possibility of a concession on that subject. Instead of minuting that
the subject should be kept under review, etc, the file should be marked
"BU 1974". The number of prisoners vill in the normal course of events
have been reduced by then to single figures and it might be worth while
looking at the subject afresh. But not in 1970 or 1971.
7.
In other words what ve might hope to get out of China more trade,
release of British subjects, political influence, better treatment for
our diplomatic mission seem to me very small objectives (or if big, have
to be heavily discounted because they are unlikely to be gained)
compared with the very substantial values we have at stake in Hong Kong,
not only economic, but political, intelligence and human. I shall
therefore argue that we ought to think more about Hong Kong and less
about China (even that we should think more about improving relations
with the Hong Kong Government than with the Peking Government!)
C
CONFIDENTIAL
/8. Because I am
2600077
CONFIDENTIAL
4CS. 41A
10,000-3/70-874512
SCR.4/3571/62
L
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD HOME KONG
page 3.
8. Because I am a member of the Diplomatic Service serving for the
moment outside the Diplomatic Service I find myself repeating the
classic criticism made in Whitehall of "the F.0.", which is that "the
F.0." tended to be willing to sacrifice genuine British interests
especially of a commercial or financial nature for the sake of smiles
and insubstantial generalities.
Your ever,
Arthur.
(A.F.Maddocks)
CONFIDENTIAL
п
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Mr Iaizā
Reference
Text 44
Kr Stevenson of the Far Eastern Department handed me the attached draft
submission and asked me to clear it with you.
2. The subject of the submission is, as you know, а long-standing matter
of discussion between the FCO and the Governor. You will recall that the
Secretary of State was briefed to take the matter up with the Governor
during his recent visit to the Colony. We do not know whether in fact he
had any discussions with the Governor on the subject: maybe Mr Maddocks
will be able to give us the answer to this and to give us an indication
of the Governor's attitude if and when the question was raised.
3. I have a number of queries to raise on the draft and these are
related in the main to paragraphs 5-7:
aftlagt
case, In/sts, in my fie. th. quetio
The
рус Cafpaidin prfinns
бе
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under deving
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(a) I think that the draft tends to ignore the Governor's own
difficulties vis à vis both public opinion in Hong Kong and the attit-
ude of his unofficial advisers It takes
a line formulated several thousand miles away from the scene of action
and it over- simplifies the implications of the issue.
(b) I do not agree that "an extension of the
lease in 1997 seems to be out of the ques- tion".
I have always thought that the crux of the matter, when the time comes,
will be the extent of the importance of Hong Kong to China. If that
importance is sufficiently great, then I think that there is a
reasonable chance on the lease being extended in one form or another.
(c)
(a)
уликова
Le pont pay youred,
フ
h
Gave v mo
to the point,
cound be +
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4.
(23 June. 1970)FED.
view
I doubt very much whether a gesture by Hong Kong at this time in
accelerating the release of a number of confrontation prisoners would
have much, if any, effect on the Chinese attitude towards Hong Kong in,
say, 10 to 15 years' time.
Is it certain that the issue of the con- frontation prisonere is still a
vital one, so far as the Chinese are concerned? In the brief prepared by
the FED for Mr Denson's visit to London before Easter, some doubt was
expressed as to how much weight the Chinese really did attach to this
problem. There certainly appears to be no pressure from the Chinese at
present for the premature release of
and from Hong Kong's point prisoners: of view at any rate, I would say
that Sino/Hong Kong relations at the moment ́are certainly sufficiently
satisfactory to "preserve the smooth running of the Colony",
2576
I understand that you will be present at the dis- cussions with Mr
Maddocks and you may therefore prefer to express your views at the
meeting, rather than attempt to agree the terms of the attached
submission with the
(AL Gaminara)
C
I
(K)
ų
Mr. Murray,
Far astern Department.
Prospects for Sino-British Relations
I am
Thank you for letting me see a copy of your paper on the Prospects for
Sino/British Relations. interested not only in my present capacity, but
in my former as Mr. Denson's predecessor.
2. The main theme of the paper is that any gestures to China in Hong
Kong are
but that we should con- sider conciliatory gestures in other, e.g.
commercial and cultural, fields. I think we must recognise that this is
unlikely to produce any significant political change.
3.
(a) As the Chinese have repeated ad nausean, liong Kong is the crux. The
link between British subjects and confrontation prisoners in Kong Kong,
always implicit, has I believe recently once again become explicit.
Unless we can produce at least a sign of movement in Hong Kong we must
not expect any political change. Without this the Central Government
will have no argument to use against the Shanghai authori- ties in order
to procure releases and no great inducement to treat us as other
European missions.
(b) Experience over the last few years suggests that the Chinese will
simply pocket gestures in, e.g..., commercial and cultural fields,
without changing their basic attitude.
The conclusion I draw from your paper is that Sino/ British relations
are frozen, and we may have to accept that they will remain so. Í think
this a great pity, since it may mean denying ourselves valuable
political and commercial opportunities because of Hong Kong.
(a) On the political side, we must look at Sino/ British relations in
the longer term in the context of the Sino/Soviet dispute. The best
prediction we can make is that Sino-Soviet hostility will continue. In
the light of this, the Chinese are likely to be increasingly interested
in improving Western contacts and learning of political and military
developments in Western Europe. They have shown an interest in the
health of NATO and, while they may go through the motions of denouncing
the E.E.C., they may also have an interest in its development. There is
also our and Europe's long-term interest in improving contacts
+
111
CONFIDE.TIAL
LA
I
;
L
4.
with China and assisting in her eventual emergence. The Soviet Union and
the U.S. may be disqualified from doing so. There is, therefore, a
potentially valuable political role we could play in Peking. Because of
the Hong Kong problem we disqualify our- selves from doing so. If
anyone, the French reap the benefits of acting as the European
interlocutor of the Chinese.
The
(b) On the question of trade, while the present situation is
"encouraging, it would probably be wrong to draw the conclusion that our
trade will go on expanding regardless of the political climate.
possibility is that before long it will reach a natural level and that
any further increase will depend on political factors. Unless our policy
changes, here again our European competitors will be better placed than
we.
The points I should therefore like to see brought out in the paper are :
(a) Hong Kong remains the crux;
(b) That we should consider very carefully the possibility of at least
small gestures in Hong Kong as a sign of movement in this critical field
and of encouragement to the Chinese;
(c) That, failing this, we must recognise that we are unlikely to make
real political progress and after a point may not make further
commercial progress;
(d) That this will be unfortunate when China may be increasingly
interested in improving West European contacts.
c.c.
Private Secretary
Mr. Baker
Mr. Wilford
Karadak
(P. Cradock) Planning Staff 25 March, 1970
Many thanks for this useful
movité on
Shiels
revising out super.
CONFIDENTIAL
I ofrend
Лока
is there.
!
Br. Apple
SECRET
Reference
וזיזיז
+
Flyt
Mr. Carter (Hong Kong Dept.)
Mr May
Sino-British Relations
This is a somewhat depressing letter from Mr. Denson on the prospects of
improving Sino-British relations and obtaining the release of the
remaining nine British subjects detained. I would agree with him that
the chances of their being released in the near future are bleak but it
seems over-pessimistic to suggest that there will be no further releases
for some years.
2. I think that we would agree in Far Eastern Department that the
premature release of at least some of the remaining Chinese prisoners in
Hong Kong is
Government's ability to manage its affairs.
But we
are not going to convince the Hong Kong Government of this at the
moment. However, it is not axiomatic
that the release of Chinese prisoners would lead to
the release of British prisoners. The Chinese have
never directly linked the nine with the remaining Chinese prisoners in
Hong Kong. It is well to remember too that the Chinese are displeased
with other aspects of our policy towards them and that their internal
political scene is also a factor in their policy-making.
3. I so not see how we can avoid the danger that the Hong Kong
Government may need to take strong action against local communists if
they decided under instructions to court such a reaction. But all the
evidence at the moment is that this is unlikely.
The local communists are under instructions not to
provoke the Hong Kong Government. Mr. Denson perhaps puts his finger on
our dilemma when he states that in the final analysis it is our position
in Hong Kong which counts rather than improved relations with the
Chinese.
4. It is not entirely clear how much weight the Chinese attach to
obtaining the release of the remaining prisoners in Hong Kong. In
official exchanges they have only raised the issue twice in recent
months and in both instances it is difficult to see how they could have
avoided doing so (our representations in December on behalf of Mrs,
Martin and Mr. McBain, and the Chinese protest about the
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/ death
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death of a Chinese Trade Unionist in a Hong Kong prison). For the most
part there is very little pressure in Hong Kong for the release of the
prisoners and the Tang case was fairly quickly dropped from communist
propaganda. In general communists in Hong Kong seen resigned to the fact
that the confrontation prisoners will serve out their sentences.
5. In his analysis of recent developments in Sino- British relations I
think that Kr. Denson perhaps exaggerates the extent to which they have
deteriorated.
On the debit side a number of events are known to have
displeased the Chinese; a) our vigorous representations on behalf of
Mrs. Martin and Mr. MoBain; b) the supplement on Taiwan in The Times; c)
E.C.G.D. cover
for the construction of a power station by a British firm in Taiwan; and
d) the dispute over the dumping
of Chinese alarm clocks on the British market. It is
true that there has been a general increase in the amount of space in
the Chinese press given to anti-British reports. But the Americans have
been similarly
attacked at the same time as the Chinese have regumed
contacts in Warsaw, It is possible to argue that the purpose of these
articles was less an indication of Chinese displeasure than an attempt
to demonstrate that we are a weak and insignificant power, racked by
political and economic crises and therefore not presenting any
significant threat to Chinese interests. This line of argument could
well be used to justify Chinese inaction to their supporters in Hong
Kong over the issue of confrontation prisoners. The articles are also
part of the continuing Chinese attack on imperialist
powers.
6. As regards other signs of displeasure by the Chinese cited by Mr.
Denson, I have seen no evidence that the Chinese are annoyed by the
closure of the Reuters office. On the contrary they could have made
difficulties for us but were in fact fairly helpful. We have seen no
evidence either of the Chinese creating adzinistrative difficulties in
other areas. A.MOFBW representative is now in Peking discussing the
reconstruction of the Chancery building with the Chinese and these
negotiations will no doubt provide some evidence of whether we can
expect the Chinese to be helpful or not over this question. Since the
arrest of Mrs. Martin and Mr. McBain there has been no
further harassment of other British subjects in China.
/ On the
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Reference....
•
On the contrary the Chinese have returned promptly some yachtsmen who
strayed into Chinese waters around Hong Kong and our fears that a
British businessman (Mr. Crowe) might be detained in Peking before
Christmas were not realised. As regards the chances of British
businessmen in Hong Kong attending the Spring Canton Trade Fair, the
S.B.T.C. remain optimistic that the ban will be lifted on this
occasion.
There are no signs that the Chinese are discriminating against us
commercially. On the contrary our commercial relations both here and in
Peking are cordial.
7. The main act of discrimination has been the curtailment of travel by
members of our Mission outside Peking. A comparison of the dates of our
representations in December on behalf of British subjects and the dates
when applications were first refused suggests that this was a direct act
of retaliation signifying Chinese displeasure at the way in which we had
deliberately raised the temperature. Mr. Denson also suggests that our
recent publicity campaign about the treatment of Mrs. Martin and Mr.
McBain would also have irritated the Chinese. fact this campaign was a
flop and I doubt whether the Chinese would have noted any additional
effort above the usual coverage given to this subject in the British
press.
In
We are not aware that there has been any significant foreign news
coverage. On the whole, therefore, my assessment of recent events is
that relations remain as poor as ever but that it is difficult to argue
that there has been a noticeable deterioration. The Chinese do not want
to put the clock back but they seem to have no enthusiasm at the moment
to move forward.
8.
Mr. Denson concludes with a number of recommen- dations for future
policy.
(a) The chance of the Chinese agreeing to the
confrontation prisoners being "returned to China" is virtually nil? If
we raised this with the Chinese again it would be largely for the
benefit of relatives and possibly Parliament if we were prepared to
announce publicly that we had done so. We would have to decide whether
the offer should be made through "Contact" in Hong Kong or diplomatic
channels. Timing would also be
* See Backgroma Wol
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3
/ important
SECRET
Flig B._._._.
important if we hoped to attract a not entirely
unfavourable Chinese reaction. I doubt whether
the present moment is propitious when the Chinese are showing no
particular interest in obtaining the release of the prisoners. It would
be better to keep it up our sleeves until they return to the charge
again as they undoubtedly will- at some future date.
(b) I agree that we should continue to stimulate
publicity but we must recognise that the British subjects are a less
interesting item for the press now that Mr. Grey has been released. Our
publicity campaign for the Martin and McBain cases was a flop. It is
also worth considering whether we have reached the point of diminishing
returns with the Chinese over negative publicity of this kind and should
now concentrate on a more positive publicity line. In this connexion it
is perhaps worth considering whether we should not stimulate articles
which draw attention to our improved commercial relations, indicating at
the same time our willingness to be helpful to the Chinese and hence
evidence of our desire to improve Sino-British relations in general.
This has its dangers I realise and could well provoke the opposite
reaction in Britain from those who are keen to
impose sanctions on the Chinese. Nevertheless it
is the one area in which we are useful to the
Chinese and although one must not exaggerate the leverage which we
obtain from this there would
seem no harm in the point being underlined in publicity.
It
(c) The letter from Mr. Maddocks (attached) on the
activities of the Board of Review is unhelpful. The Board's
deliberations show no aign of any particular urgency to resolve this
problem. sat only three times since July. On the last two occasions it
failed to recommend any of the
prisoners in whom we are interested for release. The procedure seems
inflexible and apart from supporting Mr. Denson's suggestion that
offenders who have health problems might be considered for release I
cannot see any way of getting round its rather rigid terms of reference.
I should be grateful for Hong Kong Department's views on this. It is
worth pointing out however, that the courts
/ would
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I
|
¡
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Reference
(a)
9.
in
would now appear to be applying more lenient criteria in their judgment
of offenders than was the case in 1967 (the head of the Gasworks Union)
and it would be reasonable to argue that the Board of Review should take
a similar relaxed view when examining these cases. There seems to be one
inconsistency in Mr. Maddock's letter; paragraph 5 he reports that the
cases of eleven young offenders were reviewed twice within the last year
although prison rules allow only for annual review. Would it be
possible, therefore, to have the long-term prisoners reviewed at less
than the statutory interval of every two years? It would be useful if
Hong Kong Department could remind us of the criteria used by the Board
when considering remission of sentences,
It must have been clear from the paper prepared for the talks with the
Governor in December and from our discussion with him that we had been
irritated by the lack of consultation on cases which had come before the
courte during the latter part of 1969. Rather than remind the Hong Kong
Government "at every opportunity of this obligation" which might be
counter productive, it would be better to confine it to occasions when
we think that consultation might have been swifter, e.g. the recent case
involving the arrest and sentencing of a former prisoner who had not
observed his supervision order. In this instance it is not clear whether
the delay in informing us was deliberate or due to administrative
inefficiency.
We must conclude that apart from continuing to advise restraint on Hong
Kong we are unlikely to persuade the Hong Kong Government to make
concessions over the remaining Chinese prisoners substantial enough to
evoke a response from the Chinese. Must our relations with the Chinese,
therefore, remain in a state of suspense? Hr. Denson points out that the
Chinese would probably like to improve relations with us as part of
their policy of maintaining links with West European countries in the
face of Soviet pressure.
The importance
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5 -
SECRET
The importance to the Chinese of European countries as a source of
supply has clearly increased during recent months. Hence the increased
activity of the Chinese Commercial Office in London. It is partly true
that
brobything the Chinese must realise that they can pocket the commercial
benefits without making any political
concessions to us.
We must therefore not exaggerate Chinese dependence on U.K. suppliers or
our leverage over them. Nevertheless commercial contact is the one
laspect of our relations with the Chinese which remains fairly cordial
and we should therefore build on this. I referred in paragraph 6(b) to
the dangers of appearing too forthcoming to the Chinese in commercial
matters, but this should not prevent us from continuing to be helpful
and provide facilities in commercial matters in the hope that some of
the goodwill generated by actions will rub off on our political
relations.
مات
Gifsem
(C. Wilson)
13 February, 1970.
I agree with Mr. Wilson's assessment of the possibilities of improving
Sino-British relations. It is clear that Sino-British trade is the only
feasible area in which we can take significant positive steps to achieve
better relations with China.
2.
I think it is important that we should realise the difficulties which an
approach to the Chinese to release Hong Kong confrontation prisoners
over the border would entail. This proposal has already been put to the
Chinese at least once during the confrontation period. The Chinese
rejected the suggestion out of hand and were obviously annoyed that we
had suggested it in the first place. They clearly assumed that we would
realise that the idea was completely unaccept- able, and seemed
convinced that we were simply trying
If we were to resurrect [ker) to debat points off them.
debatingpoints this propisal at the present time the Chinese would be
deeply annoyed, having made their views abundantly clear in the past.
Moreover, discussions on the release of prisoners inside China would
raise all the old long-term problems of Chinese sovereignty over Hong
Kong as well as bringing up once again the con- tentious issues which
occurred during the confrontation period.
3.
A geature such as the premature release of some
/prisoners
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6-
+
!
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Reference
prisoners in Hong Kong or even better, an amnesty, i would register with
the Chinese and would be taken as a significant step on our part to
improve relations. But a proposal to release prisoners inside China
would, I am afraid, be only counter-productive,
Спермедал
(L. V. Appleyard) 13 February, 1970
These angul monter come taken into account.
in the preferative of and paper of
2th Round
H
"The Refunds for Smo- Briksh Platine":
pla
mAll
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[
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Reference
33-
--------➖ ➖➖
N
3
Mr. C. 1вon, Wison,
Far Eastern Departhent
I am in general agreement with paragraphs 1-7 of your minute but have
reservations on your view that we could without weakening confidence in
Hong Kong do more in the way of premature release of confronta- tion
prisoners. On this matter, my department will once more study the
possibilities, taking up the points in paragraph 8(c) of your minute,
and will comment separately.
2.
I agree with Mr. Appleyard on the question of releasing prisoners to
China, For us to take the initiative in raising this again would, I feel
sure, greatly exacerbate relations. Just conceivably it may be worth
mentioning to them again if, as you suggest in paragraph 8(a) of your
minute, the Chinese themselves give us the opportunity to do so. (3.1
consider that the Governor is fully aware of the need for caution and
restraint in handling the local communists, and I would dispute that he
showed no recognition of this in our discussions in November, as Mr.
Denson would seem to suggest. The question of asking him to give an
undertaking in these terms did not (and I hope will never) arise.
Successive Governors have become skilled at treading the narrow path
between firmness and avoidance of provocation, and I do not think that
Sir David Trench is any less skilful or less discerning in plotting the
right course. Difficulties arise because there must inevitably be
differences of opinion as to where that course lies, Governors have
tended (though not always) to veer towards firmness, with their gaze
concentrated primarily on the problems of local administration, Our
representatives in Peking, naturally preoccupied with the sady of
Sino/British relations, are more 5 concerned to avoid provocation and
indeed to see móði positive advance in our relations with China.
Generally our role has been to reconcile and resolve differing views; on
occasions, however, we have found ourselves holding quite distinct
opinions of our own. It has been a role which, I suggest, Far Eastern
and Hong Kong Departments have in concert 'played with some skill over
the years, given the various personalities involved. Mr. Denson has
himself, of course, been one of the dramatis personae at this end,
Therefore we must in the forthcoming discussions with him pay particular
attention to his evident sense of frustration as it emerges from this
correspondence.
¿
March, 1970
(W. 8. Carter) Hong Kong Department
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WEBL 51-7406
BACKGROUND
مجھے آن ها
(r)
Deportation, to China.
A
1.In 1960 the physical deportati n of BRÍXRAKEX criminals from Hong Kong
came to a complete halt, and the only category which the Chinese
government was prefed to accept were those people arrested for esphonage
activities on behalf of the C.P.G., and the last case in this category
occurred in 1966. 3.However,with the commencement of Communist
confrontati n in H.K. in 1967, and following arrests and subsequent
recommendations by magistrates that prisoners should we consi- dered for
deportation the C. B.G.made it clear through an anouncement txxx by
LAUNG
ai Lan,director of the H.K. branch of the
KONA in a bulletin of June 15 that this weal
wold not be tolerated by the C.P.G as"it is the inviolable and
inalienable right of the Chinese people to reside in Hong Kong." 3.On 14
March 1968 it was decided to make a test case of two communist ile
stars,Shek maar Wai and Fu Ki who were presented for "re- lease to
China" at Lowu on 14 March. The C.F. C.P.G. condemned this as a
disguised
us as form of deportation, an. branded it as a "new form of persecution"
and it became the aubject of an official protest to .K.. in Peking.
4.On 11 April 1968 it was suggested that a garage and H.k.G. would be
prepared to allow certain prisoners in ..to go to China to reside. Lo
Kuei-po described this proposal as a " disguised form of deportation"
and said that the Chinese · Øvernment could not
་
possibly agree to this.
5.On 15 Muy a further approach was made to the NONA offering to release
a person, at that time detained in the V.R.G. for Chinese -spionag:
activities,on the understanding that the CIA would make arrangements for
his return to China.After some delay the FORA denied all knowledge of
the detainee concerned and stated tiut any attempt to deport him to
China would be unacceptable. 6.On 30 August 1968 the Foreign Secretary,
Kr.George Grown wrote to Ch'en Yi
k
this same point, with special reg rd to the possibility of the mutual
deportation of Mr. Anthony Grey, the Reuters' correspondent, from China,
and of sich P'ing, the communist ONA reporter from ong Kong. The Chinese
Government
made no response.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
PERSONAL & CONTIENZIKE
Office of the British Chargé
à'Affaires,
Dear James,
Fully chanson withe 20 Janson.
Peking.
See and
parfer of 24 Maule.
27 January, 1970.
Rands
You had earlier said that you would be letting me have your viets on the
state of Sino/British relatione following my interview with the Acting
Read of the Western Luropean Department of the Foreign Ministry on 22
December, Since then there have been various developments and I thought
that you might like my own assessment in the form of a consoli- dated
paper, which I now enclose.
2. The picture which I paint is bleak, particularly as regards the
prospects for the release of detained Eritish subjects. I hope that I am
proved wrong, but I think that the unpleasant possibility of there being
no further releases (except on health grounds) for some years must be
faced. If, as . result of this, and of the lack of any progress towards
the release of confrontation prisoners in Hong Kong, our political
relations remain soured, it could have a depressing effect in other
directions, including trade. But as you ill know from recommendations I
have made se arately, I am certainly not "orking on this assum tion.
3. ly views about the need to co-ordinate all aspects of Sino/British
relations and to regulate actions in Hong Kong accordingly are already
on record and have been well reflected in the paper prepared by Far
Eastern Department for the meeting with the Governor of Hong Kong on 25
November last (enclosed in your letter of 4 Ducumber). I share your hope
that w shall be able to steer the Hong Kong Government away from
injudicious policies. Thie at any rate should stop the position getting
worse, though if the line on prisoners is maintained, I doubt if it will
get much better. It is very difficult to argue from here against the
view that any further remissions or releases would be damaging to
confider.ce in the Colony and have the various other unfortunate effects
which the Covernor claims. It is however a fact that everyone in Hong
Kong does not share the Governor'a view. There are some who think that
the Hong Kong Government is now in a position of such strength and the
Chinese are so anxious not to rock the boat that the moment is
propitious for some political gesture in the interests of relations with
China as a
hole. They also share my view that the real danger lies in an incident
or situation arising in which the Hong Kong authorities would be
compelled to take stron, action, thus risking escalation. An unabrasive
policy would minimise the risk, but the possibility of it happening
spontaneously e.ɛ. an incident on the border or in a street market
cannot be ruled out. In these circumstances, if a policy of gradual
relaxation is not being followed, there will be no fund of local or
Chinese Government tolerance and the restoration of order may
accordingly becore more difficult without repressive measures. I dare
say that these are some of the subjects which will come u for
consideration when the appointment of the new Governor is made. The main
purpose of my paper is to point to the probable consequ- ences of the
continuation of the presert situation. I fully agree with
/the statement
James Kurray, Esq., C.K.G.,
Far Eastern Department,
F.C.O.
+
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PERSONAL & CONFIDENTI
PERSCHAL & CONFIRLITIAL
the statement in paragraph 7 of Far Eastern Department's paper that Hong
Kong is the "prime element" in Sino/British relations. In this case, we
may be justified in sacrificing all other elements in order to maintain
the position we want in Hong Kong, using the methods which the incumbent
Governor considers appropriate. But we should be clear what this
sacrifice may entail.
4. I have made certain recommendations of which (a) and (c) might be
examined further, subject to your views. I should in any case be glad to
know what you think of my general analysis and the prospects I fore- Bee
for the future.
Yours
wis ever, Jou
(J. B. Denson)
·
PERJONAL & CO)
•
CONFIDENTIAL
Sino/British Relations
Present Position
After the release of Mr. Grey and five other British subjects in
October, and even after te subsequent arrest of Kra. Kartin and Mr.
McBain, the Chinese in contacts with us laid stress on the efforts they
had made to improve relations and indicated that reciprocal measures
were expected. Specific mention of confronta- tion prisoners in Hong
Kong was not however made until 22 December when I pressed the Acting
Director of the Test European Department very hard for information about
rs. Martin and Mr. Kesain. Reference to prisoners was again made when
Kr. T'ang protested to me on 5 January about the death of the Chairman
of the Taikoo Dockworkers Trade Union, and asked that these prisoners
should be released. The Chinese representations were in a low key and
were clearly intended mainly to support representations by local
communists in Hong Kong. I do not think the death will prove a decisive
element in our relations, but the timing was unfortunate. It is clear
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