*
16.
The next move of significance came on 10th December when the
official in charge of communist publishing circles briefed his
subordinates
on a massive propaganda campaign which, apparently, local communists had
been instructed by Peking to launch as a counter to the Western
publicity
about the conditions of Grey's detention in Peking. This campaign, which
was to concentrate on alleged maltreatment of detainees/prisoners in
Hong
Kong and demand their release, was launched almost immediately and is
still
continuing. Its high-point was the press conference given by FAI Yi Man
(paragraph 8 refers). It is of especial interest that it was emphasised
that
the campaign should not, in any way, relate the release of Grey to the
release of detainees/prisoners in Hong Kong indicating, perhaps, that
the
C.P.G. did not wish to be placed in a position which would leave no room
for manoeuvre,
17.
The last information received from delicate and secret sources
relating to Grey concerns a conversation on 23rd December between FAI Yi
Man
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and LEUNG Wai Lam, Director of the Hong Kong Branch of the N.C.N.A. în
which FAI admitted Grey's detention had been an error of judgement;
it had bean thought that it would prevent the Hong Kong authorities from
arresting other "compatriote" in Hong Kong. It was apparent from the
conversation, which was virtually a monologue by FAI, that FAI did not
have any idea as to current thinking and actions in Peking. At one stage
he said the Hong Kong Government was trying to create an atmosphere
favourable to Grey's release and he went on to say that he thought
negotiations between the British and the M.F.A. must be taking place in
Peking. LEUNG did not comment on these observations which, it is
significant, were made on the same day as FAI's interview with the
A.F.P. correspondent (see paragraph 8).
FURTHER POINTS OF INTEREST
18.
emerges.
The various comments and observations on Grey have been quoted
in some detail in an effort to see if any overall picture or pattern
There is little doubt that Grey was originally incarcerated in
retaliation for the arrest of HSUEH Hing. However, the C.P.0., although
inferring strongly that Grey's detention is still connected with the
imprisonment of communist journalists in Hong Kong, has been very
careful not to specify conditions for his release, thus leaving
themselves some latitude for manoeuvre, The offer, made by Her Majesty's
Government through diplomatic channels in December, 1967, and repeated
in March, 1968, to exchange Grey for HSUER Ping was ignored completely
by the C.P.G. thus seemingly indicating, at that stage, they wanted
rather more than HSUEK. Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe
that in early Cctober, 1968, they were considering seriously the release
of Grey at the end of that month, by which time they apparently thought
HSUE Ping would have completed his sentence. It will always be a matter
of speculation as to whether Grey would have been released if RSUEH had
come out of prison in October - certainly by the time he was released in
November the situation
had already changed,
19.
At the end of October the Acting Charge d'Affaires in Peking visited
Hong Kong for dental treatment and consultations with Government and a
senior member of the Foreign Office who visited the Colony at the same
time, At a press conference following his arrival the Acting Charge made
some reference to the "scandalous" treatment of Grey by the C.P.G.
and this was taken up by the world press and marked the revival of
interest
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of the Western press in Grey's situation. These remarks undoubtedly
stung the C.P.G. and the local communists and evoked an upsurge in
virulence in
the communist press here in retaliation. }
20.
Grey's detention in Peking must be viewed against the canvas of
overall C.P.G. foreign policy; this was made very clear in the directive
from CHOU En Lai. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the present
communist thinking in regard to Hong Kong; this, based on intelligence
from reliable sources, can be summed up as follows:-
(a)
Local communists pursued blundering tactics in 1967.
They must desist from these tactics and continue the
struggle by different means entirely;
(b)
(c)
(a)
(6)
CONCLUSIONS
21.
As a first ain they must win over the support of "the
70% of uncommitted people" in Hong Kong by flexible application of the
teaching of MAO, by winning whatever they can in negotiations over minor
issues, by realistically exploiting situations as they arise to the
fullest practicable extent and, of course, by propaganda
and education;
They can expect no material support in their struggle
from Peking; there is no intention of taking over Hong
Kong at the present time;
Events in Hong Kong must not be allowed to interfere
with or affect Peking's foreign policy plans and foreign
relations, including relations with Britain. All
relations with foreign countries will be directed from
Feking and all actions subordinated to overall policy;
No suggestion must be made that Grey's release is specifically
linked with the release of the detainees, the news workers
or anything else. The situation must be left fluid, to
enable Peking to deal with Grey as best suits their
foreign policy.
Although Grey's continued detention has been linked, both
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so.....
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Page 10
officially and unofficially, with the arrest; of "patriotic news
workers", and the latest statements come closest to "putting a price on
his head" the C.P.C. has deliberately avoided giving any undertaking
that Grey will be released if the remaining 12 staff members of
communist news agencies and newspapers are given their freedom.
Therefore, there is no guarantee that any such concession by the Hong
Kong Government would achieve its desired effect. Indeed, on the basis
of the material in this paper it is clear that Grey's release is
dependent solely on Peking's calculations as to whether or not retaining
or releasing him advances or hamper their overall foreign policy.
Nevertheless, while Grey remains in detention the local communists are
in a position to use his predicament as implied blackmail in any
attempts to squeeze concessions from the Hong Kong Government. However,
it is clear that they are under instructions not to commit Peking to a
position which leaves no room for manoeuvre. Similarly, of course, they
are free to try to make the best use they can of criticisms of the
Emergency Regulations from liberal-minded non- communists, and from
allegations about the mistreatment of detainees and prisoners. There is
no doubt that much of the recent publicity over Grey has touched Peking
on the raw, and the prosent propaganda line about the Emergency
Regulations, detainees and prisoners is directed from there in an
endeavour to counteract the bad impression Grey's case has made inter-
nationally. The latest N.C.N.A. release makes it clear, however, that
Peking has no intention of bowing to any form of pressure and therefore
the chances for Grey's release in the immediate future must be very
slim. Peking has, in effect, warned Britain that she will not do
anything to alleviate the conditions of Grey's detention while
international pressure is being applied.
i
I
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COPY Nd2..
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 87 Aha!
TOP SECRET.
TOP SECRET
TO FOREIGN AND COMITONWEALTH OFFICE
28 JAAUARY 1959
Mr him for 2011. 1hr Musin
The Cayde Im
RECEIVED WITHOUT PREAMBLE/
REC ARCH
No.31
28 JAN 1969
307
FEC/30/1
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 57: GREY.
330
نہیں
CATER CARRIED OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS ON 27 JANUARY, AFTER
CONSULTATION WITH NE ON HOW CERTAIN SUPPLEMENTARY MATTERS WHICH OCCURRED
TO US OUGHT TO BE HANDLED.
2. CONTACT ASKED HIN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RETURN TO HONG KONG
OF RELEASED NEVSVORKERS. CATES REPLIED ON THE LIES OF
PA: 503) OF TELERIAN UNDER REFERENCE, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE VAS
SPEAKING OF EXPIRY OF FULL, SENTENCE NOT OF SENTENCE LESS RŒMISSION,
3. 19
1: ADDITION TO THE DETAILS 1: YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE CATER SAID
THAT IF THE ARRANGEMENTS VIRE AGREED WE WOULD AVOID
SO FAR AS POSSIBLE MAKING PUBLIC STATENRITS OR COMMENTS.
IF ASKED, NC WOULD DENY THAT A DARGAB HAD VEEN STRUCA WITH THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD PRODADLY SUIT VS BOTH REST IF
GREY WERE RELEASED ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER THE NEWS WORKERS
SUTICOLON BUT AS SOON AS AGREENENT WAS REACHED WE WOULD EXPECT
HIM TO BE TOLD OF HIS LIPENDING RELEASE AND WOULD EXPECT HIS
14.
CONDITIONS TO BE IMPLOYER.
32,169.
TOP
SECRET
TOP
SECRET 2-
4. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THIS SERIES OF MEETINGS CONTACT WAS
QUSINESSLIKE, LISTENED CAREFULLY TO CATER AND TOOK NOTES.
HE SAID HE WOULD PASS THE MESSAGE TO PIXING BOTH THROUGH LI CHO-CHIH AND
DIRECTLY TO CHOU EN LAI'S PERSONAL OFFICE.
CONTACT WAS PLEASED WITH OUR PROPOSAL, HE THOUGHT IT EXCELLENT,
INDEED'RATHER BEITER THAN HE HAD EXPECTED, AND EXPRESSED
OPTIMISM THAT IT WOULD PROVE ACCEPTABLE.
ぢゅ
FULL TEXT OF CATER'S REPORT WILL DE SENT TO LONDON AND PEKING
BY FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
(F.C.O. PLS PASS PRIORITY TO PEKING
SIR D. TRENCH
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
FILES
F. EASTERN.D.
H.K.D.
P.U.S.D.
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD
SIR A. GAL SWORTHY
SIR J. JOHNSTON MR. MORETON
TOP SECRET
CYPHER/CAT 'A'
>IORITY HONG KONG
TOP SECRET
сытры
Fari cumph 0227/1
COPY NO
Ir29'5
∙10
Mr Will 2.10 (Top con in Mer
Thursory)
.
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
(332)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
TELEGRAM NUMBER 82
27 JANUARY 1969.
pale 11 27 JAN 1969
TOP SECRET
ADDRESSED TO F.C.0. TELNO 82 OF 27TH JANUARY. RFI PEKING.
330CUR TELEGRAM NO 67: GREY.
MY ONLY COMMENT IS THAT IF WE ARE FORCED TO ACCEPT RETURN ON
EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE, THIS SHOULD NOT BE ON EXPIRATION OF
SENTENCE AFTER REMISSION BUT AFTER EXPIRATION OF FULL SENTENCE CYOUR
PARA. 400) REFERS).
4(8) actually fr
2. CATER WILL NOW BE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE AN APPROACH ON THE LINES
PROPOSED IN YOUR TELEGRAM.
F.C.O. PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
FILE S
F.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
PRIVATE SECTETARY
P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD
SIR J. JOHNSTON
KR. MORETON
TOP SECRET
305
COPY NO....
11
380
TOP SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OF RECEIVED IN TELEGRAM NUMBER 67
TOP SECRET.
TOP COPY
2/2
per TO HONG KONG
[ARCHIVES No.31
27 JAN 1969
24 JANUARY 1969
(F.E.D.)
FEC13C/ Proza/1
Coquel t
HAKK I/K
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 07′ OF 24 JANUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 44. [OF 16 JANUARY: GREY).
1264
WE ARE INCLINED TO SHARE CRADOCK'S VIEW (PEKING TELEGRAM NO.3) THAT THE
RELEASE IN HONG KONG OF THE ELEVEN NEWSPAPER WORKERS WOULD SECURE THE
RELEASE OF GREY, THOUGH WE ADMIT THAT THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE. WE
ACCEPT HOWEVER THAT THIS STEP WOULD CARRY GRAVE DANGERS FOR THE FUTURE
SECURITY OF HONG KONG.
WE WOULD WANT TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH AN EVIDENT DETERIORATION IN
GREY'S MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH LEADS TO WIDESPREAD PRESSURE THAT ON
HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS WE SHOULD ACCEPT RISKS IN HONG KONG. LIKE CRADOCK
THEREFORE (PEKING TELEGRAM NO.30) WE SEE ADVANTAGE IN AN EARLY
SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE.
295
2. WE ARE NOT AT ALL OPTIMISTIC THAT THE CHINESE WOULD BE WILLING TO
STRIKE A BARGAIN WHEREBY IN RETURN FOR GREY YOU IN EFFECT RELEASED THE
NEWS WORKERS TO CHIPA. MUCH MUST DEPEND ON HOW EMBARRASSING THEY ARE
FINDING GREY. BUT SUCH A BARGAIN MAY SEEM TO THEM TO COME TOO CLOSE TO
COMPROMISING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHT OF ALL CHINESE TO LIVE IN HONG
KONG. MOREOVER IT MAY FACE THEM WITH PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THAT THE
NEWS WORKERS THEMSELVES MAY WELL BE RELUCTANT TO RETURN TO CHINA EVEN
FOR A PERION 3. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE EVIDENCE THAT THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES
EXPECT A REACTION FROM US TO THEIR LATEST MOVE, THE DESIRABILITY OF
DEMONSTRATING THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GO SOME WAY TO HELP THEM OVER,
THEIR DIFFICULTIES WITH THEIR FOLLOWERS IN HONG KONG, AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF MAINTAINING OUR CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH THE CONTACT, WE
AGREE THAT AN APPROACH GENERALLY ALONG THE LINES YOU SUGGEST WOULD BE
WORTH TRYING AND ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR
/PROPOSALS
+
LAUT
#IF
MEAT
305
332
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
2-
+
PROPOSALS.
4. WE ACCEPT THAT THE INITIAL OFFER SHOULD LEAVE SCOPE FOR SUBSEQUENT
MANOEUVRE. WE HAVE HOWEVER THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON
YOUR PRESENT PROPOSED TACTICS.
(A) WE SUGGEST THAT SINCE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HE CONVEYS OUR VIEWS
CORRECTLY TO THE CHINESE, CONTACT SHOULD BE TOLD THAT
WHATEVER THE FORM IN WHICH HE PUTS OUR OFFER HE MUST EMPHASISE
THAT RELEASE IN THE COLONY IS OUT OF THE QUESTION.
(B) DESPITE CONTACT'S ADVICE THAT WE SHOULD NOT OFFER ALL ELEVEN AT
FIRST (YOUR TELEGRAM NO.27) WE SEE LITTLE TO BE GAINED BY 304LEAVING
VAGUE WHETHER OR NOT OUR OFFER APPLIES TO ALL ELEVEN.
(C) WE THINK THAT IF WE INSIST AT THE OUTSET THAT REPATRIATION MUST BE
PERMANENT, WE INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE CHINESE WILL SIMPLY
REJECT OUR OVERTURE OUT OF HAND AND AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, CONVERSELY
ANY SLIGHT CHANCE THERE MAY BE OF SUCCESS WOULD BE IMPROVED IF IT
APPEARED THAT WE DID NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THAT THE PRISONERS COULD
RETURN TO HONG KONG ON THE EXPIRY OF SENTENCE, WE SHARE YOUR DISTASTE
FOR THIS LATTER COURSE: A TRIUMPHAL RETURN ACROSS THE BORDER IN
SEPTEMBER MIGHT BE
ALMOST AS DAMAGING TO CONFIDENCE AS RELEASE IN THE COLONY NOW. BUT WE
ACCEPT THAT WE MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE DRIVEN TO THIS CONCESSION IF WE WERE
UNDER GREAT PRESSURE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS TO DO SOMETHING FOR GREY,
AND THIS WAS THE FIRM PRICE FOR HIS RELEASE. IT MIGHT BE BEST,
THEREFORE, IF OUR INITIAL APPROACH DID NOT SPECIFICALLY INDICATE WHETHER
REPATRIATION WOULD BE PERMANENT OR NOT. WE COULD THEN RECONSIDER THE
MATTER IN THE LIGHT OF AMY CHINESE REACTION. IT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE
POSSIBLE TO REACH A HALF-WAY POSITION WHEREBY THE CHINESE ACCEPTED THAT
ANY QUESTION OF RE-ENTRY AFTER EXPIRY OF SENTENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE
CONSIDERED CASE BY CASE AT THE TIME.
15. SUBJECT
J
I
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-
TOP SECRET
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
-3-
5. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS THEREFORE WE THINK THAT CATER SHOULD NOW
APPROACH CONTACT ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:
(A) RELEASE IN COLONY IS OUT OF THE QUESTION.
(B) YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER COMMUTING SENTENCES OF ANY OF THE
NEWS WORKERS WHO FORMALLY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO BE REPATRIATED TO
CHINA, AND WHOM THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES UNDERTOOK TO ACCEPT. (IF CONTACT
ASKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT REPATRIATION ONLY UNTIL THE EXPIRY OF
SENTENCES, CATER MIGHT REPLY THAT THIS WOULD RAISE GRAVE DIFFICULTIES:
BUT IF THE CHINESE WERE TO MAKE A FIRM PROPOSAL ON THESE LINES HE THINKS
YOU MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IT).
(C) YOU WOULD EXPECT APPROPRIATE ASSURANCES FROM THE CHINESE THAT THEY
WOULD IN RETURN RELEASE GREY.
6.) AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WE HAVE RELUCTANTLY DECIDED AGAINST THE
INCLUSION IN YOUR OFFER OF ANY REFERENCE TO OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS IN
DETENTION. THE CHINESE MAINTAIN A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN GREY, WHO IS
HELD AS A POLITICAL HOSTAGE
FOR ALLEGED MISDEMEANOURS BY THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES, AND THE OTHER
BAITISH NATIONALS, WHO ARE HELD FOR ALLEGED MISDEMEANOURS OF THEIR OWN.
TO INJECT THE OTHERS INTO OUR OFFER WOULD NOT IN OUR VIEW HELP TO SECURE
THEIR RELEASE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE ANY HOPES OF A SUCCESSFUL BARGAIN OVER
GREY.
STEWART
FILES
F.E.D.
P.U.S.D.
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD
SIR A. GALSWORTHY
SIR J. JOHNSON
MR. MORETON
FFFFF
TOP SECRET
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry 'No.
FTOP SECRET
DEPARTMENT Far Eastern ·
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
XIOD X
Confidential
PRIORITY MARKINGS (Date)....
}
* Date and time (G.M.Të filegram should
reach addressge).
2441
330
EE CYPHER
Restricted
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. Cloda Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
HONG KONG
No+67
(Date)
And to:-
24/1
Repet to:-
PAKING
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
FILES
Far Eastern Dept. PUSD
Frivate Secretary Få/Lord Shepherd Sir Al Galsworthy
Copier to !----
to:- Sir J. Johnston Moreton
ве
1
24/11
Routine
[Secu
Security classification] TOF SECRET
-if any
[ Privacy marking
-if any 1.
[Codeword-if any]
IL-
Addressed to HÙNG KANG
telegram No.
67
---INT
(date)
24 January
And to
repeated for information to
Saving too.....
PEKING
++-----------
Your telegram No. 44 of 16 January: Grey.
We are inclined to share Cradock's view
(Peking telegram No. 3) that the release in Hong
Kong of the eleven newspaper workers would
secure the release of Grey, though we admit that the
evidence is not conclusive. We accept however that
this step would carry grave dangers for the future
security of Hong Kong. We would want to avoid a
situation in which an evident deterioration in
Grey's mental and physical health leads to wide-
spread pressure that on humanitarian grounds we
should accept risks in Hong Kong. Like Cradock
therefore (Peking telegram No. 30) we see advantage
FanF in an early settlement of the case.
2. We are not at all optimistic that the Chinese
would be willing to strike a bargain whereby in
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WBL 51-7406
x
* TOP SECRET
Ei
return for Grey you in effect released the
news workers to China. Much must depend
on how embarrassing they are finding Grey.
But such a bargain may seem to them to come
too close to compromising the principle of
the right of all Chinese to live in Hong
Kong. Moreover it may face them with
practical difficulties in that the news-
workers themselves may well be reluctant to
return to China even for a period.
3. However, given the evidence that the
Chinese authorities expect a reaction from us
to their latest move, the desirability of
demonstrating that we are prepared to go
some way to help them over their
difficulties with their followers in Hong
Kong, and the importance of maintaining our
channel of communications through the
contact, we agree that an approach generally
along the lines you suggest would be worth
trying and are grateful for your proposals.
4. We accept that the initial offer should
leave scope for subsequent manoeuvre.
have however the following comments on your
present proposed tactics.
(a) We suggest that since it is
We
important that he conveys our
views correctly to the Chinese,
contact should be told that what-
ever the form in which he puts our
offer he must emphasise that
release in the Colony is out of the
question.
2
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
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A
From D
(b) Despite contact's advice that we
should not offer all eleven at first
(your telegram No. 27) we see little
to be gained by leaving vague
whether or not our offer applies to
all eleven.
(c) We think that if we insist at the
outset that repatriation must be
permanent, we increase the likelihood
that the Chinese will simply reject
our overture out of hand and as a
matter of principle. Conversely
any slight chance there may be of
(it appeared success would be improved if we that we did not cutiuly
excule, h wore prepared to agbee that the
prisoners could return to Hong Kong
on the expiry of sentence. Te share
your distaste for this latter course;
a triumphal return across the border
in September might be almost as
damaging to confidence as release
in the Colony now. But we accept
that we might eventually be driven
to this concession if we were under
great pressure on humanitarian
grounds to do something for Grey,
and this was the firm price for hie
release. It might be best, therefore,
if our initial approach did not
specifically indicate whether
repatriation would be permanent or
rot. We could then reconsider the
matter in the light of any Chinese
-
TOP SECRET
reaction
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
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TOP DEURET
reaction. It might conceivably
be possible to reach a half-way
position whereby the Chinese
accepted that any question of
re-entry after expiry of sentence
would have to be considered case by
case at the time.
5. Subject to your views therefore we think
that Cater should now approach contact on
the following lines:
(a) Release in the Colony is out of the
(A)
question.
You would be prepared to consider
commuting sentences of any of the
news workers who formally expressed
willingness to be repatriated to
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.