[Codeword-if any]
MAY 14 KA
Addressed to
HONG KONG
telegram No....
.....(đate) ....
And to
repeated for information to
And to:-
Saving to...
יויװr11ייו
PEKING
.... BILLI'I
Repeat to:-
PEKING
Saving to:-
Distribution:
FILES
A
Far Eastern
Dept. Hong Kong Dept. PUSD
Frivate Sec. Copies to:-
25/Lord Shep-
herd
Sir A. Gals-
worthy
Sir J. Johnston Mr. Moreton
Your telegram No. 44 of 16 January7: Grey.
We are inclined to share Cradock's view
(Peking telegram No. 3) that the release in Hong
Kong of the eleven newspaper workers would secure
the release of Grey though we admit that the evidence
is not conclusive. We accept however that this
step would carry grave dangers for the future
security of Hong Kong. We would want to avoid a
situation in which an evident deterioration in
Grey's mental and physical health leads to wide-
spread pressure that on humanitarian grounds we
should accept risks in Hong Kong. Like Cradock therefore (Peking
telegram No. 30) we see the need
for speed.
2.
Flam E
We are not optimistic that the Chinese would
be willing to strike a bargain whereby in return
+
for Grey you in effect released the news
workers to China. Much must depend on how
embarrassing they are finding Grey. But such a
bargain may seem to them to come too close to
compromising the principle of the right of all
Chinese to live in Hong Kong. Moreover it may
face them with practical difficulties in that
the news workers themselves may well be reluctant
to return to China even for a period.
3.
However, given the evidence that the
Chinese authorities expect a reaction from us to
their latest move and the desirability of
demonstrating that we are prepared to go some way
to help them over their difficulties with their
followers in Hong Kong, we agree that an
approach generally along the lines you suggest
would be worth trying and are grateful for your
proposals.
4.
But
We accept that the intiial offer should
leave scope for subsequent manoeuvre.
since it is important that contact puts our
offer correctly to the Chinese, we gee
advantage in defining slightly more precisely then you at present
envisage the limits of
our position:
(a)
We suggest that contact should be told
that whatever the form in which he puts
our offer he must emphasise that
release in the Colony is out of the
question.
#1033) DA 39200571
(77 sorts)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Dd. 32855 B4 (4200)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Clay D
5.
TOP SECRET
(b) Despite contact's advice that we
(c)
should not offer all eleven at first
(your telegram no. 27) we see little
to be gained by leaving it vague
whether or not our offer applies to
all eleven.
We are inclined to accept Cradock's
view (Peking telegram no. 20) that
if there is to be any chance of
success the prisoners would have to
be released to China only until
expiry of sentence, and we note that
you would in the final instance
reluctantly accept this. It might
conceivably be possible to reach a
half-way position whereby we agreed
that any question of re-entry after
expiry of sentence would have to be
considered case by case at the time.
It might be best therefore
if our initial approach left it
unclear whether we were suggesting
that they should return to China
for good or merely until expiry of
the sentence. We would in any case
wish to reconsider the matter in the
light of Chinese reactions.
Subject to your views therefore
we think that Cater should now approach contact
on the following lines;-
/(a) ...
6.
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(a) Unecnditional Release in the
Colony is out of the question.
(b) You would be prepared to consider
commuting sentences of any of the
news workers who formally
expressed willingness to be
repatriated to China, and whom
the Chinese authorities undertook
to accept.
(c) You would expect appropriate
assurances from the Chinese that
they would in return release Grey.
After careful consideration
The
we have reluctantly decided against the
inclusion in your offer of any reference
to other British subjects in detention.
Chinese maintain a clear distinction between
Grey, who is held as a political hostage for
alleged misdemeanours by the Hong Kong
authorities, and the other British nationals,
who are held for alleged misdemeanours of
their own. To inject the others into our
offer would not in our view help to secure
their release and would frustrate any hopes
of a successful bargain over Grey.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
13/1.
TOP SECRET Sie A Solowning has seen.
Gutes.
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG
KRECEIVED IN
337
ARCHIVES No.31
7th January, 1969.
Dear Arthur
29 JAN 1969
FECIBC/1.
الله معاهم
I have, as you know, never been convinced that Grey's release (or any
Chinese action towards us, here in Hong Kong or elsewhere) was in fact
substantially influenced by or conditional upon any concessions we make
to then. But since, during our talks in London, the view was
categorically expressed by James Murray that, in particular, the release
of Grey would follow upon the release of all detainees and the 13 (now
11) "newsworkers"; and that there was evidence in support of this view;
I again, on my return, went over what we have on record bearing on the
subject and it is not inconsiderable in quantity to see if I might not,
after all, have been wrong in opposing this opinion and the view
generally that concessions deliberately made as such would bring
results.
After looking through the papers, it seemed to me that it might be
worthwhile to have the evidence on Grey drawn together, and this has now
been done (ny telegram 2286 refers). The attached paper No. PA/1763 is
the result, and, although the paper could scarcely be expected to be
conclusive, I am still convinced that I was not wrong.
There is, of course, the one deduction in doubtful support of making
concessions to be drawn from the lifting of restrictions on the Embassy
staff in Peking following upon our relaxation of restrictions on the
Chinese Embassy staff in London, but I can find no other evidence which
impugns my central argument. This is, if you recall, that although the
Chinese have avowedly followed a policy of "tit-for-tat", it is
fallacious to take it for granted from this that they will also pursue a
policy of what I inelegantly called "untit-for-untat".
Sir Arthur Galsworthy, KCMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.
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/contd....
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GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG.
Page 2
The paper, in paragraph 20, summarises what we know of present communist
thinking, and to me the clear conclusion is that Grey will not be
released in recognition of any concessionary moves in Hong Kong (cf.
"there is no price for Grey") but only as a result of Peking's
calculations as to whether or not retaining or releasing him advances or
hampers their overall foreign policy. Nevertheless, local communists, as
the paper points out, are free to try to use Grey's predicament as a
means of squeezing concessions out of us if they can, always provided
they do not commit Peking into releasing him. It follows then that their
tactics are to hint at Grey's release if we do this or that, in the hope
that we will fall for the hints and respond; when they will be in a
position to play the same game all over again with a fresh lot of hints
about a new and enhanced price for Grey. It is, after all, in fact what
they have done so far. Nevertheless, whether we respond or not, they
will release Grey if and when, and only when, he becomes more of an
embarrassment to them than an asset. Any concessions they get out of us
would be a bonus, and, of course, would tend if anything towards tipping
the scales against releasing him.
Furthermore, I cannot but think we shall be in a very curious position
indeed with our own public opinion if we released the remaining 11
"newsworkers" and only got Grey in return we got him. People are bound
to ask why we did not get all our prisoners back,
supposing
In short, I continue to think we should go on dealing with the remaining
detainees and prisoners as we are now, releasing the detainees as the
security position permits and the prisoners as their sentences expire. I
think we would be very wrong to consider releasing the "newsworkers"
until we were very sure of getting an adequate quid pro quo not just
Grey in return.
-
As for poor Grey and the others, I honestly think that the best thing we
can do is make it clear we will not try to enter into a bargain for then
while continuing to embarrass them with periodic publicity followed by
quite long periods of silence to give them a chance to let him go
without appearing to be bowing to outside pressure. The threat to use
publicity pressure should, however, be apparent in the background since
they certainly appear to be sensitive to it.
TOP SECRET
/contd....
TOP SECRET
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG,
Page
Finally, I should add that this letter representa my personal views.
They are views which generally express official opinion here, but, in a
matter such as this, no doubt everyone who wrote on the subject would
place the gloss and emphasis slightly differently. It is best therefore
to make it clear that this way
of looking at things is my own only.
Yours ever
David.
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Attachment to FEC130/1337
SPECIAL BRANCH HONG KONG
- 2 JAN 1969
TOP SECRET
Reference: PA/1763
INTRODUCTION
TOP SECRET
ANTHONY GREY
Pago No. 1 of 10Fages
Copy No. 6 of 20Copies
Special Branch,
Hong Kong Police.
2nd January, 1969.
-
INDICATIONS OF C.P.G. ATTITUDE
TOWARDS HIS RELEASE
On 21st July, 1967, Anthony Grey, Reuters' correspondent in
Peking, was aussoned to the News Department of the C.P.G. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (M.F.A.) to "talk about his work". From the H.F.A.
Grey was driven, under escort, to his hous where he has since been
confined. Grey was the only British correspondent in Peking at that time
and his detention was clearly in retaliation for the arrest, arising
from criminal offences, of New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.) reporter
HSUE Ping in Hong Kong a few days earlier. Although the C.P.G. has never
made a clear-
cut statement as to the conditions necessary to secure Grey's release
there have been, both at the time restrictions were originally placed on
him and
since, a number of Chinese communist pronouncements, official and
unofficial,
as to the reason for his detention. This note examines these statements,
together with intelligence received from covert sources relating to this
subject, in an attempt to assess the current attitude of the C.P.G.
towards Grey's release and the price, if any, in the form of concessions
by the Hong Kong Government, likely to be accepted by the C.P.G.
C.P.G. STATEMENTS OF GREY
2.
At the time the restrictions were originally placed on Groy's movements
the C.P.G. overtly linked his detention with the imprisonment in Hong
Kong of a number of employees of the N.C.N.A. and communist newspapers,
According to a subsequent telephone call from Grey, he was told at his
interview at the H.F.A. on 21st July, 1967, that his movements were
being restricted because of "illegal persecutions and fascist atrocities
in
Hong Kong against Chinese compatriots". In answer to a query from Grey
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Page 2
about the possible length of detention it was stated "There is no need
to
answer you now. The Hong Kong British authorities could release all the
compatriots without conditions". In an N.C.N.A, news release of the same
date the M.F.A. stated Grey had been detained because "the British
Government and the Hong Kong British authorities had paid no heed to the
Chinese Government's serious warnings and carried out serious
persecution
against correspondents of N.C.H.A. and other patriotic reporters and
have
taken such a step as illegally sentencing them". In addition to
mentioning
HSUE Ping this release specifically named two other N.C.N.A.
correspondents
and referred to five other communist news workers. There is little doubt
that
these others were members of a group of reporters arrested outside
Government
House on 15th July, 1967, who were sentenced, fined and released within
a
few days. Apart from this group there was one other communist reporter
serving a prison sentence at the time Grey's movements were restricted,
He was not referred to in the K.F.A. statement and in any event he also
has since completed his sentence and been released.
3.
Statements made by C.P.G. representatives since Grey's detention
have been extremely vague and ambiguous; at times they have linked the
release of Grey with confrontation in Hong Kong as a whole and at other
times it has been connected simply with the arrest of journalists. In
May, 1968, an H.F.A. official in Peking answered a protest about Grey by
the British
Charge d'Affaires by stating "You should consider the question of
patriotic
journalists and news workers imprisoned in Hong Kong and you will find
the answer yourselves, The Grey question is not an isolated one but part
of the Hong Kong problem". In September, in reply to a Foreign Office
protest, a member of the Chinese Mission in London said "Grey's freedom
is limited
because of unreasonable arrests of N.C.N.A. journalists and other
patriotic correspondents in Hong Kong" while the following week the same
official
remarked "Restrictions on Grey's freedom are due to British policies in
Hong Kong, specifically the unjustifiable arrest of N.C.N.A. and other
patriotic journalists. The Chinese Government and people are deeply
concerned at the long sentences imposed". However, on 2nd November, in
conversation with the Political Adviser in Hong Kong about visits to
imprisoned journalists, an N.C.N.A. official linked Grey's detention
with
confrontation prisoners in general rather than just the news workers.
On the 4th December, a delegation of journalists who called on the
Chinese Hission in London to present a petition for Grey's release was
13.....
1.
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told "How can you expect us to release Grey when 13 patriotic
journalists remain in detention in Hong Kong". This remark was somewhat
distorted by some newspapers which claimed that the official had
specifically stated that the restrictions on Grey would not be lifted
until all imprisoned communist news workers in Hong Kong had been
released. The next official C.P.G. comment on Grey was made on 9th
December to a member of the British Mission in Peking, following a
further protest and request for Grey's release on the grounds that all
communist news workers imprisoned in Hong Kong at the time of his
detention had now been released. The C.P.G. official said "Since the
1967 statement by the C.P.G. the British side has gone further in
persecuting and arresting large numbers of patriotic countrymen and
press workers. The solution (to the detention of Grey) can only come
through an act by the British Government",
5.
The last C.P.G, pronouncement, to date, on the Grey question was
contained in an article published by N.C.N.A. Peking on 27th December.
The article, two-thirds of which consisted of refutation of statements
by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, compared the lenient
treatment accorded Grey with the "savage persecution" of compatriots in
Hong Kong; it also declared that the C.P.G. had not shifted its ground,
for although the communist journalists who were in prison in Hong Kong
at the time of Grey's detention had been released the Hong Kong
authorities
It concluded that "Since the had since imprisoned other news workers.
Hong Kong British authorities continue to keep the 13 patriotic Chinese
Journalists in jail, the Chinese Government is fully justified in
continuing to restrict Grey's freedom of movement. This is the
consistent stand of the Chinese Government. In its anti-China outcry on
the Grey question the British Government will absolutely achieve nothing
in its effort to force the Chinese Government to change its stand. This
unreasonable action does not help to solve the question but only makes
it more complicated". The article then finished with a routine KAO
quotation.
LOCAL COMMUNIST STATEMENTS
6.
Apart from what can be accepted as official C.P.G. statements there have
been a number of comments on the subject of Grey by prominent communists
in Hong Kong in conversation with neutral journalists. As.long ago as
January, 1968, Hans Bargman, a West German newspaper correspondent in
Peking, while on holiday in Hong Kong was allegedly told by an N.G.N.A.
when HSUEH Ping is official here that "the price for Grey had not gone
up
-
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released Grey will be allowed to leave China". However, in September,
Bargman claimed he was told by the same official that "Grey's situation
is connected with atrocities in Hong Kong and questions about his
release
should be addressed to Peking".
7.
In August, 1968, Sam JAFFE, the Hong Kong correspondent of the American
Broadcasting Company, was told by the Chief Reporter of the N.C.N.A.
that "Anthony Grey will be released shortly after our journalist is
released in October". Jaffe assumed this was a reference to HSUEH Ping
at this time there appeared to be a general misconception about the date
of HSUH's release; he was, in fact, released on schedule on 16th
November,
8.
On 20th December, FAI Yi Wan, Publisher of the Ta Kung Pao, held a
press conference as the climax of a communist propaganda campaign in
Hong Kong alleging inhuman treatment of confrontation
prisoners/detainees
and demanding their release, This conference was initiated on C.P.G.
instructions, to counter Western publicity concerning Grey's plight. In
answer to a question on Anthony Grey he said "Since our Government's
announcement to restrict the movement of Anthony Grey, the Hong Kong
British authorities have not ceased their unreasonable persecution of
the patriotic journalists in Hong Kong. Nor did they
Nor did they promptly free HSUE Ping and the
others. On the contrary, the Hong Kong British authorities aggravated
the
situation by arresting and jailing more than 10 other patriotic
journalists
in Hong Kong. Up till the present, there are still 13 patriotic
journalists incarcerated in the prisons. Therefore the responsibility
for the continuing restriction of Grey's movement lies entirely with the
British side". The
A.F.P. correspondent in Hong Kong, who has fairly frequent contact with
FAI Yi Man, and who had attended the press conference, claimed, in a
conversation with the Political Adviser on 23rd December, that earlier
that
day FAI had told him categorically Grey would be released when the 13
newspaper men were let out of prison. This is somewhat different to the
carefully worded statement made by FAI three days before. Although a
prominent comunist United Front worker in the Colony, FAI cannot be
considered a leading communist official and if the correspondent's story
is true it is unlikely FAI would have made such a statement without the
authority of at least senior local communists, It is, of course,
possible
also that FAI's remarks were misinterpreted in a manner similar to the
misconceptions which have appeared from time to time in the Western
press
concerning communist statements on Grey.
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L
i
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9.
Page 5
An unofficial communist voice, that of Dr. T.P. WU, a member of the All
Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, said in an interview on
14th December, with a local English language newspaper, that "Grey would
be held until the last Chinese was restored to freedom in Hong Kong".
However, WU has no official standing in local communist circles and his
frequent pronouncements often embarrass the local communists more than
the Hong Kong Government.
COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH COVERT CHANNELS
10.
In March, 1968, LI Choh Chih, General Manager of the Bong Kong Branch of
the Bank of China sought to establish a channel of communication to the
Hong Kong Government through a former senior employee of the Bank of
China who still acts as an exchange broker for the Bank and who is a
member of the Banking Advisory Committee. LI was allegedly acting on
instructions from CHOU En Lai, the Chinese Premier. While little that is
really constructive has come through this link so far there has, on
occasion, been reference to Anthony Grey. On 17th September, 1968, the
contact said to the Hong Kong He Government representative that HSUER
Ping was not the price for Grey. claimed Peking was embarrassed by the
continued detention of Grey and it was only a matter of time before he
was released. The contact claimed he would write to CHOU En Lai's
secretary, a channel of communication which he used periodically,
by-passing LI Choh Chih, and ask whether anything could be done about
Gray. Four days later the contact stated that LI too had said Grey was
an embarrassment to Peking; however they were not interested in an
exchange of Grey for HSUEH but the Hong Kong Government should,
nevertheless, be sounded out on the possibility of an early release for
HSUEH. On the 24th September, the contact claimed he had heard from CHOU
En Lai to the effect that CHOU was concerned about Grey and he would be
released when the opportunity occurs". The contact also mentioned that
LI had received instructions to proceed with discussions to explore the
possibility of an exchange of prisoners but he felt the C.P.G. would ask
for more than just HSUMH possibly all the imprisoned news workers.
contact was of the opinion that Grey would be released at the latest by
1st January as "this is the target date for complete de-escalation". On
14th October, the contact claimed to have received a reply from CHOU En
Lai's secretary. While nothing specific was included about conditions
for Grey' a release it was stated that Peking did not intend "to ask for
the impossible
from the Hong Kong Government",
The
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11.
Page 6
Three weeks later, on 6th November, the contact reported that LI asked
him to pass a message to the Hong Kong Government to the effect that if
there was a genuine desire to improve Sino-British and Sino-Hong Kong
relations it was possible to come to some arrangements on the basis that
the Hong Kong Government could take steps to de-escalate and the Chinese
would reciprocate; the Chinese could do "various things including the
release of Grey" contact added. LI was reported to have stressed that
the
exchange of Grey for HSUER Ping was not possible but an exchange for all
news
workers might be. The contact opined that this proposal had originated
from Peking and he suggested that three or four news workers might be
let
out as an act of clemency.
12.
On the 22nd November, the contact claimed that the local branch
of N.C.N.A. had informed Peking that the Hong Kong Government was
softening and
might be prepared to pay a price for the release of Grey. Peking was, he
said, putting pressure on the H.C.N.A., Hong Kong, to produce something
to
support its theory. The last mention of Grey through this channel was
received on 10th December when the contact claimed that the remarks made
by the Chinese Hission in London about Grey (paragraph 4 refers) were
not
authorised by Peking. Peking was, he said, very concerned about the
publicity being given in the West about Grey but was still contemplating
his release. However, he said, "in view of the publicity it may now take
some time and there may be a gradual easing of restrictions rather than
a
complete release".
INTELLIGENCE FROM DELICATE SOURCES
13.
In October, 1968, a report from a completely reliable and delicate
Special Branch source gave strong indications that the C.P.G. was
considering
the early release of Grey and was preparing local communist circles for
this eventuality. On the 9th October, at a meeting of senior officials
in
communist film circles, an N.C.N.A. official outlined a directive
reportedly
given by CHOU En Lai to a Hong Kong delegation which had visited Peking.
Although no date was given for the directive it was believed to have
been
passed over in the latter half of September. The directive, which dealt
with
the general conduct of Chinese communist affairs in Hong Kong, made
reference
to Grey, stating his release would in no way affect the Hong Kong
struggle.
It stressed that the present situation was more favourable to
Sino-British relations and nothing should stand in the way (of further
improvement). It
was emphasised that the essence of this directive should be disseminated
to
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the communist lower echelons by the 20th October, a significant date in
that an erroneous belief was widely held in Hong Kong at the time that
HSUE Ping was scheduled for release from prison on the 19th October.
14.
A more detailed insight into the contents of the CHOU En Lai
directive was obtained on 17th October when the same N.C.N.A. official
gave
a lengthy briefing on its contents to a group of senior local
communists.
In referring to Grey he claimed that this release would have no effect
on
the proletarian world revolution but, on the other hand, if he was not
released it would be difficult to carry on the struggle in Hong Kong".
He did not explain this point but went on to say that "the Hong Kong
struggle must not be allowed to interfere with the foreign policy of
China which included the release of Grey",
15.
On the 21st November, at a meeting of senior officials in local
publishing circles it was said that "after careful assessment Peking had
concluded that Grey's release would not affect China's overall policy
but
compatriots (in Hong Kong) must not expect the release of confrontation
prisoners in reciprocation". A week later the same officials admitted
that
the continued detention of Grey was now the main issue (between China
and
Britain); it was stated that Peking had rejected Britain's protests
about
Grey's detention and said that even if Grey was released the Hong Kong
Government would not release detainees or journalists,
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.