(L. Monson)
P.U.S. (with copy of original submission and drafts)
Sir S. Tomlinson
Mr. Wilford
Mr. Laird
Mr. Leahy (as for P.U.S.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking(Priority)
(Pervome), for
O METSENTIAL
WONG KONG (IKITOKATE)
KITS (PRIORITY) (PERSONAL FOR IR AMSON)
Piles
PED MY
Mår 3 Temi inn Sir i. Memben Keilford
Kiss 7000 HUMILIKI
ľrivate Office
1.
you
KWAL FOR GOVERNOR PHDH KRONETARY OF STATE.
I am grateful to you for your thoughtful commenta resting with your tel
le 935 and I hova given careful consideretion to the points you make. I
should like
in no doubt that it was primiriky xy se of the lengutem interests of
Hong Kong that sted ny bol Xe 24. Indeed, I would not like you
in to think that I see Bino-zritish relations is isolation from the
interesis of Hong Kong. Ou contrary, Sang Tang munt be the next
laportant ement of Sino-british relations es a wholei
2. La moon here, va mast balanes the risks in giving boo little boo late
against those of giving bes unch too soon, The Chinese are oleariy most
anxio.Ja
to improve their laternational imago nad in sur judgment they do not si
presmi visk te be foroed into a position where they will feel obliged to
take
OMPETENTIAL
aotion in oupport of their competrists in the
Colony. He that erbent I believe vo aze ia
Té
w
position of strength but I agree with you that
mass mulatsin our sathority
shatever we
in the Osleny.
As you may in paragraph 5 of your vel no 17, petition so far presented
is, by Chinese standards, moderately purused,
By assesment to that it osatnina the
impliâstion that if the Hong Kong Goverment wishell be release these
prioeners, then the local Communiste do not intend reeking the best by
muggesting that this was really a politicel
coneess Loca
3.
Kevertňelase, the Chinese have non put
on notice that they are initiating a sampaige (the referense do Aritish
banks in Shanghai is in paraguayh 6 of Madéoska1 Letter of 10 December
te Tenson). There can be no
certainty that the calmer counsels at present in evidence in Peking
would prevail. It would even be that by failing to respond to the
present relatively mated approaches,
stali
suoemrage the mess hand-line elementa in the Mineen leadership to ado ̧t
tougher polisies towerða Hong Kong, 1 sooryt the analysis set out in
paragraph 4 of Me Demoon's telegraa
Xo 42.
4.
proposals sosinined in pour telegram He 30 would, I fear, net sonstitim
what the Osiness would regard sa an adequate gesture,
ONFIDENTIAL
I
OCHFERISPELAL
Indeed it seems that there would be only two
'emmaplary" esses she would qualify for more
Shan a few months' remission. In paragraph 8
of your tel Re 24 you soked for further
DOMSLISɔRİCE in Hong Kong. I should
grateful to iman what form yen would like this
esconltation to take. There is a risk that
fer no not to send an officiel from here for
this par son could foster sỹegulation of the kind you repert in your bal
To 29.
5. To memarise my own feeling 1 "sosph entirely your general somoinsion
(paregrupė 5 of your telegram ne 36). I agree that we should
ain for releases at our own pace und fer our
deliberate and explainable reasons, I
would hope nevertheless that the careful meriting that you are
personally giving would result in the amchers eligible for relevat in
this outegory being nearer to those I had
în mînă án u telogram no 24.
3.
DORFEUENTIAL
Mr Wilford
bir 8 Tomlinson
Sir L Men S OR
Mr Legan
Private Secretary
COVERING JRORIT
CONFIDENTIAL
COMFBORTATION PRISONERS IN HONG KONG
t
r
ست نداریم
O & D
A
@
1.
The Governor's resations to the Secretary of state
telegram Xo 24 have now been received (Hong Kang Tel Nos 13, (S17 and
36).) To also have the views of Peking
(Peking Tel No 42).
Mr
2. This Department's considered assessment remains, now
firmly supported by ir Denson, as in the Secretary of State's
talogram (ny submission of 31 December) that it is in the long-
tern interests of Hong Kong for a goature new to be made to
the Chinese, Fren Hong Kong Tel Xo 30 it appears that the
moves the Governer contemplates taking would met constitute
adequate gesture.
would be only 2
Indeed from his figures it seans that there
zeaplazy" cases who would qualify for sere
than a few months' remission. The Chinese have nad it clear
that an "adequate" gesture would be the release of 42 of the
remaining 73.
3. The Governor clearly needs some reassuranes that the
action we have suggested is based on our assessment of
long-term interests of Hong Kong and that we do not see
ple
OOKP ZIMUT KAL
COVERING SECRET
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10
CONFIDENTIAL
Sino-British relations in isolation from those interests,
The Governor has asked for consultation and I recommend
I have nisgivings
that ve discover what he has in sind.
about this proposal as it could result in further speculation
about "rifta" between HG and the Hong Kong Goverment.
5. I res
I recommend that we accept the Governor's general
conelusion (paragraph 3 of his Tel No 36) that we should
"aim for releases at our own pace and for our own deliberate
sad explainable reasons". I would hope nevertheless that
the Secretary of state would agree to express the hope that
the sareful sorutiny the Jovernor is personally giving would
result in the numbers eligiblə fer release being nearer te
those the begrotary of State mentioned in his originai
telegram.
6. A draft telegram in this sense in submitted.
await the Secretary of State's return.
It an
J A L Hergan
Far Eastern Department E 255
19 January 1971
Copy to: Hong Kong Dept (Er Lairi)
CONFIDENTIAL
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CYBER/ONG A
FROM HONG KONG 1934452
SECRET
SECRET
TOP COPY
TO PRIORITY F.C.0. TELNO 36 OF 19 JANUARY REPEATED INFO PRIORITY
PEKING.
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 42: CONFRONTATION PRISONERS,
WHEN RISKS TO THE SECURITY OF HONG KONG ARE BALANCED AGAINST THE CHANCES
OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINA IT IS PROBABLE THAT
ANY GOVERNOR WILL SEE THINGS DIFFERENTLY FROM ANY CHARGE.
HOWEVER, THINK THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE UNDERESTIMATES THE
RISKS AND OVERESTIMATES THE CHANCES OF BETTER RELATIONS.
I po,
2. REF. PARAGRAPH 3. MORE THOUGHTFUL RESIDENTS OF HONG KONG WILL SEE
THAT THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG CANNOT BE WHOLLY DIVORCED FROM THE STATE OF
SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS GENERALLY BUT IT IS
PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCE MANY THAT THE WHOLESALE AND
SPEEDY RELEASE OF THE REMAINING CONFRONTATION PRISONERS WILL BENEFIT
HONG KONG. IT IS ONLY TOO OBVIOUS THAT THE MORALE OF THE LOCAL
COMMUNISTS WOULD BE RAISED AND THE DETERMINATION
OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE ATS AUTHORITY BROUGHT INTO DOUBT. THE
DIFFICULTIES OF DEALING WITH ANOTHER LOCAL COMMUNIST RESORT TO VIOLENCE
OR INDEED DEALING WITH THEM ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS AS WE HAVE TO DO,
WOULD BE INCREASED,
FOR MOST RESIDENTS, HONG KONG IS THEIR ONLY SAFE HAVEN AND THEY WOULD
INEVITABLY RE VERY QUICK TO FEEL A WEAKENING AT THE TOP. FURTHERMORE,
THE PRESS ARE ONLY TOO LIKELY, TO DO FURTHER DAMAGE BY REPRESENTING ANY
CONCESSION AS SOMETHING FORCED ON HONG KONG BY LONDON, WITH HONG KONG'S
INTERESTS AN INCONSIDERABLE ELEMENT
IN THE SITUATION.
3. ALTHOUGH THE SUBJECT CERTAINLY BELONGS MORE TO THE CHARGE
THAN TO ME I CAN RECALL NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A BELIEF THAT
ANY IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATIONS WITH CHINA ACHIEVED BY AN
AMNESTY WOULD BE EITHER SUBSTANTIAL OR LASTING. RELATIONS
HAVE EASED OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS WITHOUT AN AMNESTY, AND
THERE ARE OTHER ISSUES HERE TO WHICH THE CHINESE ARE EQUALLY,
7
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M
BECRET
OR MORE, SENSITIVE E.G. THEIR PRESS AND SCHOOLS. IT IS THEREFORE
DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT OF THE PRISONER ISSUE UNLOCK THE
DOOR TO A TROUBLE-FREE ERA. THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE IS THAT THE LONG TERM
POLICY OF CHINA TOWARDS HONG KONG WOULD BE UNAFFECTED AND THAT AT THE
BEST THE SHORT TERM POLICY COULD LEAD TO SOME INCONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT
HERE, BUT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT EVEN THE SHORT TERM POLICY WOULD
WORSEN IF SUCH AN IMPORTANT DELIBERATE CONCESSION BY US ENCOURAGED
PEKING TO THINK MORE COULD EASILY BE HAD,
REMAIN APPREHENSIVE OVER
4. OF COURSE I AGREE, AS I HAVE STATED IN EARLIER TELEGRAMS (E.G. MY
TELEGRAM NO. 13) THAT THE EXISTING PROCEDURE OF THE PRISON BOARD OF
REVIEW SHOULD BE FULLY USED. I HOPE THAT IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS OR SO
THERE WILL BE SOME RESULTS TO SHOW ON THE LESS SERIOUS CASES ALTHOUGH
THE BOARD'S REACTIONS. MOREOVER, I AM MYSELF READING THROUGH THE ENTIRE
AVAILABLE COURT RECORDS OF EVERY SERIOUS CASE AND WILL ASK THE BOARD TO
CONSIDER RELEASING OR REDUCING THE SENTENCES OF AS MANY AS WE SAFELY CAN
THROUGH THIS PROCEDURE, WHERE THERE IS ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR IT. IT
SHOULD BE POSSIBLE THEN TO LET THE CHINESE ASSUME THAT WE HAVE RESPONDED
TO THEIR GESTURE OVER JOHNSTON, ALTHOUGH TO SAY SO TOO EXPLICITLY STILL
SEEMS TO ME TO HAVE GRAVE DANGERS. RELEASES BY CHINESE NEW YEAR NEXT
WEEK HOWEVER ARE PROCEDURALLY IMPOSSIBLE.
·
5. IN SHORT, IT IS AMNESTIES AS A PURE POLITICAL MANOUEVRE WHICH I MOST
SINCERELY FEAR: NOT RELEASES AT OUR OWN PACE AND FOR OWN DELIBERATE AND
EXPLAINABLE REASONS.
SIR D.TRENCH
FILES:
FED
HKD
GIPD
IRD
PUSD
NEUS DEPT 13
EIR S. CRAWFORD P3 TO MR. ROYLE
SIR S. TOMLINSON SIR L. MONSON NR. VILFORD
SECRET
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PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FM PEKING 1603+ØZ(SIC)
SECRET
TOP COPT COFI
SECRET
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 42 OF 16 JANUARY INFO PRIORITY HONG
KONG CPERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
J
YOUR TELNO 24 AND HONG KONG TELNOS 13 AND 14 TO YOU.
1. I AGREE THAT A MOST IMPORTANT STAGE HAS BEEN REACHED
IN SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE CHINESE ARE LOOKING FOR
NORMALISATION AND IMPROVEMENT IN ALL ASPECTS OF OUR
RELATIONS AND HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WISH TO SEE AN END TO
THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE EVENTS OF 1967. IN
THIS THEY WILL REGARD THE ACTIONS OF HER MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG AS
INDIVISIBLE AS THEY HAVE ALL ALONG. IT IS ROUND
THIS QUESTION THAT THE COMMENTS WHICH FOLLOW
MAINLY REVOLVE.
2. IN MY VIEW THE LINK BETWEEN BRITISH SUBJECTS DETAINED IN
CHINA AND CONFRONTATION PRISONERS
IN HONG KONG HAS ALWAYS BEEN IMPLICIT IN CHINESE THINKING.
CARRYING OUT A GRADUAL PROCESS OF RELAXATION WITHOUT
THEY DID NOT AT FIRST MAKE IT EXPLICIT BECAUSE THEY PROBABLY
HOPED THAT BY NOT DOING SO WE SHOULD BE ASSISTED IN
+
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SPECIFIC TERMS BEING STATED. BUT AFTER GREY'S RELEASE THEY
MADE THE LINK QUITE CLEAR AND IT WAS EMPHASISED DURING WILFORD'S
VISIT LAST APRIL.
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13. I FIND
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3. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY IF THE MATTER WERE SUITABLY
EXPLAINED, PEOPLE IN HONG WOULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT
THEY OWED SOMETHING TO BRITAIN AND TO BRITISH SUBJECTS IN
CHINA WHO HAD SUFFERED IN THE INTERESTS OF MAINTAINING LAW AND
ORDER IN THE COLONY AND HENCE THAT NOW AND IN THE FUTURE THERE
COULD BE NO COMPLETE DIVORCE BETWEEN
THEIR INTEREST AND WIDER SINO BRITISH INTERESTS
4. THE PRESENT IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS IS
+
PART OF A GENERAL IMPROVMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
CHINA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD FROM WHICH WE MAY BENEFIT TO SOME
J
DEGREE EVEN IF PROBLEMS IN HONG KONG REMAIN UNRESOLVED.
I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS UNWISE TO ASSUME THAT THERE IS
UNANIMITY WITHIN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH
RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. THERE
ARE REPORTS THAT THERE HAS BEEN DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE RECENT
CHINESE CONDEMNATION OF EVENTS IN POLAND WHICH IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN
OPPOSED BY THOSE IN FAVOUR OF BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS AND
CHAMPIONED BY THOSE WISHING TO GIVE ALL-OUT SUPPORT TO QUOTE
REVOLUTION UNQUOTE. THE POSITION OF HONG KONG IS SUI GENERIS
SINCE THE CHINESE CONSIDER IT PART OF CHINA. FOR THIS REASON
A POLICY OF NO CHANGE THERE MUST BE CORRESPONDINGLY MORE
DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY. FROM ALL AVAILABLE
EVIDENCE IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAVE INSTRUCTED
THEIR SUPPORTERS IN HONG KONG NOT TO MAKE TROUBLE AND HAVE
CRITICISED THEIR HANDLING OF EVENTS IN 1967 SINCE
THE OUTCOME SHOWED THEY DID NOT ENJOY POPULAR SUPPORT.
THE PRESENT POLICY IS TO TRY SLOWLY TO BUILD UP SUCH SUPPORT. WHILE
I, OF COURSE, DEFER TO THE GOVERNOR'S
ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE REACTION OF
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/NON-COMMUNIST
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NON-COMMUNIST OPINION TO FURTHER RELEASES, I
SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE RISK OF FURTHER COMMUNIST
RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE OR OTHER ACTION WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A
THREAT TO SECURITY WOULD BE LESS RATHER THAN
MORE AT A TIME WHEN THEY HAD OBTAINED SOME SATISFACTION FOR THEIR
AMOUR PROPRE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
CHINA WERE SEEN TO BE GETTING BETTER. THERE WOULD NO DOUBT BE SOME
CROWING BUT I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD RECEIVE PARTICULAR ENCOURAGEMENTS
FROM HERE. THE GREATER DANGER SEEMS TO ME TO LIE IN A
SITUATION WHERE LOCAL ACTIVISTS BECOME TOTALLY
FRUSTRATED AND CLAMOUR TO BE LET OFF THE LEASH. IN THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES THE MORE MODERATE ELEMENTS IN THE
PEKING LEADERSHIP WILL NOT BE WELL PLACED TO
COUNSEL CAUTION AND IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER OUTBURST
OF VIOLENCE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT BE ABLE COR PERHAPS
WILLING TO TRY TO CONTROL IT.
J
Ꮀ
5. IF WE TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY NOW OFFERED, I DO NOT,
REPEAT NOT, THINK THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL REGARD IT AS A
SIGN OF WEAKNESS BUT RATHER OF POLITICAL SAGACITY, PROGRESS
WITH RELEASE OF PRISONERS WOULD IN MY VIEW BE SIGNIFICANT
NOT ONLY IN THE SHORT TERM BUT ALSO IN THE LONGER TERM WHEN
THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEKING GOVERNMENT WILL BE DECISIVE.
PER CONTRA A TOTALLY UNYIELDING ATTITUDE NOW COULD
MAKE MATTERS MORE DIFFICULT AT SUCH TIME AS THE FUTURE OF
THE COLONY BECOMES A SUBJECT WHICH HAS TO BE RAISED.
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6. I VERY MUCH HOPE THEREFORE THAT IT WILL BE FOUND POSSIBLE
TO CONTINUE TO MAKE AT ANY RATE SOME FURTHER RELEASES AND THAT
AS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THE FIRST GROUP MIGHT BE LET OUT FOR THE
CHINESE NEW YEAR.
*
DENSON
FILES
FED
HKD
GIPD
IRD
PUSD
NEWS DEPT
PRIVATE SECRETARY
SIR S CRAWFORD
P.S./MR ROYLE
SIR S TOMLINSON
MR WILFORD
SIR L MONSON
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TÍMEDIATE
YPHER/CAF A
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FROM HONG KONG 1815/Z
PASTRICTED
T. IMMEDIATE F.C.0. TELEGRAM NO. 33 CF 19 JANUARY 1971 INFO HMEDIATE :
EKING (PERSONAL FOR DENSON).
FR MONSCH FROM GL VERNOR.
TELEGRAM NO. 33 PARACRAPH 3.
PEPLIES TO PRESS QUERIES ON CONFRONTATION PRISONERS.
THE INFORMATION SERVICES DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN ASKED A NUMBER OF
DESTIONS CCCASIONED BY PRESS REPORTS REACHING HUNG KONG FROM
LONDON IN RECENT WEEKS.
2. ON 23 DECEMBER VE COMMENTED IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS ON A REUTERS
REPORT WHICH WAS BASED ON AN EDITORIAL IN THE FINANCIAL TIES": BUTE
DURING THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION AND RIOTS OF 1947, A T TAL OF 1,936
PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED, TRIED IN THE COURTS AND CONVICTED OF CRIMINAL
OFFENCES. OF THIS NUMBER, ONLY 74 ARE STILL IN PRISON: THEY WERE
CONVICTED OF SUCH CRIMES AS THE FOSSESSION OF BOMBS, EXPLOSIVES AND
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, OF ASSAULT, PICTING AND CAUSING GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM.
IT IS TO BE STRESSET THAT THESE FRISCNEPS HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF
CRIMINAL OFFENCES AND THAT NO POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE DETAINED ANY HERE
IN THE COLONY. THERE IS A RECOGNISED PROCEDURE, THROUGH THE PRISONS
BOARD OF REVIEW, FOR PERIODIC RECONSIDERATION CF SENTENCES: THE BOARD
NEFTS EVERY THREE MONTHS. WE HAVE NO FURTHER COMMENT TO MAKE ON THE
SPECULATIVE EDITORIAL IN TODAY'S 'FINANCIAL TIMES'' PENTITLED IN A
REUTER REPORT TC WHICH YOU REFERRED. UNQUOTE. 3. THIS LINE WAS FOLLOWED
CLOSELY IN COMMENT BY INFORMATION SERVICES IN THE FOLLOWING DAYS. I
REGRET THAT A TRANSCRIPT OF THE GPCADCAST REFERRED TO IN MY TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE HAS AT, UNTIL NOW, BEEN AVAILABLE. TEXT FOLLOWS THE SAME
LINES AND
IS BEING FORWARDED BY BAG.
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4, ON 7 JANUARY THE PRESS HERE WAS TOLD THAT THE FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRISONS BOARD OF REVIEW COULD NOT BE
L
L
MITICIPATER. ON 8 JANUARY, HEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON REPORTS FROM
LINEON THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD AMNESTY THE REMAINING
PRISONERS, LE SAID: CUGTE THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE FRESENT
POLICY REGARDING THE RELEASE OF RISONERS SERVING SENTENCES FOR
OFFENCES COMMITTED DURING THE 19/7 DISTURBANCES. THE PRISONS
BOART OF REVIEW EXAMINES ALL LONG-TERM SENTENCES REGULARLY.
ALL RISONER CAN EARN A NORMAL REMISSION FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
PRESS REPORTS OF AN 'AMNESTY FOR CONFRONTATION PRISONERS' ARE
COMPLETELY UNTRUE. UNGULTE.
TRENCH
FILES
FED
HKD
PRIVATE SECRETARY
PS. /MR ROYLE
SIR L MONSON
MR WILFORD
SIR S TOMLINSON
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www
I
FLASH
CYPHER/CAT A
SECRET
712,
Cer
F 'ONG KONG 152345Z
SECRET
TO FLASH FCO TELNO 30 OF 15 JANUARY, INFO PRIORITY PEKING (PERSONAL FOR
DENSON)
FERSONAL FOR MONSON FROM GOVERNOR,
YOUR TELEGRAM 37.
THE NUMBERS IN THE POSSIBLY EXEMPLARY CATEGORY MAY NOW BE AS MUCH
AS 24, BUT OF COURSE THE BOARD OF REVIEW MAY VERY WELL NOT AGREE THAT
ALL CAN BE SO CATEGORIZED, OR RECOMMEND ANY ACTION. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE
PUSHED THE UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE BOARD FAIRLY
ALREADY. *FAR THEIR LIMITS
2. YOUR PARA. 2. FIGURES AS NEARLY AS WE CAN ASCERTAIN THEM AT THE
MOMENT ARE:
(A) OF THE 24 ''EXEMPLARY'' CASES 22 ARE DUE FOR RELEASE DURING THE
SUMMBER OF 1971.
(B) OF THE 41 NAMES IN THE PETITION : ~
(I) 12 ARE AMONGST THE 24 ''EXEMPLARIES''
(II) 11 ARE DUE FOR RELEASE DURING THE SUMMBER OF 1971
(111) 5 ARE WOMEN.
+
(IV) ONE IS THE YOUTH MENTIONED AT THE END OF MY TELEGRAM
N 17 WHO IS TO BE RELEASED ON 3RD FEBRUARY.
(C) THE BOARD IS NOT DUE TO HAVE A REGULAR MEETING UNTIL 19TH じ MARCH,
BUT THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FEELS THAT THIS "EETING COULD BE
BROUGHT FORWARD TO ABOUT MID-FEBRUARY WITHOUT EXCITING TOO MUCH
REMARK. I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF PREPARATION
AND GROUND-WORK TO BE DONE BEFORE THE PAPERS ARE IN A STATE
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE BOARD.
SECRET.
13. YOUR BARA 3
SECRET
3.
YOUR PARA. 3. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS IN, THE FORM OF A SHORT
PRESS RELEASE AND A RADIO INTERVIEW WITH THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
INFORMATION SERVICES, FOLLOWING THE LINE IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 873 OF 1979.
TEXTS WILL BE TELEGRAPHED TOMORROW.
4. QUITE APART FROM THE ABOVE, DETAILED EXAMINATION IS TURNING UP THE
OCCASIONAL ODDITY AMONGST THE LONGER TERM PRISONERS WHICH
MAY JUSTIFY REFERENCE TO THE BOARD FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE IF
NOT FOR VERY EARLY RELEASE.
+
5.
THIS TELEGRAM WAS DRAFTED PRIOR TO THE DESPATCH OF MY TELEGRAM
NO. 29.
SIR B.TRENCH
FILES
FED
HKD
PS
PS TO MR ROYLE
SIR L MONSON
WR WILFORD
SIR S TOMLINSON
SECRET
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CONFIDENCIAL
CYPHER/CAT A
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FCO 151920Z
CONFIDENTIAL
(FED)
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 47 OF 15 JANUARY INFO
PEKING.
YOUR TEL NO 29: CONFRONTATION PRISONERS.
FOR GOVERNOR FROM SIR L. MONSON.
WE ARE AS MYSTIFIED AS YOU ARE AS TO THE SOURCE OF THESE STORIES. WE CAN
ASSURE YOU THAT NOBODY IN THE FCO CONCERNED WITH THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN
IN TOUCH EITHER WITH A.F.P. OR WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE.
2. THE A.F.P. ARTICLE WHICH WE HAVE SEEN WAS DATELINED LONDON ON 7
JANUARY. THIS PREDATES THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TELEGRAM NO. 24 AND ON
THAT DATE WE DID NOT EVEN KNOW WHETHER HE AGREED WITH THE DRAFT OF IT.
YOUR OWI TELEGRAM NO. 13 REACHED LONDON ON A SATURDAY AND WAS NOT SEEN
BY ANY MEMBER OF THE OFFICE DIRECTLY CONCERNED UNTIL MONDAY, 11 JANUARY,
SO AGAIN WE CANNOT SEE HOW ITS CONTENT COULD HAVE LEAKED AT THIS END IN
SUCH A WAY AS TO BE USED IN AN
ARTICLE ON 10 JANUARY.
3. YOU MAY HAVE SEEN THE ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE FINANCIAL
TIMES ON 23 DECEMBER SOON AFTER JOHNSON'S IMPENDING RELEASE WAS
KIOWN WHICH SPECULATED ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHINESE WOULD EXPECT
MOVEMENT ON CONFRONTATION PRISONERS AND EVEN MENTIONED CHINESE NEW YEAR.
THERE WAS SIMILAR COMMENT IN THE TIMES THAT
DAY ALSO. WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK THAT MEMBERS OF THE PRESS WHO ARE
INTERESTED IN THIS SUBJECT HAVE TAKEN THEIR CUE FROM THERE.
CERTAINLY 1 CAN REPEAT MY ASSURANCE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO BRIEFING OF
THE PRESS OF A KIND WHICH COULD HAVE GIVEN RISE TO EITHER THE
A.F.P. OR THE PEOPLE STORY.
#
THE FCO NEWS DEPARTMENT HAVE NOT HAD ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ARTICLE
WHICH APPEARED IN THE PEOPLE AND I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THESE STORIES WILL
DIE NATURALLY, WE NOTE THE LINE WHICH YOU TOOK, BUT, IF WE HAVE TO SAY
ANYTHING, WILL SAY THE STORY OF A ROW IS QUOTE QUITE UNTRUE UNQUOTE.
DOUGLAS-HOME
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