FILE NO......FAG..
YEAR 1968/9
STAMP
SECUR
N.B. The UPGRA
(N.B. The grading of the jacket muat be the same as that of the higher
graded int contained in it. The appropriate upgrading ship must be
affixed when ever necessary.)
TOP SECRET
H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE DEPT.
FOREIGN AND
FC 4420
Contents checked for transfer to
DRO
(Sgd.).
Date
COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE
вс 10%!
FAR
EASTERN
ANNEX
FILE No. FEC 13 G/L (Part.
TITLE:
CHINA.
(Part.........
FOREIGN FARR PENDANTS. IN:
A
ANTHONY GREX
REFER TO
REFER TO
<p> <span></span></p><!--more--><p></p>
REFER TO
NAME
TO
DATE
(and dept, where necessary) SEE:
NA (and djipt, whefe Messary) SEE:
|
DATE
NAME
TO
DATE
(and dept, where necessary) SEE:
ANNEX
DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
PART.
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. Or PA
>
mol H Th
CLOSED UNTIL
2000
Registry Address
RM 271,
KC
ST.
FGO
SECURITY ONANING
N.B. The gra
UPGRAD
INGI. The prauką focament contained in
of this jacket maar The
ing tip mat
that of the highest graded affixed when
TOP SECRET
ver necessary)
YEAR STAMP
1968/9
Stock No.FC4420
DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.
YEAR
1963/9
STAMP
SECURITY, GRADING
N.8.
UPG
NUB. The ra
Jaciment cantered in
..
ke uḥ ved when form nece any
TOP SECRET
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH DEPT.
OFFICE
Contents checked
for transfer to
(Sgd.).
Date
FAR EASTERN
FILE No. FEC130/1 TITLE: CHINA
....--
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN:
D.R.O.
ANNEX. (Part .)
ANTHONY GREY.
REFER TO
NAME (and dept, when necessary)
#LI
REE.
FB. Reg
REFER TO
.. P..~~.-1
- -
12. -‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒JOLLLLONLINIILLL
REFER TO
NAME
-1Hו11י
TO SEE:
DATE
NAME
(and dept when necessary)
TO SEE:
DATE
(and daps, when necessary)
TO SEE:
DATE
1.6.
Ico Mr W
ICE
352
1840
2/2
The Conte
779
LLL
JB 4/4 23
Rag Ico 119
مع
1264 100
- - -
Afr
121323|24|1
Mr Wiland 227
ArAnny.
Mmmm
FITIM. T.
1. Amay
haka..
Rez
Teo (348)
The
M.
JUI
Registong
JB.
Qu JB
J3
JB
J.B.
JB
-JB
HEILU L
252
T IN
I
JB
Mr Wilso
Mr Murray HIC на деня
PUST
PARA LILI
MINI-L'
متا
ايام
340 340 in My Muning
26/24
400, 5.3
417
13
561/17/4
6.42 2.5
+
6.3"
4274 14.5 805804 305
B.
My JB
--
177
Gin94272
------יוני
23+
z=2
Anxhalian 930 19
Родив
Z
Registry Address
Rm. 271,
.IIIIILI
Bold La
K.CW. Fo.
FECBC/1
ANNEX
PART
FILE No.
SEC
N.B.
UPC
Ry
NA
The rating at aku
GRAZI
TOP SECRET
i
L' out of the highest geneleć
LI
YEAR STAMP
1968/9
FEE 134/1
TOP SECRET
Far Eastern Department,
Jhonist
1 August, 1969
Anthony Grey
907
Your telegram No. 2115 of 25 July mentioned the remarks of the Secretary
of State on the difficulty of arranging an exchange for Anthony Grey.
You will subsequently have seen these remarks in full in our telegram
No. 250. You may well have wondered whether we were about to strip the
vell from our covert channel to the Chinese in Hong Kong and from the
discussions that have taken place through it. This is not the intention,
By agreement with the Governor of Hong Kong we have been referring the
curious to Mr. George Brown's letter of 1967 to Chen Yi and to
subsequent official exchanges in Peking. No mention is being made (other
than to Mr. Gerald Long of Reuters) of the covert channel. is a slight
form of cheating, but necessary.
This
2. I enelose copies of two submissions of 23 and 31 July to give you
some idea of how we are trying to conduct the defence.
(J. D. I. Boyd)
x. M. Wilford, Esq., C.M.G.
WASHINGTON,
*-who already komink
TOF SECRET
934
233
TOP SECRET
thanks
14 AUG 1969
bany
Sir S. Tomlinson
A Wilgo.r.
I 1918
COVERT CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES
THROUGH HONG KONG
From my submissions on the case of Mr. Anthony Grey,
the detained Reuters correspondent in Peking, you will
already be aware of the existence of a covert channel to
the Chinese authorities on the mainland through Hong Kong.
This may be the moment to set out what we know at greater
length.
2. The go-between in Hong Kong is a local businessman of
Chinese race, K. C. Jay. He has acted as a point of
contact between ourselves and the Chinese authorities on
the mainland for a number of years. He is regularly in
touch with Mr. Jack Cater of the Hong Kong Trade and
Development Council, a career Civil Servant of the Hong Kong
Government on detached duty. The following is a brief
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the use
of this channel.
Advantages
3. It is clearly useful to have a point of contact in
Hong Kong with the mainland authorities through whom messages
of a practical, and occasionally of a political character,
can be passed. There is of course already one such point
of contact.
The principal representation of the mainland
interest in the Colony ie, as in many parts of the world,
- 1 -
TOP SECRET
930
TOP SECRET
the New China News Agency.
Business of a practical
nature has often to be conducted through this body.
However, the N.C.N.A. has tried for many years to acquire
a quasi-consular position as the spokesman of "progressive"
Chinese elements in the Colony vis-à-vis the Hong Kong
Government and all business conducted through the N.C.N.A.,
treated as the interlocuteur valable of the Chinese
Government in the Colony, tends inevitably to enhance the
public standing of the organisation. This, for obvious
reasons, we are anxious to discourage. Jay's first value
therefore is that he provides an alternative to the N.C.N.A.
4. Jay's second point of value is that he is deniable.
The Hong Kong public do not know that he is a channel to the
mainland and arrangements reached through him have the
advantage that they remain without official character unless
the Hong Kong Government decides otherwise. An example of
this function is offered by the case of Mr. Grey.
It was
possible to conduct with Peking a form of flexible negotiation
over Mr. Grey (albeit unsuccessful) which could not be done
through more orthodox channels, for fear of the consequences
for public confidence in Hong Kong. Such a negotiation
would be much more difficult to conduct through the diplomatic
channel in Peking (or in London) where, given the nature of
relations between officials on our side and their Chinese
counterparts, it would have to proceed by rigidly formal
steps, and where bargaining might in effect be ruled out by
- 2 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Chinese unwillingness to be dislodged from any position
which they had formally taken up.
Disadvantages
5.
The disadvantages of the Jay channel are, however, considerable. First,
like many such go-betweens, he has
a tendency to want to be all things to all men. Not content with passing
messages to us from the Chinese authorities, he is unable to refrain
from embellishing them with personal philosophy and advice and it is
often difficult to disentangle the two strands. A second functional
disadvantage is his
reluctance to work to one master alone on the Chinese side. Jay works in
the first instance to the Kanager of the Bank of China in Hong Kong, who
is known to be a competent and responsible official enjoying the
confidence of the Peking authorities. However, Jay also claims to carry
on a personal correspondence with Chou En-lai's private secretary in
Peking. Based on this latter correspondence he produces assessments of
the balance of forces among the leaders in Peking (on the lines of
"extremists" versus "moderates") which sometimes look like playbacks of
assessments by Western "China-watchera" and consequently liable to be
misleading; seem designed deliberately to make our flesh creep and hurry
us into concessions.
The Balance
and which sometimes
6. Thus there must be reservations about the reliability of this
channel. Nevertheless, we know from discussions last
- 3 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
year that the Governor of Hong Kong has a ome faith in
Jay. And our friends, whose experience of Jay goes back
some years, have in the past found him to be a reliable
contact. I myself favour the continuing use of the channel
provided we remember what we are doing; we must continue to
treat Jay's messages from China with a large pinch of salt and
set out the messages we wish to have conveyed back in a form
that is entirely unambiguous. If the Chinese attempt to
set a price (in terms of the release of prisoners in Hong
Kong) on the British subjects, other than Mr. Grey, still in
detention in China, we may be glad of Jay's services, if only
to try to head the Chinese off.
Recent Exchanges
7.
Meanwhile the continuing conversations between Jay and
Er. Jack Cater provide a certain insight into the thoughts
and neuroses of the Chinese leadership vis-à-vis Hong Kong.
8. Mr. Cater's report of 20 June provides good examples
of mainland thinking. In this conversation Jay purports to
express mainland preoccupations about the next incumbent of
the governorship of Hong Kong and about the next Colonial
Secretary. This simply confirms yet again the anxiety of
the Chinese of which we have always been aware that these
posts should not fall into other than British handa. (It is
simply a detailed reflexion of the Chinese anxiety that
nothing should ever happen that might contribute towards a
change of constitutional status for the Colony whether it
1
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
be self-government, independence or some form of
internationalised status.) Jay then goes on to set out
i.e.
the communist attitude to Hong Kong,/that the communists have
no love at all for capitalist economics as such and would
dearly love to undermine the Hong Kong administration, but
that in practice they find Hong Kong too valuable in its
present form, both economically and politically, to upset
the applecart; and that they are less likely to change their
mind if they continue to see that we ourselves are prepared to
use considerable firmness to keep the applecart upright.
Jay comments interestingly that the date of 1997, when our
lease on the New Territories expires, "really means nothing".
We have already written to the Political Adviser in Hong Kong
asking for an exegesis of this phrase. In particular, we
have asked for an opinion as to whether Jay was speaking on
instructions or simply venturing a personal view. Meanwhile
I would only venture the remark that reassuring words about
1997 from the communists are not necessarily an accurate guide
to their eventual intentions. For one thing, they will no
doubt continue to weigh up the balance of gain and loss that
would accrue from a takeover of the Colony, not to mention
the balance of forces involved at any one time in any test
of wills. Second, there is no interest for the communiste
in taking over a bankrupt Colony and the only way to preserve
prosperity in Hong Kong in the interim is for them to let it
- 5 -
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
be thought that they have no intention of ever taking over.
9. Finally, Jay refers to the possible repercussions for
Hong Kong of recognition of China by the United States.
Here we are up against a hypothetical situation. Factors
that would modify Jay's warning are the question of physical
facilities (1.e. whether the Chinese can develop Shanghai as
a viable alternative to the splendid port of Hong Kong) and
whether or not United States big business decides to continue
to use Hong Kong as its base for the China trade or to abandon
it. I do not think we need let ourselves be too alarmed at
this stage by Jay's predictions.
г
Jams Manay
(James Murray)
12 August, 1969.
Copies to: Sir L. Monson o.r.
Mr. Wilford
Mr. Carter O..
P.U.S.D.
K.C. Panerus O.SE. 3/3/70
· 6 -
TOP SECRET
(111291) D4. 391599 - 1,300 2,00 Hw.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
ÈCURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential
Restricted.
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
-----~ ~➖➖➖ ➖➖➖ ➖ ➖➖ ➖ ➖➖➖ ➖ ➖➖ ➖
In Confidence
TOP SECRET
DRAFT Submission
Type 1 +
From
To:-
Sus Tomlins
James Murray
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
се би
a Su So Monsmo.f.
Mo Wilfork My Chutnat
DUST)
Weis regrimey m Fimm with Me Jack
Calen
7
Huy
Deve
The Hig
Kary
COVERT CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES THROUGH
HONG KONG
From my submissions on the case of M. Anthony
Grey, the detained Reuters correspondent in Peking, you
will already be aware of the existengé of a covert
channel to the Chinese authorities on the mainland
through Hong Kong. This may be the moment to set out
what we know at greater lengt
2.
a logo husinsman of Carmest rave, The go-between in Hong Kong is/F. K.
C. Jay. He
Hong/Kong
has acted as a point of contact between ourselves and
the Chinese authorities on the mainland for a number of
years. The following is a brief assessment of the
advantages and disadvantages of the use of this channel.
Advantages
3. It is clearly useful to have a point of contact in
Hong Kong with the mainland authorities through whom
messages of a practical, and occasionally of a political
Theme is win onderdry me surt prout Ą contact. character, can be passed.
The principal representation
of the mainland interest in the Colony is, as in many
world D
parts of the lopy, the New China News Agency. the New China News Agency.
Busi-
ness of a practical nature has often to be conducted
through this body.
However, the NCNA/has tried for
many years to acquire a quasi-consular position as the
2
spokesman of "progressive" Chinese elements in the
Colony vis-à-vis the Hong Kong Government and
TOP SECRET
/all
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
P
TOP SECRET
[
all business conducted through the NCNA,
treated as the inten locuteur valable of the
Chinese Government in the Colony, tenda
J
invisibly to enhance the standing of the
and anxam bi duromags organisation. (Jay's first value therefore is
This for Barn remem
Suck a negotiation could be much more to conduct diffrakt Krough the
diftomatic
chussed in taking (at in Lanches) Then, gure
the native of rebutions
bution thein's
site and their Clime
counterparts, it wonce have to prend by rigidly Jamal stake, and when
bangaining might in affet. be
malack and
Chimne
ancellingues to be distadque from any
soitin whisk
Which Key
خدا
Lee formally welfare
eginning
competence?
the comfubues of the Peluing and he writing
arrangem
that he provides an alternative to the NCNA,
Jay's second point of value is that he is
deniable. The Hong Kong public do not know
that he is a channel to the mainland and e-
wts reached through him have the advantage
that they remain without official character
unless the Hong Kong Government decides other-
*/se. An example of this function is offered
Me
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.