LINES YOU FEAR, SPECULATION IS BOUND TO ARISE FROM MR ROYLE'S VISIT IN
ANY CASE AND I WOULD DOUBT WHETHER DENSON'S PRESENCE (SUBJECT TO HIS
VIEWS) WOULD MAKE IT VERY MUCH WORSE. 2. THE QUESTION, I THINK, REALLY
TURNS ON HOW IMPORTANT MR ROYLE FEELS IT TO BE TO SEE HIM HERE. IF IT IS
IMPORTANT, WE
CAN WEAR THE RESULT.
(FCO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING)
P
SIR D.TRENCH
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
P.S. TO MR. ROYLE
SIR L.MONSON
MR. WILFORD
+
+
[REPEATED AS
REQUESTED)
4
1
'CONFIDENTIAL
Ple
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CYPHER/CAT A,
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
RÂM NUMBER 363
CONFIDENTIAL.
peor
TO PEKING.
11 SEPTEMBER 1973. (FED)
FEAT 2/1
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 303 OF 11 SEPTEMBER AND TO HONG
KONG.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 578.
FOLLOWING FROM WILFORD.
&
I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MR. ROYLE. WE WOULD LIKE BOTH YOU AND
THE GOVERNOR TO RECONSIDER WHETHER IT IS WISE FOR YOU TO COME TO
HONG KONG DURING MR. ROYLE'S STAY. THIS IS THE FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT
WHICH MR. ROYLE HAS PAID TO THE COLONY AND HIS PURPOSE IS TO HAVE
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNOR ON INTERNAL QUESTIONS.
INEVITABLY IF YOU ARE PRESENT AS WELL, EVEN IF ONLY FOR PART OF THE
VISIT, THERE WILL BE SPECULATION THAT ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS
VISIT IS TO CONSIDER HONG KONG'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA, THE SITUATION
OF THE CONVICTED PRISONERS AND SO ON. IS THERE NOT A RISK THAT THIS
WILL LEAD TO EXPECTATION OF A MOVE ON THE PRISONERS
AND TO PEOPLE IN PEKING EXPECTING YOU TO RETURN WITH FRESH
INSTRUCTIONS?
1
2. IF ON FURTHER RECONSIDERATION BOTH YOU AND THE GOVERNOR THINK
WE ARE BEING UNNECESSARILY APPREHENSIVE, MR. ROYLE WOULD, OF COURSE
BE GLAD TO SEE YOU AND THE NECESSARY FINANCIAL AUTHORITY FOR YOUR
JOURNEY IS ASSURED.
DOUGLAS HOME
FILE S
F.E.D.
K.K.D.
P.S. TO MR. ROYLE
SİR 1. muRSON
MM. WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
10
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Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
Emergency)•
Confidential Kertamed
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Priority Kousine
• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
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12/9/
(Date)
Despatched
X
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Draft Telegram 10:-,
No.....
(Date)
FRKING
And to:-
303
Security classification
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-If any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to PEKING
HONG KONG
telegram No.
19
And to
CONFIDENTIAL
repeated for information to.. HONGN
(date)....
11 Sept
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
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P.SKM. Royle Sit. Memor
11/9/1/0
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Saving to:
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578
Your telegram No. 594.
Following from Wilford.
I have discussed this with Mr. Royle. We
would like both you and the Governor to
reconsider whether it is wise for you to come to
Hong Kong during Mr. Royle's stay.
This is the
first official visit which Mr. Royle has paid to
the Colony and his purpose is to have discussions
with the Governor on internal questions.
Inevitably if you are present as well, even if
only for part of the visit, there will be
speculation that one of the objectives of his visit
is to consider Hong Kong's relations with China,
the situation of the convicted prisoners and so on.
Is there not a risk that this will lead estime to
expectation of a move on the prisoners which Chr
matérsky diet people
expecting
in Peking
instructions?
espect you to return with fresh
/2.
CONFIDENTIAL
[
CONFIDENTIAL
2. If on further reconsideration both you and the Governor
think we are being unnecessarily apprehensive, Mr. Royle would,
of course, be glad to see you and the necessary financial
authority for your journey is assured.
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Mr Royle
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they dear 1/4
Please see Peking telegram No. 578 addressed by Mr. Denson to
There will be no difficulty in obtaining the necessary authority from
the Administration for Mr. Denson to make this journey. However, before
replying, I wonder if we ought not to think perhaps for a moment about
the desirability of Mr. Denson being in Hong Kong at the same time as
you are. On this occasion you wish to concentrate your activities on
internal affairs in Hong Kong and this will no doubt be the gist of what
you will say publicly on arrival and of any briefing you may give once
in Hong Kong. If, however, Mr. Denson appears at the same time as you
are in the Colony there is some danger at least that the press will say
that his presence at the same time as yours means that matters connected
with China, or possibly the release of convicted prisoners is under
discussion. This would be a pity. I wonder therefore whether you would
like to re-consider the question whether Mr. Denson should come to Hong
Kong at the time he proposes.
2. A subsidiary argument but one which we should, I think, consider is
that you will not have all that amount of time available in Hong Kong
and you may not be able to spare much for extraneous matters. Mr. Denson
has only just been through Hong Kong himself so I doubt if he is in need
either of R. and R. or an excuse to do some shopping. I have mentioned
this matter also to Sir L. Monson and you may like to add this to the
agenda of the talk on Hong Kong which should have taken place today but
which I understand may take place tomorrow.
Km Kun hiffo
(K.M. Wilford)
9 September. 1970
Tel sent
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY PEKING
TELEGRAM NUMBER 578
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
8 SEPTEMBER 1970
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 578 OF 8 SEPTEMBER R F I
GOVERNOR HONG KONG.
FOR WILFORD.
FEET 2/1
L
WHEN I SAW MR. ROYLE IN LONDON HE SAID IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF I
HAD A TALK WITH HIM WHILE HE WAS IN HONG KONG. I WOULD ACCORDINGLY
PROPOSE TO ARRIVE IN HONG KONG ON 11 OCTOBER AND LEAVE
FOR CANTON ON 14 OCTOBER IN TIME TO ATTEND OPENING OF CANTON
TRADE FAIR ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG WITH WHOM
I HAVE DISCUSSED THESE PLANS SEES NO OBJECTION. GRATEFUL FOR
AUTHORITY FOR JOURNEY.
MR. DENSON.
FILES
F.E.D.
H.K.D.
PERS, OPS.D.
P.S. TO MR. ROYLE.
MR. WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
8
L
5
SA
CONFIDENTIAL
2877
Reference
Mr. Morgan,
Far eastern Department
Sino-British Relations
Mr. Maddocks has kindly sent me a copy of his letter to you of 12 June
on Sino-British relations.
2. You will not be surprised to learn that I find it unconvincing, for
reasons set out in part in my minute of 25 March to Mr. Murray (copy
attached). I shall not add to that except to say:
3.
(a) Mr. Maddocks should give more thought to
the future: on the one hand the declining importance and increasing
embarrassment) of Hong Kong; on the other the increasing importance of
China.
(b) As for the present, if we are to take a
hard look at the Peking/Hong Kong/London triangle, let us not overlook
Hong Kong. What does H.M.G. gain from Hong Kong' would be interesting to
see a balance sheet.
If there are to be any general discussions on the future of Sino-British
relations, I hope that Planning Staff will be given a chance to attend.
It
M
Handach
(P. Cradock) Planning Staff 3 July, 1970
Copy of submisini ₤37
sent to Me Carlock.
Mk
waish
SM
เจ
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
COVERING TOP SECRET
Flag A
SA
Mr. Wilford
Enter a resubmit pl. матиз
HONG KONG AND SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS
Mr. Maddocks will be in the Office on 6 and 7 July and
One of the
is booked provisionally to see you on 7 July.
subjects he will wish to discuss is the place of Hong Kong
within the broader context of Sino-British relations. In
anticipation of his discussions Mr. Maddocks has written
expressing considerable misgivings about what he sees as our
policy of bartering material interests in Hong Kong against
unreliable and ephemeral expressions of goodwill from the
Chinese.
2.
Mr. Maddocks' views appear to derive from a difference
of view on the basic aims of our policy. Since the comments
in Mr. Laddocks' letter underly some of the telegraphing from
Hong Kong (though in a more extreme form), it is important
that Mr. Haddocks should be reassured that we are under no
illusions about the extent to which Sino-British relations
can be improved, that we shall continue to pay due heed to
the substantial real interests in Hong Kong, and that our
policy is based on hard-headed calculation and not on wishful
thinking. Most of the points raised by Kr. Maddocks have
already been discussed at length, but I have some general
commenta on his letter.
Sino-British Relations
3. No-one here is under any illusions that in the foreseeable
future we can expect to
SECRET
COVERING TOP SECRET
/ China,
SECRET
COVERING TOF SECRET
4
given the present Chinese leadership and its likely
successors. There are too many deep-rooted obstacles:
history, competing ideologies, our close links with the United
States, our votes on the China seat in the United Nations and
our views on the status of Taiwan. These impediments will
persist even if the short-term problem of British subjects
is resolved.
The most we can aim for in the long term is a
sufficiently well founded
to ensure that temporary incidents (e.g. events in Hong Kong)
do not have a significant lasting effect on relations and are
dealt with in a reasonable fashion on the basis of our mutual
In the short term we can hope for an atmosphere,
interests.
in which problems like British subjects or potential disagreements
can be settled sensibly. In addition of course we want our
trade to continue to expand on a sound commercial basis without
discrimination against our traders on political grounds.
These are very limited objectives, based on a calculation of
the possibilities and, we consider, within our reach without
the sacrifice of real interests.
Commercial Relations
Li We should agree with much of what Er. Haddocks says in
paragraph 4 of his letter. We do not expect our trade with
China to outstrip our exports to markets in Europe or under-
developed countries. It will always be a small proportion of
overall British trade.
But the level of business continues to
Given that we are not
rise and the balance is in our favour,
bargaining away our interests elsewhere, and that the trade is
SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET
2
/ conducted
SECRET
COVERING TUF SECRET
conducted on a strictly commercial basis, there is every
reason to work for further improvement.
The Flace of Hong Kong
5. The crux of Kr. Maddocks' case is that we are too ready to
make concessions in Hong Kong in the search for a will-o'-the-
wisp improvement in Sino-British relations.
Flag B
6. T།
beyond any doubt that
TO APITTE- of "Hong
has shown
We can put
Similarly if an extension of the lease in
1997 is out of the question sooner or later, and possibly
long before 1997, we shall have to come to a settlement with
the Chinese over Hong Kong. This is bound to be painful.
The most we can hope for is an underly
on terms
consistent with our moral obligations to the inhabitants and
One unlikely to bring
pervane on this country.
This presupposes a considerable degree of Chinese restraint
and moderation.
term interests of Hong Kong itself that Sino-British and
It follows therefore that it is in the long-
Sino-Hong Kong relations should at least be sufficiently smooth
that we can enter into informal talks with the Chinese on this
problem with a reasonable chance of success.
7. In the short term it is scarcely necessary to re-emphasise
the need for satisfactory Sino-Hong Kong relations to preserve
the smooth running of the Colony. Accordingly we must
continually strike a delicate balance between maintaining con-
fidence in our determination and ability to preserve our
/position
SECRET COVERING TOP SECRET
3 -
SECRET
COVELLING TOP SECRET
position in the Colony, and the long and short-term
necessity to preserve sound relations between Hong Kong and
China. This means that while we should, and indeed do, pay
close attention t
Hong Kong by
showing that we are prepared wher▼ Hevesosiy
pressure, we should pay equal attention to removing irritants
in relations with China where this is possible. This entails
a hard look at the practical possibilities available to us, and
more particularly at the question of confrontation prisoners.
No purpose will be served simply by ignoring the problem, even
if the Chinese would allow us to do so. Given the oft-repeated
Chirme statement that
as much
relations.
we must at least continue to examine the problem
We may still conclude, as Mr. Maddocks suggests,
that there is little leeway for action; but this is no reason
for not taking up the issue, particularly as the local
Communists show no sign of wishing to resume ther campaign of
violence and the success of the Hong Kong Government in preserving
order becomes clearer and clearer with the passage of time. In
any case we cannot shelve the problem of confrontation prisoners
for four years, as Mr. Maddocke suggests, since we shall have to
decide during next year whether we wish to recommend the Governor
to
8.
A further point is that of timing.
relations with the Chinese are fleeting.
Moment of "good"
They are clearly
/ under
SECRET
COVERING TOP SECRET
-
SEORET COVERING TOP SECRET
under instructions to ensure that difficulties should not
be raised at present.
We should ensure that we are not
losing a good occasion for extracting benefits from them at
a lower cost than might be required at other times.
9. Mr. Maddocks touches briefly on the problem of maintaining
confidence between Whitehall and the Hong Kong Government.
This is one of the questions which Hong Kong Department
is keeping under constant review.
Copy to:
SALMorgen
(J. A. L. Morgan)
3 July, 1970
Clearly we have failed abyssually
Maddocks as the god Atte what
China is
that
Yr. Laird, Hong Kong Dept.
Mr. Cradock, Planning Staff
SECRET
+
стина м
our policy towwwt?
we have any but this most
COVERING TOP SECRET
5-
evil
Hong Kong. I find this very
Saud
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but weshall have
Nying
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inpress.
sall matie aand
m M' Madducks Forrow.
(ictor)
did they boat. He
did not exclude the idea of
using the 'exemplary'
play of which he sawd 17x
had never thought.
Pl. Discus
OS. DA
2600077
10,000-3/70-874512
SCR.4/3571/68
CONFIDENTIAL
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD HONG KENE
SA
Dear John,
Sino/British Relations
12th June, 1970.
pla may
I
ба
EC
Thank you for your letter FEC.3/548/2 of 2 June. look forward to
discussing this large subject with you in a fev veeks' time.
2. You will find that, having been here 2 years, I have become a strong
advocate of the Hong Kong point of viev. find myself out of sympathy
with the argument which starts from the assumption that the UK's
political and economic relations with China are capable of substantial
improvement and goes on to conclude that it is possible and wise to make
some concessions in Hong Kong to achieve those purposes.
3. I find it difficult to take very seriously the prospects of a
substantial improvement in political relations between UK and China. Our
inheritance from the last century, the extraordinary dogmatic nature of
the Chinese regime, the probable continuation of irritations and
problems in Hong Kong and the relative decline of our pover in the world
set narrow limits to the scope for improvement. The present discounted
value of our political prospects in China seems to me to be almost zero.
If we stay as we are, ve shall not do too badly.
4. The economic outlook seems hardly better. Although ve know very
little about the Chinese economy, it seems likely that her rate of
economic growth is very small indeed. Dramatic changes in the total
volume of her external trade are not to be expected. The present volume
of Ur/China trade is low in terms of the UK's trade. It is of importance
to a number of firms and pressure groups, but it does not seem to me to
make good commercial sense to concentrate much effort or hope on trade
with China. The lesson ve have reluctantly learned in the '50s and '60s
is that the industrialised countries of the world show the really
dramatic increases in trade openings for Britain. We want to do our best
in trading also with the
}
J.A.L.Morgan, Esq.,
F.C.O.
c.c. J. Allan, Esq., Peking.
P. Cradock, Esq., FCO.
CONFIDENTIAL
/under-developed
CS. 41A
2600077
18,000-3/70-374312
SCR.4/3571/62
CONFIDENTIAL
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG HONG
page 2.
under-developed world including China but the real pickings are not
there.
5. Of course I accept that ve would be well advised to improve political
and commercial relations with China if ve can. I am simply arguing that
we ought to make a very cool, realistic judgement of the probabilities,
especially if there is a price to be paid for the chance of obtaining
these benefits.
On the other side of the equation I should like to emphasise the
difficulties of making concessions in Hong Kong. First of all it is a
matter of opinion whether making concessions is a sensible way to deal
with the Peking Government. Secondly there is the particular question
whether a concession can be made. If one looks towards the confrontation
prisoners in Stanley and Laichikok the Hong Kong viev is that it cannot.
The subject was examined ad nauseam during Grey's detention, There is
nothing new to say. I think it would be best to accept that there is no
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.