little chance
of mitigating public indignation, real or whipped up. The news of a
substantial increase in the defence contribution is quite likely to be
inflammatory; but of equal danger is the fact that the bus companies
(particularly KMB) are again in severe financial difficulties, and fare
increases in the near future unavoidable.

14.

Further, we currently look like being in for an increasing amount (from
a low base) of student agitation, egged on by European and American
dissidents. The issue of the Senkaku Islands is the favourite cause for
demonstrations at the moment; and it goes without saying that there is
nothing we can do to meet them over this issue.

15.

Next, the results of the Salaries Commission are unlikely to be other
than controversial: particularly as regards teachers and nurses, these
grades being ones whose salaries also govern the salaries of large
numbers of teachers and nurses in subvented non-Government
organizations. Both also can rely on emotional support from the public.
Finally, negotiations over the many current issues of external trade
relations are unlikely to result in

arrangements which please everybody, and the blame will fall on
Government.

16.

It may well also now become harder to effect reviews of confrontation
prisoners' sentences, both because the unofficials on the Board may be
more reluctant to recommend reductions, and because one section of
public opinion will inevitably obtain publicity for their condemnation
of the releases and point to the recent "bombing' as grounds for their
objection. On the other hand, I would hope that the recent démarche over
ping-pong may have countervailing influences.

SECRET

11

[ SECRET

7 -

·7

17.

We shall, of course, thread a way as warily as
circumstances will permit through all these problems, and I am as
confident as one can be that we shall be able to do so successfully. But
if any should go badly wrong, or too many go fairly wrong
simultaneously, the cry of Government "ignoring the will and wishes of
the people will once again arise and may quite well lead to some
undesirable form of public excitement. It is a risk which I fear I must
say faces during the next few months. There is little enough, I am
afraid, you can do to help us, except to try to see that HMG is aware of
the situation, and takes it into account in their relations with us.

18.

One factor which is in a sense on the credit
side is that the Communists, while certain to go fishing in any troubled
waters, are unlikely to join in violently or even very openly; unless of
course things get too much out of hand and they feel they cannot be left
out. But I emphasize I do not believe things will come to this. Tea-cup
storms perhaps ; but we should be able to prevent anything worse.

19.

中華

As a final footnote, the quite extensive
training in dealing with bombs (although on a "first aid' level) which
has been given to a very considerable number of Police (and some other)
officers since 1967 proved of great value. Royal Hong Kong Police
resources, although busy enough, were never overstrained in dealing with
these incidents.

Sir Leslie Monson, KCMG, CB, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,

London, S.W.1.

Yuns ever Что

David.

SECRET

Ref:- GEN/13/2317

Statistics

SECRET

Copy tlo. 3 of 10 Copies

Page No. 1 of 2 Pages

Special Branch,

Royal Hong Kong Police.

BOMB INCIDENTS

ASSESSMENT

15th April, 1971

During the period from 27th March to 08.00 hours on 15th April, 1971,

the following have been reported.

(a) Real

ུ。。

(b)

Simulated/Fake

(c)

Mistaken Report

(a)

Malicious/Fake Report

2

117

131

17

TOTAL:

267

;.

Police Action

2.

Two of the persons charged in connection with the police raid on Hok Tau
pleaded guilty and were fined a total of $300 and $400 respectively,
while the third pleaded not guilty and was discharged.

3.

Further anonymous letters have been received but C.I.D. enquiries have
made no progress on that addressed to the Far Eastern Economic Review.

Present Trend

4.

The number of simulated bombs have continued to decrease and none were
reported on 12th April.

Reactions

5.

Peking is reported to have issued an assessment to the effect that the
bomb campaign was organised by the 'U.S./Chiang' clique in an attempt to
mar Sino/British relations and to have instructed that:-

SECRET

/(a)

.

#

SECRET

Page 2

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Assessment

6.

a close watch should be kept on local communists to prevent them from
participating;

no remarks on the bombs should be made or reports issued;

if asked, the communists should say that they strongly disapprove of
such methods; and

right-wing newspaper reporters should be firmly rebuffed but British
reporters or Government officials should be

well treated.

Although the numbers of simulated bombs have much decreased, the
occasional one may be expected during the coming week and mistaken
reports, also in decreased numbers, will probably continue to be
received.

SECRET

-000-

!

From: Colony POLMIL

LIIL

Date: 29th March, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

Suspected Bombs

Sitrep at:

05/16.00

(a)

SERIAL

(b)

TIME REPORTED

(c)

LOCATION

(d)

TEAM SENT

1.

272205

I

o/s Central Govt Offices Blåg. in Lower Albert Rd,near

B.O. R

Garden Rd.

2

281322

K

4/F Multi-storey car park at

B.0.

Templo St.¿/o Shanghai St.

3

290038

o/s 14-16 Oakland Path

To :

CP

LCP/Ops

DOP/Adnin

CPIO

50/Ops 'A'

SSI/Ops

DOI

DSB

ACP/Ops

G/Int

Sheet :

1

;

(e)

REMARKS

(e)

RESULT & TIME

PASSED

B.0. injured on right hand at |23.15 hrs-live

R Detonated by

B.O. at 1600 hrs - Live

Unwrapped by

B.0.-

newspaper inside

Hoax--A burst football with a dictionary beside it. B.0.cleared scene.

A milk tin wrapped in white cloth about 6" x 6" with

posters about 20" x 7"

Object in a card-board box

of freund do

fuls thould not

Regh Br

steld.

uferation still wanted from Boot. Chsaugst

Object 3" x 7a with notice *Copatriots keep away

A bamboo basket on top of a traffic cono.

A red packet, with a red book by the sido on tramtracks.

Pq #2 31+

vò contain

a Real Bind

B.O.

S

290150

к

Canton Rd.near Nam King St.

B.0. ̄MI F

False report

h

5

290223

I

King's Rd near Len Sin St.

B.O.. S.

.6

290315

K

Waterloo Rd.near Lion Rock Tunnel.

3.0. M. F 3.0.found it to be a false report

Empty tin

7

290825

o/& St.Paul's School, 33 MacDonnell Rd.

̧¡B.O. › H: F.

B.0.found it to be a false report

Tomato Juice tin

290843

Salisbury Rd.near Nathan Rd.

B.O. S

CONDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

Detonated by B.0. at 10.20 hrs. Appeared to be

hoax.

Small box 4′′ x 5′′ x 12′′ wrapped in red cloth

Date: 30.3.71.

CONFIDENTIAL

Suspected Bobs

Sitrep at: 08.00/¤¤¤¤¤600

Sheet: 2

3

(a)

SERIAL

(b)

TIME REPORTED

(c)

LOCATION

(a)

TEAM SENT

(e)

RESULT & TIME

(e)

REMARKS

PASSED

7

290825 I 0/s St Fauls School, 33 MacDonnell Road.

B.O. ni

290856

Tomato juice tin.

Mistaken report

8

290843

K

Salisbury Road near

B.0.

S:

291020

Nathan Road.

Simulated bamb

Small box 4′′ x 5′′ x 12" wrapped in red cloth,

9

291912

K

Object hanging from Traffic

EOD/K H. F.

bollard in Luen Hop Rd, Kin.

10

'291947

H

Roxy Cinema Car Park

B.0.

S

292045 Detonated Simulated boob

11

292118

-1

0/a No.306 Electric Road behind State Cinema.

B.O. S.

292230 Detonated Simulated bomb

292010 Detonated Basket 12" x 8" with cloth top. Mistaken report

Mistaken report

300010 Simulated bamb

300422 Detonated Simulated bomb

Brick 3′′ x 2" x 1" wrapped in newspapers. Chinese characters "Danger Do
Not Cone Close, Complaining Water Rates."

Red packet 12" x 4" x 2" with Chinese characters "Frotest Against Indian
Oil, There Should Be No Rent Increases".

A parcel of cloth.

White paper parcel 8" x 8" with blue plastic bottle inside. Chinese
characters; Compatriots Do Not Touch, Objection to Rise in Water Rates,
Chinese as an Official Language".

Small with packet. Characters; "Compatriots Do Not Touch, Beat Down the
H.K. British, Liberate H.K.".

12

292230

I

Wanchai Gap Road, i/o

B.O. M. F

300010

Kennedy Road.

13

292304

M

0/s East gate of HKU Bonham Road,

B.O. .S..

14

300042

J/o Sunning Road and Leighton Road.

EOD/HKI S

ד

CONFIDENTIAL

E

CONFIDENTIAL

Suspected Bombs

Sitrep at : 08.00/X£OKÁTOK?

(a)

SERIAL

Date: 30.3.71

(b)

TIME REPORTED.

(c)

LOCATION.

(d)

TEAM SENT

·

15

300105

к

Inside lift of No. 774 Ning Po| Street, Yaumati.

B

3.0

16.

30021.5

0/s 24, Larch St, Kowloon

EOD/K

K

S.

(HKSBC Building)

17 -

300324

0/a 26, Larch St, Kowloon.

ECD/K

18

300330

Nr. Subway under Tai Wan

EOD/NT

Road, Shatin.

S.

Comments

Approved members can add comments, bookmarks, and private notes.

No comments yet.

Private Research Note

Private notes are available after approval.